1. A suit by qualified voters of Maryland to require the
Maryland Board of Registry to strike the names of women from the
register of voters upon the grounds that the state constitution
limits the suffrage to men and that the Nineteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution was not validly adopted is maintainable under
the Maryland law, and raises the question whether the Nineteenth
Amendment has become part of the Constitution. P.
258 U. S.
136.
2. The objection that a great addition to the electorate, made
without a state's consent, destroys its political autonomy and
therefore exceeds the amending power applies no more to the
Nineteenth Amendment than to the Fifteenth Amendment, which is
valid beyond question. P.
258 U. S.
136.
3. The Fifteenth Amendment does not owe its validity to adoption
as a war measure and acquiescence. P.
258 U. S.
136.
4. The function of a state legislature in passing on a proposed
amendment to the federal Constitution is federal, and not subject
to limitation by the people of the state. P.
258 U. S. 137.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221,
253 U. S. 231.
5. Official notice from a state legislature to the Secretary of
State, duly authenticated, of its adoption of a proposed amendment
to the federal Constitution is conclusive upon him and, when
certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts. P.
258 U. S. 137.
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,
143 U. S.
672-673.
139 Md. 46 affirmed.
Certiorari to a decree of the court below affirming a decision
of the state trial court dismissing a petition by
Page 258 U. S. 131
which the plaintiffs in error sought to require the members of
the Maryland Board of Registry to strike the names of specified
woman voters from the registration list.
Page 258 U. S. 135
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
On October 12, 1920, Cecilia Streett Waters and Mary D.
Randolph, citizens of Maryland, applied for and were granted
registration as qualified voters in Baltimore City. To have their
names stricken from the list, Oscar Leser and others brought this
suit in the court of common pleas. The only ground of
disqualification alleged was that the applicants for registration
were women, whereas the Constitution of Maryland limits the
suffrage to men. Ratification of the proposed amendment to the
federal
Page 258 U. S. 136
Constitution, now known as the Nineteenth, 41 Stat. 362, had
been proclaimed on August 26, 1920, 41 Stat. 1823, pursuant to
Revised Statutes, ยง 205. The Legislature of Maryland had refused to
ratify it. The petitioners contended, on several grounds, that the
amendment had not become part of the federal Constitution. The
trial court overruled the contentions and dismissed the petition.
Its judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the state, 114
A. 840, and the case comes here on writ of error. That writ must be
dismissed; but the petition for a writ of certiorari, also duly
filed, is granted. The laws of Maryland authorize such a suit by a
qualified voter against the board of registry. Whether the
Nineteenth Amendment has become part of the federal Constitution is
the question presented for decision.
The first contention is that the power of amendment conferred by
the federal Constitution and sought to be exercise does not extend
to this amendment because of its character. The argument is that so
great an addition to the electorate, if made without the state's
consent, destroys its autonomy as a political body. This amendment
is in character and phraseology precisely similar to the Fifteenth.
For each, the same method of adoption was pursued. One cannot be
valid and the other invalid. That the Fifteenth is valid, although
rejected by six states, including Maryland, has been recognized and
acted on for half a century.
See United States v. Reese,
92 U. S. 214;
Neale v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370;
Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347;
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368. The
suggestion that the Fifteenth was incorporated in the Constitution
not in accordance with law, but practically as a war measure which
has been validated by acquiescence, cannot be entertained.
The second contention is that, in the constitutions of several
of the 36 states named in the proclamation
Page 258 U. S. 137
of the Secretary of State, there are provisions which render
inoperative the alleged ratifications by their legislatures. The
argument is that, by reason of these specific provisions, the
legislatures were without power to ratify. But the function of a
state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the federal
Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the
amendment, is a federal function derived from the federal
Constitution, and it transcends any limitations sought to be
imposed by the people of a state.
Hawke v. Smith, No. 1,
253 U. S. 221;
Hawke v. Smith, No. 2, 253 U. S. 231;
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.
S. 350,
253 U. S.
386.
The remaining contention is that the ratifying resolutions of
Tennessee and of West Virginia are inoperative because adopted in
violation of the rules of legislative procedure prevailing in the
respective states. The question raised may have been rendered
immaterial by the fact that, since the proclamation, the
legislatures of two other states -- Connecticut and Vermont -- have
adopted resolutions of ratification. But a broader answer should be
given to the contention. The proclamation by the Secretary
certified that, from official documents on file in the Department
of State, it appeared that the proposed amendment was ratified by
the legislatures of 36 states, and that it "has become valid to all
intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution of the United
States." As the Legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had
power to adopt the resolutions of ratification, official notice to
the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they had done so, was
conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation,
is conclusive upon the courts. The rule declared in
Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649,
143 U. S.
669-673, is applicable here.
See also Harwood v.
Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547,
162 U. S.
562.
Affirmed.
