The objection that a tax on a special class of persons and
property for a public purpose by which they are not benefited is a
taking of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the general income tax of
Massachusetts (Acts, 1916, c. 269, §§ 2, 5(b), as amended, 1919, c.
324, § 1) and use of funds so derived (Acts, 1919, c. 363) to
reimburse cities and towns for increase of educational salaries. P.
260 U. S.
14.
237 Mass. 493 affirmed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts dismissing a petition for mandamus.
Page 260 U. S. 14
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Massachusetts, taxes of a kind that used to be imposed by the
cities and towns now are imposed and collected by the Commonwealth
and afterwards distributed to the cities and towns to be expended
for various public purposes. In this way are collected and
distributed, with necessary exceptions, taxes upon the interest
from debts, dividends from stock and from partnerships, Gen.Acts
1916, c. 269, § 2, and upon the excess over $2,000 per annum of
income derived from professions and business, again with necessary
exceptions,
id., § 5(
b), both as amended.
Dane v. Jackson, 256 U. S. 589. The
latter tax, under § 5(
b), was increased one percent for
the years 1918 and 1919 by an Act of 1919, c. 324, § 1. The
validity of these taxes
per se is not disputed. They make
a comprehensive income tax. But, by an Act of 1919, c. 363, the
Treasurer and Receiver General is directed to set
Page 260 U. S. 15
aside and pay over to the cities and towns from the proceeds of
the income tax a sum sufficient to reimburse them for specified
increases of salaries of school teachers, supervisors,
superintendents, and the like. Thereupon the plaintiff in error, a
taxpayer, brought this suit, a petition for mandamus, to prevent
the respondent from paying over as directed, contending that the
Act of 1919, c. 363, imposed a public charge upon a special class
of property and persons not specially benefited by the services,
and for that reason was a taking of property without due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Judicial
Court, waiving questions of procedure, held that the income tax was
a general tax; that the proceeds of the tax became part of the
general funds of the state; that these funds could be expended for
education, and that there was no appropriation of such a character
as to make the tax a special tax for a special purpose or use. The
petition was dismissed.
We see no reason for not accepting the views taken by the
Supreme Judicial Court. The plaintiff in error asks us to connect
the increase of the tax for two years by the Act of 1919, c. 324,
with the reimbursement directed by c. 363, which he assails. This
cannot be done, especially not for the purpose of attributing to
the legislature an attempt to achieve by indirection a result
supposed to be beyond its power. The reimbursement from the general
funds of the Commonwealth was lawful, and to make it, the funds
must be provided. The fact that the end was contemplated, if it
was, in this particular increase, is no more than was necessary in
some form to bring about the result.
Judgment affirmed.