Section 10 of the Lever Act (August 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat.
276, 279), providing that any person dissatisfied with the
President's award for supplies requisitioned under that section
shall receive 75% of the award and may sue the United States for
the balance claimed, confers jurisdiction on the district court "to
hear and determine all such controversies," while other sections of
the act providing for requisition
Page 256 U. S. 548
and award in respect of other classes of property, entitle
persons dissatisfied to sue the United States "in the manner
provided by 24, par. 20, and § 145 of the Judicial Code," which
confer concurrent jurisdiction on the district court and the Court
of Claims to adjudicate claims against the United States.
Held, referring to the legislative history of the act and
to other acts
in pari materia, that the jurisdiction under
§ 10 is conferred exclusively on the district court as part of
their ordinary jurisdiction over actions at law for money, of which
the right to trial by jury is an incident, and that a judgment
rendered under that section is therefore not reviewable in this
Court by direct writ of error. P.
256 U. S.
550.
Writ of error dismissed.
Error to review a judgment of the district court in an action
under § 10 of the Lever Act. The facts are stated in the
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to § 10 of the Lever Act (Act Aug. 10, 1917, c. 53, 40
Stat. 276, 279), the President requisitioned for the army on April
18, 1918, a radial drill belonging to Pfitsch. The Board of
Appraisers of the War Department found its then value to be
$3,979.50, and awarded him that amount as compensation. Pfitsch
declared this amount was unsatisfactory, and insisted that the
value was greater, and that he was entitled also to interest from
the date of the taking. On February 5, 1919, the government paid
him an amount equal to 75 percentum of the award.
Page 256 U. S. 549
Thereupon this suit was brought by him in the District Court of
the United States for Southern New York to recover the balance
alleged to be due. The case was tried, by agreement, without a
jury. The court found the value to be $4,550, and entered judgment
for the part then unpaid, together with interest from the date of
taking at the rate of six percent on the amounts from time to time
unpaid. The government brought the case here by direct writ of
error, and assigned as the only error that interest should not have
been allowed.
The preliminary question arises whether this Court has
jurisdiction on direct writ of error. The answer to be given to it
depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred upon the
district court by § 10 of the Lever Act. If the jurisdiction is to
be exercised in the manner provided by § 24, paragraph 20, of the
Judicial Code, which confers upon the district court jurisdiction
concurrent with the court of Claims, a direct writ of error lies
from this Court.
J. Homer Fritch, Inc. v. United States,
248 U. S. 458. If
however, the jurisdiction is the ordinary jurisdiction of the
district court, the writ of error should have gone, in the first
instance, from the circuit court of appeals under § 128 of the
Judicial Code. The nature of the jurisdiction of the district court
is of importance not only because of the question directly
involved, but because the answer given to it will determine
incidentally whether plaintiffs who proceed under § 10 are entitled
to a trial by jury, for § 24, paragraph 20, of the Judicial Code
declares that "all suits brought and tried under the provisions of
this paragraph shall be tried by the court without a jury."
See
United States v. McGrane, 270 F. 761;
Filbin Corp. v.
United States, 266 F. 911.
Section 10 provides that the President may requisition foods,
feeds, fuels, and other war supplies with the necessary storage
facilities, and that he shall ascertain and pay
Page 256 U. S. 550
just compensation for them. But if any person is not satisfied
with the President's award, he is to receive 75% of the award, and,
for the balance claimed,
"shall be entitled to sue the United States . . . and
jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the United States district
courts to hear and determine all such controversies."
Three later sections of the act which provide for requisitioning
other classes of property -- § 12, relating to factories, mines,
and pipelines; § 16, to distilled spirits, and § 25, to coal or
coke plants or businesses -- make provision for suits against the
United States to recover just compensation in terms materially
different from that in § 10. Each of those three sections provides
in identical terms that a person dissatisfied with the President's
award
"shall be entitled to sue the United States . . . in the manner
provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one
hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code."
The latter of these sections of the Judicial Code confers
jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to adjudicate claims against
the United States, and the former confers upon the district courts
jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims in cases which do
not involve more than $10,000. Thus, while § 12, 16, and 25 of the
Lever Act in terms confer jurisdiction concurrently upon the Court
of Claims and the district courts sitting as a Court of Claims, §
10, in terms, confers jurisdiction to hear all cases arising under
it upon the district courts alone. The question presented to us is
whether this exclusive jurisdiction granted the district courts by
§ 10 is to be exercised in accordance with the law governing the
usual procedure of a district court in actions at law for money
compensation, or by the provisions of the law governing the
exceptional jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims where
it sits without a jury.
The legislative history of the Lever Act establishes that
Page 256 U. S. 551
the difference of the jurisdictional provision in § 10 from
those of §§ 12, 16, and 25 was the result not of inadvertence, but
of deliberate action in the face of opposition. The jurisdictional
provision of § 10, as introduced into the House of Representatives
and as originally passed by it, was in the precise form in which it
was enacted into law. 65th Cong. 1st Sess. House Rept. 75; 55
Cong.Rec. 4113. When the bill reached the Senate from the House,
the Senate committee reported an amendment striking out the House
provision and substituting a provision which made § 10 in this
respect identical with §§ 12, 16, and 25 -- that is, the senate
committee's amendment provided that suits under § 10 should be
brought against the United States "in the manner provided by §
twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and
forty-five of the Judicial Code." 55 Cong.Rec. 4626. This would
have conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims and
the district court sitting as a Court of Claims. As so amended, §
10 was passed by the Senate; but the House refused to concur in
this amendment. And this disagreement, with eight others relating
to § 10, was sent to the conference committee. 55 Cong.Rec. 5473.
The House conferees recommended receding from objections to the
eight other Senate amendments of this section, but they insisted
upon the objection to the change of the jurisdictional provision.
55 Cong.Rec. 5733-5737. The Senate conferees recommended receding
from its amendment to the jurisdictional provision, and that the
original House provision be restored. 55 Cong.Rec. 5709. In
reporting for the House conferees, Mr. Lever said of this
amendment:
"Amendment 30. This amendment gives jurisdiction, in suits to
recover just compensation under § 10 of the House Bill, to the
Court of Claims in addition to the United States district courts.
The Senate recedes."
65th Congress, 1st Sess. House Report No. 117, p. 14; 55
Cong.Rec. 5737.
Page 256 U. S. 552
It is plain, then, that Congress had this question presented to
its attention in a most precise form. It had the issue clearly
drawn between granting for the adjudication of cases arising under
this section concurrent jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and the
district courts without a trial by jury, or of establishing an
exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts of which the right to
a jury trial is an incident. The first alternative was rejected,
and the reason given for this rejection in the statement of the
House conferees is that the proposed amendment would confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims. It is difficult to conceive
of any rational ground for rejecting the clear and explicit
amendment made by the Senate except to accord a trial by jury. All
difficulties of construction vanish if we are willing to give to
the words of § 10, deliberately adopted, their natural meaning.
Furthermore, it is significant that this is not the only
occasion upon which Congress has provided for suits against the
United States exclusively in the district courts. Section 1 of the
War Risk Insurance Act of May 20, 1918, c. 77, 40 Stat. 555,
provides that suits upon insurance policies
"may be brought against the United States in the district court
of the United States in and for the district in which such
beneficiaries or any one of them resides."
The Act of March 4, 1919, c. 125, § 3, 40 Stat. 1348, which
authorizes the President to requisition storage facilities for
wheat, provides, in the words of § 10 of the Lever Act, that
"jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the United States district
courts to hear and determine all such controversies." And § 2 of
the Act of July 11, 1918, c. 145, 40 Stat. 898, permits suits
against the United States on marine insurance "in the district
court of the United States, sitting in admiralty."
A survey of the war legislation permitting the seizure of
property discloses that congress has established three distinct
jurisdictions for the purpose of suit against the
Page 256 U. S. 553
United States for compensation. In 17 instances, [
Footnote 1] it definitely provided by
reference to the appropriate sections of the Judicial Code for
concurrent jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and the district
courts sitting as a court of claims. In the four instances above
set forth it conferred jurisdiction only on the district courts. In
four instances, it conferred jurisdiction only on the Court of
Claims. [
Footnote 2] The
established rule of statutory construction should lead us to give
effect in every practicable manner to the distinctions which
Congress has seen fit to make.
Compare Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523,
252 U. S. 533.
And where it designates a
Page 256 U. S. 554
jurisdiction in which the trial will be with a jury instead of
one where the trial will be by the court alone, it is our duty to
give effect to its designation.
The writ of error is dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this
Court.
Dismissed.
[
Footnote 1]
Statutes which provide for suits for compensation against the
United States in both the district courts and the Court of Claims
in the manner provided by § 24, par. 20, and § 145 of the Judicial
Code: Act March 4, 1917, c. 180, 39 Stat. 1193; the Naval Emergency
Fund Act; Act June 15, 1917, c. 29, 40 Stat. 183, Emergency
Shipping Fund Act; Act Aug. 10, 1917, c. 53, §§ 12, 16, 25, 40
Stat. 279, 282, 284; Act Oct. 6, 1917, c. 79, 40 Stat. 353, 371,
372, land for ordnance proving ground and for naval construction;
Act March 1, 1918, c.19, 40 Stat. 438, 439, Shipping Board Housing;
Act April 22, 1918, c. 62, 40 Stat. 535, shipping Board trolleys or
interurban railways; Act April 26, 1918, c. 64, 40 Stat. 537, 538,
land for ordnance proving ground; Act May 16, 1918, c. 74, § 2, 40
Stat. 551, land for war housing; Act July 1, 1918, c. 114, § 5,
par. "d," 40 Stat. 720, contracts for ships, war materials,
factories, etc.; Act July 8, 1918, c. 139, § 1, 40 Stat. 826,
Buildings for War Dept. in District of Columbia; Joint Res. July
16, 1918, c. 154, 40 Stat. 904, telegraph systems; Act July 18,
1918, c. 157, § 14, 40 Stat. 916, dry docks, wharves, warehouses,
terminals; Act of Oct. 5, 1918, c. 181, § 3, 40 Stat. 1010,
minerals, ores, mines, smelters, etc.; Act Nov. 21, 1918, c. 212, §
1, 40 Stat. 1048, buildings for Department of Agriculture in
District of Columbia.
[
Footnote 2]
Statutes which provide for suits for compensation against the
United States only in the Court of Claims; Act Oct. 6, 1917, c.
106, § 10, 40 Stat. 422, patents; Act July 1, 1918, c. 114, 40
Stat. 705, patents used by United States; Act March 21, 1918, c.
25, § 3, 40 Stat. 454, railroads; Act March 2, 1919, c. 94, § 2, 40
Stat. 1273, war contracts, etc.