Section 10 of the Lever Act grants jurisdiction to the district
court of an action against the United States to recover the
difference between what the government has paid the plaintiff as
just compensation for property requisitioned under that section and
what the plaintiff, alleging that the payment was accepted under
protest, because of duress, and with express reservation of the
right to demand more, claims to be just compensation. P.
262 U. S.
364.
Reversed.
Error to a judgment of the district court dismissing, for want
of jurisdiction, an action under the Lever Act to recover the
difference between what the government paid the plaintiff as just
compensation in full for property requisitioned and a larger amount
which, plaintiff alleged, was the true value.
Page 262 U. S. 364
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This cause went off below on motion to dismiss the petition, and
the record presents a question of jurisdiction only. Judicial Code,
§ 238. Did the district court have authority to hear and determine
the issues tendered by plaintiff in error? The point is not free
from difficulty, but, after considering the contending views, we
conclude there was jurisdiction, and that the judgment to the
contrary must be reversed.
Purporting to proceed under authority granted by § 10
* of the Lever
Act, approved August 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276, the President,
acting through the Secretary of the Navy, requisitioned coal
belonging to the plaintiff in error and paid therefor $4 per ton,
just compensation as ascertained by him. Alleging that this was
received under protest, because of duress, and with express
reservation
Page 262 U. S. 365
of the right to demand more, the coal company instituted the
original action to recover the difference between the amount
received and what it claimed to be just compensation. The court
held that § 10 did not grant permission to sue the United States
therein to one who has received the amount determined by the
President for requisitioned articles, and that it lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues which the petition
presented.
The Lever Act was passed in view of the constitutional provision
inhibiting the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. It vested the President with extraordinary
powers over the property of individuals which might be exercised
through an agent at any place within the confines of the Union,
with many consequent hardships. As heretofore pointed out,
United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.
S. 547, by deliberate purpose, the different sections of
the act provide varying remedies for owners -- some in the district
courts and some in the Court of Claims.
It reasonably may be assumed that Congress intended the remedy
provided by each section should be adequate fairly to meet the
exigencies consequent upon contemplated action thereunder, and thus
afford complete protection to the rights of owners. Considering
this purpose and the attending circumstances, we think § 10 should
be so construed as to give the district courts jurisdiction of
those controversies which arise directly out of requisitions
authorized by that section.
Reversed.
*
"Sec. 10. That the President is authorized, from time to time,
to requisition foods, feeds, fuels, and other supplies necessary to
the support of the army or the maintenance of the navy, or any
other public use connected with the common defense, and to
requisition, or otherwise provide, storage facilities for such
supplies, and he shall ascertain and pay a just compensation
therefor. If the compensation so determined be not satisfactory to
the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid
seventy-five percentum of the amount so determined by the
President, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to
recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five percentum
will make up such amount as will be just compensation for such
necessaries or storage space, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred
on the United States district courts to hear and determine all such
controversies:
Provided, that nothing in this section or
in the section that follows shall be construed to require any
natural person to furnish to the government any necessaries held by
him and reasonably required for consumption or use by himself and
dependents, nor shall any person, firm, corporation, or association
be required to furnish to the government any seed necessary to the
seeding of land owned, leased, or cultivated by them."