A decision of a state court, denying a carrier's right to make a
charge for refrigerator cars not provided for in tariffs filed at
the stations where the shipments originated, and based wholly on an
interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act and the rules of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, without questioning their validity,
does not deny the validity of an authority exercised under the
United States, and is therefore not reviewable by writ of error
under § 237, Jud.Code, as amended. P.
258 U. S.
80.
Writ of error to review 145 Minn. 108 dismissed.
Error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
which denied the right of a carrier to recover charges for
refrigerator cars employed in interstate shipments.
Page 258 U. S. 78
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error, as receiver of the Missouri, Kansas &
Texas Railway Company, brought suit against J. C. Famechon Company
in the Municipal Court of the City of Minneapolis to recover for
charges for rental of refrigerator
Page 258 U. S. 79
cars used in shipping potatoes in 1914 and 1915 from various
points in Minnesota over connecting lines to points in Oklahoma and
Texas. The initial carriers were the Northern Pacific and Great
Northern Railways, and the terminal carrier the Missouri, Kansas
& Texas Railway Company, for which plaintiff in error was
receiver. The terminal carrier received the potatoes, delivered
them at their destinations, and collected from the shipper in
excess of the regular line haul rate the sum of $5 for the use of
each refrigerator car in four shipments in 1915. Upon one
refrigerator car, shipped in 1914, the excess was not collected.
Famechon Company made claim against the railway company for an
overcharge of $5 on each of the four shipments so made in 1915. The
railway company refunded $20 to Famechon Company, for which sum the
receiver brought suit, claiming the refund was made by mistake and
through a misunderstanding of the tariff and schedules; he also
brought suit to recover $5 rental for the refrigerator car shipped
in 1914.
Famechon Company, in its answer, put in issue the allegations of
the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for the rental paid on two
cars shipped in 1916. In the Municipal Court of Minneapolis,
defendant in error had judgment for $10, with interest and costs,
and the receiver for the railway company appealed to the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, which affirmed the judgment, 145 Minn. 108. A
writ of error was allowed bringing the case to this Court.
From the facts found by the Supreme Court of Minnesota and shown
by evidence and stipulation, it appears that the established
freight rate on potatoes in carloads from points of origin to
points of destination, named in the pleadings, was contained in
tariffs known as "Southwestern Lines' Tariffs." These tariffs were
subject to the "Southwestern Lines' Classifications, Exceptions
and
Page 258 U. S. 80
Rules Circulars." Neither such circular nor the Southwestern
Lines' Tariffs was on file or published at any of the stations of
origin of shipment, but they were on file in certain designated
offices of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Railways in
Minneapolis and St. Paul, and at various points in other states. At
the time the shipments were made, Western Trunk Line Circular No.
12, specifically referred to in Southwestern Lines'
Classifications, Exceptions and Rules, was on file at the points of
origin of shipment and destination, and it was the only tariff
issued by any of the carriers participating in the transportation
of the shipments in question which contained a $5 rental provision
for refrigerator cars; that circular was printed and filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and contained a rule to the effect
that, when the shipper ordered a refrigerator or other insulated
car to be heated by him or to move without heat, a charge of $5 per
car per trip would be made for use of car, which would accrue to
the owner thereof.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota recited the provisions of § 6 of
the Interstate Commerce Act, 34 Stat. 586, requiring the filing of
rates and charges with the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
posting thereof at stations, and the rule of the Interstate
Commerce Commission adopted June 2, 1908, requiring the filing of
rates and schedules, and held that the additional charges could not
be collected under that statute and rule because neither the
Southwestern Lines' Tariffs nor the Southwestern Lines'
Classification, Exceptions and Rules Circulars making reference to
Circular No. 12 were on file at the point of origin of shipment,
and that there were no tariffs on file at such point to which
shippers could refer to ascertain the rates of transportation.
The case is brought here by writ of error. We are of opinion
that we cannot acquire jurisdiction by that
Page 258 U. S. 81
method under § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act of
September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726. Counsel for plaintiff in error
contends that a writ of error is the proper method of review
because there was drawn in question the validity of an authority
exercised under the United States, and that the effect of the state
supreme court decision was to deny such validity. The argument is
that the Interstate Commerce Act confers on carriers the right to
receive the revenues defined in the tariffs, and is a command with
penalties that carriers collect those revenues, and that, as the
decision turns on the issue directly raised, and necessarily
involved whether the tariff was or was not valid, there was drawn
in question the validity of an authority exercised under the United
States; that the question really decided by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota was not the interpretation of the tariff nor the extent
or nature of the rights claimed under it, but the validity of a
tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. But we cannot
accept this contention.
We have recently had occasion to consider the meaning of the
phrase "validity of an authority" as used in § 237 of the Judicial
Code as amended September 6, 1916.
Jett Brothers Distilling Co.
v. City of Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1,
252 U. S. 6, and
cases cited. We held that the validity of an authority was drawn in
question when the power to create it is fairly open to denial, and
is denied. In that case, we cited with approval the same conclusion
reached by this Court in its opinion rendered by Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller in
Baltimore & Potomac Railway Co. v. Hopkins,
130 U. S. 210. We
see no occasion to depart from that definition of the phrase.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not
question the federal power to enact the statute as to rates with
its requirements concerning the filing and posting thereof, nor the
authority of the Interstate Commerce
Page 258 U. S. 82
Commission to make the rule quoted in its opinion. What the
court did was to so interpret the statute and rule as to render
essential the filing of the tariffs at stations at the points of
origin of shipment. Such interpretation, whether right or wrong,
did not involve the validity of an authority exercised under the
United States, and the review in this Court should have been sought
by a petition for writ of certiorari.
The writ of error must be
Dismissed.