After expiration of the term of the district court at which
final judgment was entered and after expiration of an extension of
the term provided by general rule, but before a day to which the
parties,
Page 258 U. S. 366
after such expirations, stipulated the term should be extended
for the purpose, a bill of exceptions was proposed to and settled
and signed by the judge.
Held that the consent gave no
jurisdiction, and the bill was unlawful. P.
258 U. S.
368.
Questions certified by the court below under Jud.Code § 239.
Page 258 U. S. 367
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Asking instruction as provided by § 239, Judicial Code, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has sent up the
statement and question which follow:
"This cause came here on a writ of error to a judgment in favor
of the Butterworth-Judson Company in an action at law in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Judgment
resulted from the verdict of a jury, and thereupon plaintiff in
error took a writ."
"The stated terms of the trial court as prescribed by act of
Congress begin each month on the first Tuesday thereof, but a
general rule of that court provides as follows:"
"For the purpose of taking any action which must be taken within
the term of the court at which final judgment or decree is entered,
each term of court is extended for ninety days from the date of
entry of the final judgment or decree."
"In respect of this case, the ninety-day period above provided
for, and therefore the term at which the final judgment in question
was entered, expired on the 24th of February, 1920."
"On March 1, 1920, a written stipulation was executed between
the attorneys for the parties hereto in the words following:"
"It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties
hereto that the November term of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York be extended to April 6, 1920,
for the purpose of settling and filing the bill of exceptions
herein."
"On or before the 6th of April, 1920, but long after the 24th of
February, 1920, the plaintiff in error proposed a bill of
exceptions. Thereupon the trial judge, over the objection of
defendant in error and on the faith of the
Page 258 U. S. 368
stipulation above quoted, settled and signed the bill of
exceptions annexed to the writ of error herein and now in this
Court."
"Defendant in error then moved in this court for an order
striking from the record the bill of exceptions so settled as above
set forth, on the ground that the same had been settled, signed and
made a part of the record herein in contravention of law, in that
the term had expired."
"Upon consideration of this motion, a question of law arises
concerning which this court desires the instruction of the Supreme
Court in order properly to decide the cause."
"
Question Certified. Is the bill of exceptions so as
above set forth settled, signed, and certified to this Court in
contravention of law, in that the term had expired before the same
was offered for settlement?"
In the recent case of
O'Connell v. United States,
253 U. S. 142,
253 U. S. 146,
we reaffirmed the doctrine announced in
Michigan Insurance Bank
v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293,
143 U. S.
298:
"By the uniform course of decision, no exceptions to rulings at
a trial can be considered by this Court unless they were taken at
the trial, and were also embodied in a formal bill of exceptions
presented to the judge at the same term, or within a further time
allowed by order entered at that term, or by standing rule of
court, or by consent of parties, and, save under very extraordinary
circumstances, they must be allowed by the judge and filed with the
clerk during the same term. After the term has expired, without the
court's control over the case being reserved by standing rule or
special order, and especially after a writ of error has been
entered in this Court, all authority of the court below to allow a
bill of exceptions then first presented, or to alter or amend a
bill of exceptions already allowed and filed, is at an end. "
Page 258 U. S. 369
And, applying this rule, we held the bill of exceptions, signed
by the trial judge after expiration of the time allowed by the rule
of court, was no part of the record.
In the present cause, the terms as extended had expired before
any action concerning the bill of exceptions was taken by either
court or counsel. In such circumstances, the court had no power to
approve it unless this could be conferred by mere consent of
counsel. This they could not do.
Consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction to courts of the
United States.
Railway Co. v.
Ramsey, 22 Wall. 322,
89 U. S. 327.
The policy of the law requires that litigation be terminated within
a reasonable time, and not protracted at the mere option of the
parties.
See United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S.
55,
235 U. S. 70. We
think the better rule and the one supported by former opinions of
this Court requires that bills of exceptions shall be signed before
the trial court loses jurisdiction of the cause by expiration of
the term or such time thereafter as may have been duly prescribed.
The certified question is accordingly answered in the
affirmative.