1. Alaska has been incorporated into and is part of the United
States, and the Constitution, so far as applicable, is controlling
upon Congress when legislating in respect thereto. P.
258 U. S.
110.
2. Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, forbidding, with
exceptions, transportation of merchandise over routes between
points within the United States in vessels not built in the United
States or documented under its laws and owned by its citizens, is a
regulation of commerce, and not within § 8 of Art. I of the
Constitution requiring uniformity throughout the United States of
duties, imposts, and excises. P.
258 U. S.
110.
3. Alaska is not a state within § 9 of Art. I of the
Constitution, declaring "No preference shall be given by any
regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over
those of another." P.
258 U. S. 111.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244,
considered.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court of the United States
for the District of Alaska sustaining a demurrer to, and
dismissing, the amended complaint in a suit brought by the
Territory and the Juneau Hardware Company to restrain the local
Collector of Customs from confiscating merchandise, shipped or to
be shipped by the Hardware Company or others in Alaska, from points
in the United States over Canadian Railroads to Canadian ports, and
thence to Alaska by British vessels not authorized under § 27 of
the Merchant Marine Act, or merchandise to be shipped in like
manner from Alaska to the United States.
Page 258 U. S. 109
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the court below appellants' bill was dismissed upon demurrer.
It attacks the validity of § 27, Merchant Marine Act of June 5,
1920, c. 250, 41 Stat. 988,
* upon the ground
that the regulation of commerce prescribed therein gives a
preference to ports of the Pacific Coast states over those of
Alaska, contrary to § 9, Art. I, of the federal Constitution: "No
preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or
revenue, to the ports of one state over those of another."
The act purports, among other things, "to provide for the
promotion and maintenance of the American merchant marine," and §
27 forbids transportation of merchandise
Page 258 U. S. 110
over any portion of the route between points in the United
States,
including Alaska,
"in any other vessel than a vessel built in and documented under
the laws of the United States and owned by persons who are citizens
of the United States, or vessels to which the privilege of engaging
in the coastwise trade is extended by §§ 18 or 22 of this Act,"
provided that, under certain conditions this limitation
shall not apply to merchandise transported between points within
the United States,
excluding Alaska, over through routes
by Canadian rail lines and connecting water facilities.
The bill assumes that the preference is obvious upon a
consideration of the statute, without more. And although by
fostering lines of boats which afford frequent, regular and speedy
service, and otherwise, the practical effect may be highly
beneficial to Alaskan ports, nevertheless, in view of the record,
we will assume that the act does give preference to ports of the
states over those of the territory.
Alaska has been incorporated into and is part of the United
States, and the Constitution, so far as applicable, is controlling
upon Congress when legislating in respect thereto.
Rasmussen v.
United States, 197 U. S. 516,
197 U. S. 525,
197 U. S. 528.
It has been organized and is governed under appropriate
congressional action. For present purposes, therefore, we need not
inquire into the object and scope of the treaty of cession.
The questioned regulation relates directly to commerce, and
clearly is not within the usual meaning of the words of § 8, Art.
I, of the Constitution: "All duties, imposts and excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States." That such regulations are
not controlled by the uniformity clause was pointed out in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299,
53 U. S.
314:
"But, having previously stated that, in this instance, the law
complained of does not pass the appropriate line
Page 258 U. S. 111
which limits laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage, the
suggestion that this law levies a duty on tonnage or on imports or
exports is not admissible, and, if so, it also follows that this
law is not repugnant to the first clause of the eighth section of
the first article of the Constitution, which declares that all
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States, for, if it is not to be deemed a law levying a duty,
impost, or excise, the want of uniformity throughout the United
States is not objectionable."
The appellants insist that "state" in the preference clause
includes an incorporated and organized territory. This word appears
very often in the Constitution, and, as generally used therein, it
clearly excludes a "territory." To justify the broad meaning now
suggested would require considerations more cogent than any which
have been suggested. Obviously, the best interests of a detached
territory may often demand that its ports be treated very
differently from those within the states. And we can find nothing
in the Constitution itself or its history which compels the
conclusion that it was intended to deprive Congress of power so to
act.
See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421;
Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U. S.
107.
Great weight is attributed to certain statements concerning the
preference clause found in the several opinions announced in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244,
182 U. S. 249,
182 U. S. 288,
182 U. S. 352,
182 U. S.
354-355. But none of these opinions was accepted by a
majority of the Court, and statements therein are not binding upon
us. That controversy grew out of a revenue measure, and the point
now presented was not directly involved. The writers used the
language relied upon in arguments intended to support their
particular views concerning the fundamental points. Without
attempting to ascertain the exact purport of these expressions, it
suffices to say that they afford no adequate support for
appellants' position.
Page 258 U. S. 112
A quotation from the opinion of the court in
Rasmussen v.
United States, 197 U. S. 516,
197 U. S. 520,
is apposite:
"In
Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S.
138, the question was whether the Sixth Amendment was
controlling upon Congress in legislating for the Philippine
Islands. Applying the principles which caused a majority of the
judges who concurred in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244, to think that the uniformity clause of the
Constitution was inapplicable to Porto Rico, and following the
ruling announced in
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S.
197, it was decided that, whilst, by the treaty with
Spain, the Philippine Islands had come under the sovereignty of the
United States and were subject to its control as a dependency or
possession, those Islands had not been incorporated into the United
States as a part thereof, and therefore Congress, in legislating
concerning them, was subject only to the provisions of the
Constitution applicable to territory occupying that relation."
The judgment below is
Affirmed.
*
"Act of June 5, 1920 -- To provide for the promotion and
maintenance of the American merchant marine, to repeal certain
emergency legislation, and provide for the disposition, regulation,
and use of property acquired thereunder and for other
purposes."
"
* * * *"
"Sec. 27. That no merchandise shall be transported by water, or
by land and water, on penalty of forfeiture thereof, between points
in the United States, including districts, territories, and
possessions thereof embraced within the coastwise laws, either
directly or via a foreign port or for any part of the
transportation, in any other vessel than a vessel built in and
documented under the laws of the United States and owned by persons
who are citizens of the United States, or vessels to which the
privilege of engaging in the coastwise trade is extended by §§ 18
or 22 of this act:
Provided, That this section shall not
apply to merchandise transported between points within the
continental United States, excluding Alaska, over through routes
heretofore or hereafter recognized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission for which routes rate tariffs have been or shall
hereafter be filed with said commission when such routes are in
part over Canadian rail lines and their own or other connecting
water facilities:
Provided further, that this section
shall not become effective upon the Yukon River until the Alaska
railroad shall be completed and the Shipping Board shall find that
proper facilities will be furnished for transportation by persons
citizens of the United States for properly handling the
traffic."