1. Whether a use for which private property is taken is public
or private is a judicial question the determination of which is
influenced by local conditions, and this Court, while enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment, should keep in view the diversity of such
conditions, and regard with great respect the judgment of state
courts upon what should be deemed public uses. P.
262 U. S.
705.
2. It is not essential that the entire community, or even a
considerable portion, should directly enjoy an improvement in order
to constitute a public use. P.
262 U. S.
706.
3. A taking of land for a highway extension is a taking for a
public use, even though the extension he wholly within the tract of
a single landowner and terminate at his boundaries and connect with
no public road save at its beginning, if it be susceptible of
present use not only by those gaining access from the highway, but
by persons living on or adjacent to the tract with access by
private ways, and of future use by those living beyond its
terminus, through future road construction. P.
262 U. S.
706.
4. A highway may be legally laid out extending to a state or
county line even though there be at the time no connecting highway
in
Page 262 U. S. 701
the adjoining state or county in reasonable anticipation of
future connections and future public use. P.
262 U. S.
707.
5. Public use of a road is not limited to its use as a mere
business necessity or ordinary convenience, but includes its use as
a scenic highway for the public enjoyment, recreation, and health.
P.
262 U. S.
707.
6. The necessity for appropriating private property for a public
use is a legislative question which may be determined by a
municipality to which the legislature has delegated the power, and
the Fourteenth Amendment does not entitle the owner to a hearing
before the determination is made. P.
262 U. S.
708.
53 Cal. App. 166 affirmed.
Error to judgments of the District Court of Appeal of California
which affirmed judgments condemning private lands as county
highways.
MR. JUSTICE SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This record includes two cases which were tried together in the
state courts and have been heard together here.
The writs of error are brought to review judgments of the
District Court of Appeal affirming judgments of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, California, condemning lands of the
plaintiffs in error for use by the county as public highways, which
they insist have deprived them of their property without due
process of law and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 1]
Page 262 U. S. 702
The two fundamental questions involved are whether the uses for
which these lands have been taken are public uses authorized by law
and whether the taking was necessary to such uses.
Section 1238 of the California Code of Civil Procedure includes
"highways" among the "public uses" for which the right of eminent
domain may be exercised. Section 1241, as amended in 1913, provides
that, before property can be taken, it must appear that the use to
which it is to be applied is one authorized by law and that the
taking is necessary to such use, provided,
inter alia,
that when the legislative body of a county has, by resolution
adopted by vote of two-thirds of its members, found and determined
that the public interest and necessity require the construction by
the county of any proposed public improvement located within its
limits and that designated property is necessary therefor, such
resolution shall be "conclusive evidence" of the public necessity
for such improvement, that such property is necessary therefor, and
that such improvement is located in the manner most compatible with
the greatest public good and the least private injury. Stats. 1913,
p. 549.
The plaintiffs in error are the owners of a large tract of land
lying on the shore of the Pacific Ocean, known as the Malibu Ranch,
extending in an easterly and westerly direction about twenty-two
miles and varying in width from one-half mile to one and one-half
miles. It lies at the base of a high and rugged mountain range
which parallels the shore at a distance of from three to four
miles, its northern line extending along the slope and foothills of
this mountain range, and is traversed by many ridges and
intervening canyons leading from the mountains toward the shore. It
lies about ten miles west of Santa Monica, one of the principal
cities of Los Angeles County, situated on the coast to the
southwest of the City of Los Angeles, and is mainly in Los Angeles
County, but extends
Page 262 U. S. 703
about a mile and a half into Ventura County, the adjoining
county on the west. It is traversed lengthwise by a private road of
the ranch owners which was formerly used by farmers and settlers
living north of the ranch on the slope of the mountains and west of
the ranch in Ventura County, but which has been for several years
closed by the ranch owners to the public. [
Footnote 2]
In 1916 and 1917, the Board of Supervisors, the legislative body
of Los Angeles County, without notice to the ranch owners, adopted,
by the required vote, two resolutions declaring that the public
interest and necessity required the construction of the two
highways now in controversy "for public highway purposes" and that
it was necessary for such "public uses" that the lands included
therein be acquired by the county, and directing that condemnation
proceedings be instituted for such purposes. One of these proposed
highways, which is known in the record as the "main road,"
commences at the eastern boundary of the ranch, where it connects
with and forms a continuation of a much traveled public county
highway running along the shore of the ocean from Santa Monica, and
extends lengthwise through the ranch in a westerly direction to the
Ventura County line, where it terminates within the boundaries of
the ranch. The other is a branch from this main road, extending to
the northern boundary of the ranch, where it terminates. There are
no connecting public roads either at the western termination of the
main road or the northern termination of the branch road.
These condemnation proceedings were thereupon instituted in the
Superior Court of the County. They were
Page 262 U. S. 704
vigorously resisted by the ranch owners, who denied the county's
right of condemnation. Certain special defenses which they
interposed, alleging that the main road would furnish no way of
necessity or convenience for public use or travel, were stricken
out by the court. Upon a preliminary trial as to the right of
condemnation, the trial judge, after the resolutions of the Board
had been introduced in evidence by the county, ruled that, while
they were not conclusive evidence of the matters specified in the
proviso to § 1241 of the Code, they were
prima facie
evidence thereof. And the ranch owners then, without objection or
limitation, introduced a large mass of evidence in support of all
of their defenses, including the matters which had been alleged in
the special defenses that had been stricken out, and a large mass
of rebuttal evidence was then introduced by the county, the
testimony on both sides relating to all the matters which had been
or now are in issue in the cases.
The trial judge reviewed the evidence and, manifestly without
reference to any presumption arising under his ruling as to the
prima facie evidence furnished by the resolutions, decided
all the questions submitted in favor of the county, and made
specific findings that the public interest and necessity required
the acquisition of these public highways; that the use to which
they were to be applied was authorized by law; that they would
afford accommodation to the traveling public, and that they were
located as required. Thereafter, the amount of landowners'
compensation and damages having been determined by a jury, as to
which no question is made, judgments condemning these lands for
public highways were entered.
On appeals taken by the ranch owners, the District Court of
Appeal held that the taking of the property for these highways was
for a public use; that the proviso to § 1241 of the Code was not
obnoxious to any provision of
Page 262 U. S. 705
the state or federal constitutions, and under it the resolutions
were conclusive evidence of the matters specified; that, in any
event, the ranch owners had not been prejudiced by the rulings of
the trial court as to the effect of this proviso, as they had been
permitted to introduce full and complete evidence on these
subjects, and that they had not been prejudiced by the striking out
of their special defenses not only because the resolutions were
conclusive evidence that the taking was necessary, but also because
every material issue tendered by these special defenses was
otherwise raised by the pleadings, and they had been permitted to
offer evidence touching every matter contained therein, and it
thereupon sustained the findings of the trial court and affirmed
the judgments of condemnation.
Los Angeles county v. Rindge
Co., 53 Cal. App. 166.
The ranch owners urge here, in substance, that the use for which
their property was taken was not a public use authorized by law,
and their special defenses raising this question as to the main
road were erroneously stricken out; that their property was taken
without any public necessity, and, the proviso to § 1241 of the
Code purporting to make the resolutions conclusive evidence thereof
being in violation of the state constitution and of the Fourteenth
Amendment and constituting neither conclusive nor
prima
facie evidence, the burden of disproving this public necessity
was erroneously cast upon them, and that, in consequence, the
judgments of condemnation deprived them of their property in
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
1.
Authorized Public Use. The nature of a use, whether
public or private, is ultimately a judicial question. However, the
determination of this question is influenced by local conditions,
and this Court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, should
keep in
Page 262 U. S. 706
view the diversity of such conditions and regard with great
respect the judgments of state courts upon what should be deemed
public uses in any state.
Fallbrook Irrigation District v.
Bradley, 164 U. S. 112,
164 U. S.
158-160;
Hairston v. Danville Railway,
208 U. S. 598,
208 U. S.
606-607. That a taking of property for a highway is a
taking for public use has been universally recognized from time
immemorial. The California Code specifically declares "highways" to
be "public uses" for which the right of eminent domain may be
exercised. Here, the Board of Supervisors, familiar with local
conditions, has declared these highways to be for public uses, and
the local and appellate state courts have likewise held them to be
for public uses authorized by law.
The ranch owners concede that a genuine highway, in fact adapted
as a way of convenience or necessity for public use and travel, is
a public use. Their real contention is that these particular roads,
while called highways, are "highways" in name merely -- that is,
that they are shams under the name of public improvements, which
cannot, in fact furnish ways of convenience or necessity to the
traveling public. This argument is based upon the fact that they
extend through the ranch alone, the main road terminating within
its boundaries, and connect with no other public roads at their
western and northern ends. These roads will, however, be open to
the general public to such extent as it can and may use it. The
people to the eastward in Santa Monica, Los Angeles, and other
cities will have access to them and to the people living on the
ranch through the connecting road from Santa Monica. The people
living on the ranch will have egress over them. The people living
north of the terminus of the crossroad, who now have no adequate
outlet, will have access to it through private roads and ways, and
may then travel over these two roads to Los Angeles and other
cities for marketing produce and other purposes, and the
Page 262 U. S. 707
people in these cities will have reciprocal access to them for
purposes of trade and otherwise. It is not essential that the
entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should
directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to
constitute a public use.
Fallbrook Irrigation District v.
Bradley, supra, p.
164 U. S. 161.
In like manner, if Ventura County should hereafter extend the main
road to the western end of the ranch, the people living beyond it,
who now have no practical outlet, would be furnished a similar
means of egress, with reciprocal ingress to them by the people
living in the cities to the east. A highway can be legally laid out
terminating at a state line even though there be no connecting
highway in the adjoining state and no definite official action has
been taken to establish such connection highway; otherwise, great
embarrassment and difficulty would be experienced in establishing
highways across state lines.
Rice v. Rindge, 53 N.H. 530,
531. So as to county highways. Public road systems, it is manifest,
must frequently be constructed in installments, especially where
adjoining counties are involved. In determining whether the taking
of property is necessary for public use, not only the present
demands of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in
the future may be considered.
Central Pacific Railway v.
Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 309.
But, aside from these considerations, these roads, especially
the main road, through its connection with the public road coming
along the shore from Santa Monica, will afford a highway for
persons desiring to travel along the shore to the county line, with
a view of the ocean on the one side and of the mountain range on
the other, constituting, as stated by the trial judge, a scenic
highway of great beauty. Public uses are not limited, in the modern
view, to matters of mere business necessity and ordinary
convenience, but may extend to matters of public health,
recreation, and enjoyment. Thus, the condemnation
Page 262 U. S. 708
of lands for public parks is now universally recognized as a
taking for public use.
Shoemaker v. United States,
147 U. S. 282,
147 U. S. 297.
A road need not be for a purpose of business to create a public
exigency; air, exercise, and recreation are important to the
general health and welfare; pleasure travel may be accommodated as
well as business travel, and highways may be condemned to places of
pleasing natural scenery.
Higginson v. Nahant, 11 Allen
(Mass.) 530, 536. The Riverside Drive in New York is as essentially
a highway for public use as Broadway; the Speedway in this city as
Pennsylvania Avenue. And manifestly, in these days of general
public travel in motor cars for health and recreation, such a
highway as this, extending for more than twenty miles along the
shores of the Pacific at the base of a range of mountains, must be
regarded as a public use.
For these reasons, we conclude that these highways will, as
found by the trial judge, afford accommodation to the traveling
public, and that the taking of land for them is a taking for a
public use authorized by the laws of California.
The ranch owners were not prejudiced by the action of the trial
court in striking out their special defenses in this behalf, since,
under the general issues, they were entitled, as held by the
District Court of Appeal, and were in fact permitted, to introduce
all their evidence bearing upon this question.
2.
Public necessity for the taking. We necessarily
accept as a matter of state law the holding of the District Court
of Appeal that the proviso to § 1241 of the Code made the
resolutions of the Board of Supervisors conclusive evidence as to
the necessity of taking these particular highways and the other
matters therein specified. So construed it, was held by that court
not to be objectionable to any provision of the state or federal
constitutions. By this we are controlled so far as the
provisions
Page 262 U. S. 709
of the state constitutions are concerned.
Fallbrook
Irrigation District v. Bradley, supra, p.
164 U. S. 155;
Georgia Railway v. Town of Decatur, ante, 262 U. S. 432.
And, so construed, this statute is not in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment either because it fails to provide for a
hearing by the landowners before such resolution is adopted or
otherwise. The necessity for appropriating private property for
public use is not a judicial question. This power resides in the
legislature, and may either be exercised by the legislature or
delegated by it to public officers.
"Where the intended use is public, the necessity and expediency
of the taking may be determined by such agency and in such mode as
the state may designate. They are legislative questions no matter
who may be charged with their decision, and a hearing thereon is
not essential to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57,
251 U. S.
58.
"That the necessity and expediency of taking property for public
use is a legislative, and not a judicial, question is not open to
discussion. . . . Neither is it any longer open to question in this
Court that the legislature may confer upon a municipality the
authority to determine such necessity for itself. . . . The
question is purely political, does not require a hearing, and is
not the subject of judicial inquiry."
Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, ante,
262 U. S. 668. And
clearly the fact that the resolutions are made conclusive evidence
by the statute only when adopted by a two-thirds vote and as
applied to an improvement lying within the county does not
constitute an unjust or unreasonable classification.
And, since the resolutions were conclusive evidence as to the
necessity for the taking of these public highways, the ranch owners
were not prejudiced by the ruling of the trial judge which treated
them as
prima facie evidence merely, and allowed them full
opportunity to introduce their evidence upon the subject. A
litigant can
Page 262 U. S. 710
be heard to question the validity of a statute only when and
insofar as it is applied to his disadvantage.
Dahnke-Walker Co.
v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282,
257 U. S.
289.
We therefore conclude that the property of the ranch owners has
been taken for highways constituting a public use authorized by
law, and upon a public necessity for the taking duly established,
and that they have not been deprived of their property in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgments of the district court of
Appeal are accordingly
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
After these judgments of affirmance, petitions to have the cases
heard and determined by the Supreme Court of California were denied
by that court.
[
Footnote 2]
There has been much litigation between the ranch owners and the
county and federal authorities as to the public use of roads and
ways across this ranch, in which, prior to these proceedings, the
ranch owners have been successful. In this litigation are
United States v. Rindge, 208 F. 611, and
People v.
Rindge, 174 Cal. 743.