1. In the absence of a statute or special contract, the
liability of a connecting carrier on a through route for the safety
of freight begins when it receives it and is discharged by its
delivery to and acceptance by the succeeding carrier or its
authorized agent. P.
258 U. S.
413.
2. The Cummins Amendment deals with and modifies the common law
liability only of the initial carrier, rendering that carrier
liable for loss or damage of property committed to its care until
delivered to the consignee, but leaving the relation of all
connecting carriers, including the terminal carrier, to the shipper
or consignee or to each other, entirely unaffected. P.
258 U. S.
413.
3. Where a bill of lading for a through shipment of livestock
provided that no carrier except the initial carrier should be
liable for loss or injury not caused by it,
held that the
terminal carrier was not liable to the consignee for an injury on
the line of an intermediate carrier. P.
258 U. S. 412.
Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling
Co., 241 U. S. 190,
distinguished.
265 F. 81 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the circuit court of appeals
reversing a judgment of the district court adverse to the plaintiff
and present respondent in an action to recover from the present
petitioner for damages to livestock while
in transitu.
Page 258 U. S. 411
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent shipped two carloads of horses from Grand Island,
Nebraska, to Spokane, Washington, for which the initial carrier,
the Union Pacific Railroad Company, issued a through bill of lading
in the form of the customary livestock contract and routed the
shipment over its own lines to Granger, Wyoming, thence over the
line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company to Huntington,
Oregon, and thence over the lines of petitioner to Spokane,
Washington.
While in transit, the animals developed disease which resulted
in the death of several and in such condition of the others that
they were delivered to the shipper consignee on the line of the
petitioner before reaching the destination to which they were
billed. The illness is alleged to have been caused by the stock's
having been given unwholesome food and water at Pocatello, Idaho, a
station on the line of the intermediate carrier, the Oregon Short
Line Railroad Company.
This suit to recover damages is against the delivering, the
terminal, carrier, the allegation of the complaint, however, being
that the unwholesome food and water were given to the stock while
in transit over the route of the intermediate carrier, the Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company. Thus, we have presented for decision
the question is a terminal carrier liable to a shipper who in this
case is also the consignee, for injury to horses caused by the
negligence of a prior and independent carrier from which they were
received?
The livestock contract under which the shipment moved contained
the following provision:
Page 258 U. S. 412
"1. Except as otherwise provided by statute law, the carrier
undertakes to transport said shipment only over its own line, and
acts only as the agent of the shipper with respect to the portion
of the route beyond its own line. No carrier shall be liable for
damages for loss, death, injury or delay to said animals, or any
thereof, not caused by it, but nothing contained in this contract
shall be deemed to exempt the initial carrier in case of a through
interstate transportation from any liability for loss, death,
damage or injury caused by it or any common carrier, railroad or
transportation company to which the livestock may be delivered
under this contract."
It is plain that this paragraph was framed to comply with the
requirements of the Cummins Amendment to the Carmack Amendment to
the Interstate Commerce Act (c. 3591, 34 Stat. ยง 20, 593, 595; c.
176, 38 Stat. 1196), but, except as therein provided, the initial
carrier limits its undertaking to its own line, declares that it
acts only as the agent of the shipper with respect to the route
beyond its own line, and the express contract is that "no carrier
shall be liable for damages for loss, death, injury or delay to
said animals not caused by it."
A verdict was rendered in favor of the shipper consignee,
subject to the court's action on a question reserved by stipulation
of the parties, and the court, acting thereunder, set aside the
verdict and rendered judgment for the defendant. The circuit court
of appeals reversed the district court, and held that
Georgia,
Florida & Alabama Railway Co. v. Blish Milling Co.,
241 U. S. 190,
required that, under the Carmack (now Cummins) Amendment, the
terminal carrier should be bound by the contract of the initial
carrier to deliver, precisely as the initial carrier is bound, and
was therefore liable for any loss or damage to the property that
had been occasioned in transit through the conduct of any of the
carriers.
Page 258 U. S. 413
In this, we think the circuit court of appeals fell into
error.
The settled federal rule is that, in the absence of statute or
special contract, each connecting carrier on a through route is
bound only to safely carry over its own line and safely deliver to
the next connecting carrier,
Myrick v. Michigan Central
Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102,
107 U. S. 107;
Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing
Co., 16 Wall. 318,
83 U. S. 324,
and the liability of a connecting carrier for the safety of
property delivered to it for transportation commences when it is
received, and is discharged by its delivery to and acceptance by a
succeeding carrier or its authorized agent,
Pratt v. Railway
Co., 95 U. S. 43.
The Cummins Amendment deals with and modifies the common law
liability only of the initial carrier. It renders that carrier
liable for loss or damage to the property committed to its care
throughout the entire route by which it is billed until delivered
to the consignee, but it leaves the relation of all connecting
carriers, including the terminal carrier, to the shipper or
consignee and to each other, entirely unaffected (
Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.
S. 186,
219 U. S.
195-196;
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,
226 U. S. 491,
226 U. S.
511), and therefore their liability is as we have stated
it unless modified by contract, and in this case, as we have seen,
the livestock contract under which the shipment moved, by expressly
providing that "no carrier (other than the initial carrier) shall
be liable for damage for loss, death, injury or delay to said
animals, or any thereof, not caused by it," leaves the common law
liability of the intermediate carrier entirely unaffected, just as
the statute leaves it.
The
Blish case,
supra, was against the
terminal carrier, and one contention in that case was that, under
the Carmack (now Cummins) Amendment, the shipper's remedy against
the initial carrier was exclusive even where the
Page 258 U. S. 414
default claimed was misdelivery by the terminal carrier. In
denying this, this Court said:
"The connecting carrier is not relieved from liability by the
Carmack [Cummins] Amendment, but the bill of lading required to be
issued by the initial carrier upon an interstate shipment governs
the entire transportation, and thus fixes the obligations of all
participating carriers
to the extent that the terms of the bill
of lading are applicable and valid."
We have seen that the amendment did not alter the common law
liability of other than the initial carrier, and in this case the
"applicable and valid" terms of the bill of lading, expressly
negative liability of any connecting carrier for damage not caused
by it.
The other contention in the
Blish case,
supra,
was that the action was barred because notice of claim, in writing,
had not been given within the time required by the bill of
lading.
In the discussion of this question, this Court used the language
following, by which the circuit court of appeals was misled,
viz.:
"When it [the initial carrier] inserts in its bill of lading a
provision requiring reasonable notice of claims 'in case of failure
to make delivery,' the fair meaning of the stipulation is that it
includes all cases of such failure, as well those due to
misdelivery as those due to the loss of the goods. But the
provision in question is not to be construed in one way with
respect to the initial carrier and in another with respect to the
connecting or terminal carrier. As we have said, the latter takes
the goods under the bill of lading issued by the initial carrier,
and its obligations are measured by its terms, and if the clause
must be deemed to cover a case of misdelivery when the action is
brought against the initial carrier, it must equally have that
effect in the case of the terminal
Page 258 U. S. 415
carrier which in the contemplation of the parties was to make
the delivery."
From this language, the circuit court of appeals concludes that,
under the amendment, the terminal carrier is bound, by the bill of
lading and the contract of the initial carrier, to deliver as the
initial carrier is bound, and is therefore liable for any loss or
damage to the property which has been occasioned through the
conduct of any of the carriers while in transit, and this led the
court to the holding that the terminal carrier was liable for the
loss and injury "although occasioned while in transit over the
Oregon Short Line."
We think the circuit court of appeals misinterpreted the only
relevant expression in the above quotation from the language by
this Court,
viz.: the terminal carrier
"takes the goods under the bill of lading issued by the initial
carrier, and its obligations are measured by its terms, and if the
clause must be deemed to cover a case of misdelivery when the
action is brought against the initial carrier, it must equally have
that effect in the case of the terminal carrier which in the
contemplation of the parties was to make the delivery."
What was decided in the
Blish case was that the
terminal carrier was liable for failure to make delivery, just as
the initial carrier would have been if it had been sued for
misdelivery, because, by the terms of the bill of lading, each was
under obligation to make final delivery. The suit before us is not
for misdelivery or other fault of the carrier sued, but for the
fault, as alleged, of a prior connecting carrier. In express terms,
the bill of lading we have here declares that no carrier shall be
liable for loss or damage not caused by it, and therefore, the
statute not providing otherwise, the petitioner cannot be liable
for the damage alleged to have been caused before the stock reached
its line.
Page 258 U. S. 416
The Carmack and Cummins Amendments were enacted to enable the
holder of a bill of lading to sue the initial carrier for any loss
or damage to property suffered on any part of a through route, and
thereby to relieve him from the necessity of searching out and
proving a case against a terminal or intermediate carrier.
219 U. S. 219 U.S.
186,
supra, p.
219 U. S. 200.
Having regard to the customary methods of doing a through business
in this country, it may have been important to have given like
rights against others of connecting carriers, but plainly, either
from design or accident, the terms of the amendment limit its
application to the initial carrier.
We think that the circuit court of appeals was mistaken in its
interpretation of the language used in the
Blish case
opinion, and its judgment must be reversed and the judgment of the
district court affirmed.
Reversed.