A postal employee of the United States, injured while in the
performance of his duty on a railroad operated at the time by the
Director General of Railroads under the Federal Control Act, c. 25,
40 Stat. 451, and who elected to accept, and received, compensation
therefor under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, c. 458, 39
Stat. 742, was thereby debarred from an action against the Director
General for negligence causing the injury. P.
258 U. S.
428.
267 F. 105 affirmed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals
reversing a judgment of the district court for the present
petitioner in his action for damages against John Barton Payne, as
Director General of Railroads. James C. Davis, successor of Mr.
Payne as Director General, was substituted as respondent by order
of this Court, he having been designated by the President as agent
for the defense of such actions under § 206 of the Transportation
Act, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461.
Page 258 U. S. 427
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, a railway mail clerk in the employ of the United
States, was injured on May 29, 1918, when the car in which he was
working was wrecked on the line of the Illinois Central Railroad,
then being operated by the Director General of Railroads under the
Federal Control Act of March 21, 1918, c. 25, 40 Stat. 451. He
brought this suit to recover for his injuries against the Illinois
Central Railroad Company and the Director General of Railroads, but
the former was dismissed from the case on demurrer. Among other
defenses, the Director General of Railroads alleged in his answer
that the petitioner, as an employee of the United States, had made
application for, and pursuant to its provisions had been paid,
compensation under the provisions of the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (39 Stat. 742), and that thereby this further
action, which is, in effect, against the United States, was barred.
A demurrer to this last defense was sustained, and the petitioner
obtained a verdict on which the district court entered judgment. On
error, this judgment was reversed by the circuit court of appeals,
that court holding that the petitioner had his option under the law
to apply for compensation under the Employees' Compensation Act, as
he did, or to sue for damages under the Federal Control Act (c. 25,
40 Stat. 451), and that, by electing to accept the benefits of the
former, he was barred from prosecuting this action for negligence
against the United States under the latter.
Thus, the writ of certiorari brings up for review the question
whether, when a government employee, injured on a railroad,
operated at the time by the Director General
Page 258 U. S. 428
of Railroads, had elected to accept payment under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act, he was thereby barred from prosecuting
a suit against the Director General of Railroads for negligence
causing the injury for which he had been compensated.
James C. Davis, the Agent designated by the President under §
206 of the Transportation Act of 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, has
been substituted for the Director General of Railroads as
respondent.
It was definitely held in
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Ault, 256 U. S. 554,
that at all of the times here involved, § 10 of the Federal Control
Act permitted the government, through its Director General of
Railroads, to be sued for any injury negligently caused on any line
of railway in his custody, precisely as a common carrier
corporation operating such road might have been sued, and that
recovery, if any, would be from the United States.
Thus, plainly the petitioner had the right to sue the Director
General of Railroads for negligently injuring him, and, if
successful, his recovery must have been from the United States.
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act, approved September 7,
1916, c. 458, 39 Stat. p. 742, provides that the United States
shall thereafter pay, as therein specified, for the disability or
death of any government employee resulting from personal injury
sustained while in the performance of his duty. The act provides
for a commission to investigate claims and to make awards, but no
compensation may be allowed to any person unless he, or someone in
his behalf, shall make written claim therefor. Thus, the
petitioner, injured as he was while in the performance of his duty,
was entitled to compensation under the act upon making claim for
it.
This reference to the two acts shows that the petitioner had two
remedies, each for the same wrong, and both against the United
States, and therefore the question for decision takes the form --
may the petitioner, after having pursued one of his remedies to a
conclusion and payment,
Page 258 U. S. 429
pursue the other for a second satisfaction of the same wrong
against the government.
That this question must be answered in the negative we think
clear from various provisions in the Compensation Act showing that
Congress intended that payments made under it should be regarded as
full and final, and that no payment in addition thereto would be
made by the government to an injured employee.
Section 7 of the act specifically declares that, so long as any
employee is receiving installment payments under the act, or if he
has been paid a lump sum in commutation of installment payments
then until the expiration of the period during which installment
payments would have continued, "he shall not receive from the
United States any salary, pay, or remuneration whatsoever except in
return for services actually performed," and except pensions for
service in the Army or Navy.
It would be difficult to frame a clearer declaration than this
that no payment would be made by the government for injuries
received other than as provided for in the act.
Section 26 provides
"that, if an injury or death for which compensation is payable
under this act is caused under circumstances creating a legal
liability upon some person
other than the United States to
pay damages therefor,"
the Commission may require an assignment to it of the right to
enforce such liability or to share in any money received in
satisfaction thereof, or it may require the beneficiary to
prosecute an action for damages in his own name. Refusal to make
such assignment or to prosecute such action, when requested by the
Commission, shall forfeit all right to compensation. This section
also provides that, if the commission shall realize on such claim
against third persons, either by suit or settlement, it shall apply
the net proceeds to reimbursing the "Employees' Compensation Fund"
for payments
Page 258 U. S. 430
theretofore made, and any surplus remaining shall be paid to the
beneficiary and credited on future compensation payable for the
same injury. If the amount of recovery exceeded the payments made
and to be made, obviously the beneficiary would be entitled to the
excess.
Section 27 also provides for cases in which death or injury for
which compensation is payable under the act is caused under
circumstances "creating a legal liability in some person other than
the United States to pay damages," but in which the beneficiary,
instead of the Commission, receives the proceeds of suit or
settlement. Here, it is required that such beneficiary shall refund
to the United States from such proceeds the amount of any
compensation that has been paid to him by the government, or shall
credit the money so received upon any compensation payable to him
for the same injury.
Plainly, by these two sections, Congress deals with the
liability of persons "other than the United States" to employees
entitled to compensation under the act not for the purpose of
increasing that compensation, but for the purpose of reimbursing
the government for payments made and of indemnifying it against
other amounts payable in the future. The sections emphasize the
disposition to treat the compensation provided for as adequate for
the injuries received, and they negative any intention on the part
of the government to make further payments.
But § 41 is even more convincing to the point we are
considering. A special proviso in this section declares that, if
the injury or death for which compensation is payable under the act
is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in the
Panama Railroad Company to pay damage therefor, "no compensation
shall be payable until the person" shall release to the Railroad
Company any right of action he may have against it or until he
assigns to the United States any rights
Page 258 U. S. 431
which he may have to share in any money or other property
received in satisfaction of such liability.
When the Compensation Act was passed, the United States was the
owner of all the capital stock of the Panama Railroad Company, and,
as such, was ultimately liable for the torts of that company just
as it became liable for the torts of the Director General of
Railroads under the Federal Control Act, and therefore this manner
of dealing with the liability of that company to employees
negligently injured is highly persuasive as to the congressional
intent.
This Compensation Act is the expression of a slowly developed
purpose on the part of the United States (1908 -- 35 Stat. 556;
1912 -- 37 Stat. 74; 1916 -- 39 Stat. 742) to give compensation to
its employees, who otherwise would be without remedy when injured
by fault of the government, and the provisions of it which we have
discussed convince us that the congressional purpose was that, when
the compensation was accepted no further payment should be made by
the government. The act does not contemplate or provide for suits
against the government. On the contrary, it is essentially an act
of justice or of grace on the part of the United States,
elaborately and carefully worked out and designed to compensate
promptly, without litigation or expense, all employees injured
while in discharge of duty in an amount, which, on the average, was
thought adequate and just. The amount of the award in each case is
determined by a specially constituted commission, without cost to
the claimant, and it is allowed wholly without regard to the
negligence of the government or its employees.
On the other hand, the right to sue the United States under the
Federal Control Act, applicable to all persons alike, is on the
basis of negligence, precisely as if the government were an
operating common carrier corporation,
Page 258 U. S. 432
and it is subject to all of the expense, delay, and hazard usual
in cases of that character. The Compensation Act deals only with,
and confers rights only upon, employees of the government, who must
necessarily be but a small percentage of those authorized to sue
under the Federal Control Act, and it is impossible for us to
conclude that Congress intended by the enactment of the latter law
to allow an employee to claim and receive the compensation
specially provided for him under the former, and then, while
enjoying that benefit, to institute suit against the government
under the Federal Control Act, which might require it to make
further payment for the same injury and which must in all cases
subject it to expensive, harassing, and often long protracted
litigation.
We find no language in the Federal Control Act inconsistent with
the distinct expression of purpose on the part of Congress which we
have found in the Compensation Act, to treat the payments under it
as sufficient and final, and, for the reasons stated in the
discussion herein of the latter act, and because the petitioner
elected to pursue to payment the remedy given him thereunder, we
agree with the circuit court of appeals that his right of action
asserted in this case was barred and the judgment of that court is
therefore
Affirmed.