1. In a proceeding in habeas corpus on behalf of a person
imprisoned under sentence of a court-martial, the inquiry must be
limited to the jurisdiction of the court-martial over the offense
charged and the punishment inflicted. P.
258 U. S.
418.
2. To sustain the jurisdiction of a court-martial in a
collateral attack by habeas corpus, the facts essential to it
existence must appear. P.
258 U. S.
418.
3. Taking property "from the presence of" another feloniously
and by putting him in fear is equivalent to taking it from his
personal protection, and is, in law, a taking from the person -- a
robbery, as defined by § 284 of the Criminal Code. P
258 U. S.
419.
Page 258 U. S. 417
4. It is not necessary that a charge in court-martial
proceedings should be framed with the technical precision of a
common law indictment. P.
258 U. S.
420.
5. In habeas corpus, objections to a court-martial trial which
are mere conclusions not supported by the record or concern merely
errors in the admission of testimony cannot be considered. P.
258 U. S.
420.
Affirmed.
Appeal from an order of the district court sustaining a demurrer
to a petition for habeas corpus and refusing the writ.
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In February, 1920, Roy Marshall, a private in the United States
Army, serving at Vladivostok, Siberia, was tried for robbery by a
court martial there convened, was found guilty, and was sentenced
to imprisonment in the penitentiary at McNeil's Island.
Seven months later, when Marshall was at the Disciplinary
Barracks on Alcatraz Island, awaiting transportation to McNeil's
Island, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in his
behalf by his attorney, G. D. Collins, in the District Court for
the Northern District of California.
In response to a rule to show cause why the writ should not be
issued, Col. J. D. McDonald, Commandant of the Disciplinary
Barracks, filed a demurrer to the petition on two grounds: (1) that
the petition did not state facts sufficient to entitle petitioner
to the writ, and (2) that the court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the petition.
Page 258 U. S. 418
This demurrer was sustained without opinion, and the case is
here for review on direct appeal from the district court, based on
sufficient constitutional grounds.
If the district court had issued the writ as prayed for, the
only questions it would have been competent for it to hear and
determine would have been
"[d]id the court-martial which tried and condemned the prisoner
have jurisdiction of his person and of the offense charged, and was
the sentence imposed within the scope of its lawful powers? . . .
The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. That being
established, the habeas corpus must be denied and the petitioner
remanded. That wanting, it must be sustained and the petitioner
discharged."
In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147,
137 U. S. 150;
Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109,
158 U. S. 118;
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365,
183 U. S. 368;
Mullan v. United States, 212 U. S. 516,
212 U. S. 520;
Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13,
100 U. S.
23.
But, the court-martial being a special statutory tribunal, with
limited powers, its judgment is open to collateral attack, and
unless facts essential to sustain its jurisdiction appear, it must
be held not to exist.
McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S.
49,
186 U. S. 62-63;
Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11,
255 U. S.
19.
Thus, the question for decision here is: does the petition show
want of jurisdiction in the court-martial over the person of the
accused and over the offense with which he was charged and for
which he was sentenced?
Neither the constitution, the convening, nor the regularity of
the proceedings of the court-martial in this case is assailed, and
that the prisoner was a private in the Army of the United States is
admitted. The only allegation in the petition of sufficient
substance to deserve notice is that the judgment is void for want
of jurisdiction in the court to render it because the
specifications do not charge any crime known to the laws of the
United States, in that it does not appear therein that the property
alleged to have been taken was not the property of
Page 258 U. S. 419
the accused, and also because it is not averred therein that the
property was in the care, possession, and custody or control of the
person from whose possession it is alleged to have been taken.
The only part of the charge appearing in the petition is a copy
of three specifications, the first of which reads:
"Specification 1: In that Private Roy W. Marshall, Company K,
31st Infantry, Private Gilbert Frey, Company K, 31st Infantry,
Private Gerald E. Troxler, Company K, 31st Infantry, and Private
James F. Hyde, Company K, 31st Infantry, acting jointly and in
pursuance of a common intent, did at Vladivostok, Siberia, on or
about the 14th day of January, 1920, by putting him in fear,
feloniously take from the presence of Van Fun Un, 40 Koreaskays
street, Vladivostok, Siberia, the sum of about ten thousand
(10,000) roubles, value about fifty dollars ($50.00)."
The second and third specifications differ from the first only
in the name and place of residence in Vladivostok of the person
robbed and as to the value of the property taken.
The argument in support of the contention of the petitioner is
that the allegation that the property was taken "from the presence
of" the persons named does not imply that it was taken unlawfully
from the presence, possession or custody of another, or that it was
not at the time the property of the accused.
The jurisdiction of the court-martial was derived from the act
of Congress embodying the Articles of War, which it is declared,
shall at all times and in all places, govern the armies of the
United States (39 Stat. 650, 670), and the charge of robbery was
certainly framed under Article 93 thereof, providing that "[a]ny
person subject to military law who commits . . . robbery . . .
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
Page 258 U. S. 420
The sufficient answer to this contention that the specifications
do not charge any crime known to the laws of the United States is
that § 284 of the federal Criminal Code, providing for the
punishment of robbery, reads:
"Whoever, by force and violence, or by putting in fear, shall
feloniously take from the person or presence of another anything of
value, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years."
This has been accepted as an accurate and authoritative
definition of robbery from Blackstone, Book IV, p. 243 (Cooley's
Edition) to Bishop's New Criminal Law, Vol. II, §§ 1177, 1178.
Taking property from the presence of another feloniously and by
putting him in fear is equivalent to taking it from his personal
protection and is, in law, a taking from the person. Men do not
feloniously put others in fear for the purpose of seizing their own
property.
It is not necessary that the charge in court-martial proceedings
should be framed with the technical precision of a common law
indictment, and we cannot doubt that the one in this case clearly
shows jurisdiction in the court over the accused and over the
offense with which he was charged, and that the latter was
sufficiently described to advise defendant of the time and place
and circumstances under which it was claimed he had committed the
crime, to enable him to make any defense he may have had.
It is also charged that there was no evidence of guilt before
the court-martial other than the confession of the accused, which,
it is averred, was made, under oath, to and at the instance of his
superior officer, under duress, whereby it is alleged he was
compelled to become a witness against himself in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. This, in substance, is a
conclusion of the pleader, unsupported by any reference to the
record and, at most, was an error in the admission of
testimony,
Page 258 U. S. 421
which cannot be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding, cases
supra.
The remaining allegations are trivial.
For the reason that the petition did not state facts sufficient
to entitle petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus, the judgment of
the district court is
Affirmed.