1. In the absence of a previous arrangement with the carrier for
reduced rates under § 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, the United
States, by requesting and accepting interstate railway
transportation for officers and men of the Army, obligates itself
to pay the rates applicable generally for like transportation, less
any lawful land grant deduction. P.
256 U. S.
206.
2. Where the only through interstate tariff rate between two
places is the individual rate, through transportation of a party
should be charged at that rate, and cannot lawfully be charged less
by combining a party rate applicable to a part of the distance only
with the individual rate applicable to the remainder. P.
256 U. S.
206.
3. The through individual rate in such case
held the
"regular tariff rate," within the meaning of a contract between the
carrier and the United States for the transportation of soldiers.
P.
256 U. S.
207.
55 Ct. Clms. 528 reversed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims rejecting the
claim of a railroad company for balances due for transportation of
soldiers for the United States. The facts are stated in the
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
On several occasions in 1914 and 1915, the railway company, at
the request of the United States, furnished
Page 256 U. S. 206
transportation from one state to another for officers and
enlisted men in the United States Army. In each instance, a through
individual rate from the initial point to the destination was in
force, and also individual rates to and from intermediate points.
In no instance was there a through party rate; but in all there was
a party rate for a part only of the distance. This situation was
shown in schedules regularly filed and posted under the Interstate
Commerce Act. In two instances, the transportation was furnished
under a contract calling for a special reduced rate for the full
trip, and in the others it was furnished without any prior contract
or special arrangement. Bills for the transportation -- computed in
the two instances at the contract rate, and in the others at the
through individual rate with appropriate land grant deductions --
were presented to the accounting officers, who allowed a part of
what was claimed in each bill and disallowed the balance. The
company then brought this suit in the Court of Claims to recover
the part disallowed, and the court, without opinion, sustained the
action of the accounting officers.
As to the transportation furnished without a prior contract or
special arrangement, the accounting officers proceeded on the
theory that the collectible rate should be determined by combining
the party rate covering a part only of the distance and the
individual rate for the remainder, and then making any necessary
land grant deductions, and not by taking the through individual
rate, less any deductions arising from land grants, as claimed by
the company. In this we think the accounting officers erred. The
service requested and rendered was a through service. The only rate
applicable to a like service for others was the through individual
rate. By requesting and accepting the service without some special
arrangement for a different rate, the United States assented to and
became obligated to pay that rate. Under a provision
Page 256 U. S. 207
in the Interstate Commerce Act, the United States could have
arranged with the company for a different and reduced rate if the
company was so disposed (c. 382, § 9, 25 Stat. 862), but that was
not done. In the absence of such an arrangement, the company's duty
to the United States was merely that of serving it at rates no
higher than those applied to individuals for like transportation
(c. 278, § 5, 14 Stat. 295), less any lawful land grant deduction.
No individual could require that the party rate covering a part
only of the distance and the individual rate for the remainder be
taken as the through rate, or as the lawful rate for a through
service. Neither could the United States do so in the absence of
some prior arrangement to that effect. The situation as respects
individuals is aptly stated in Conference Ruling No. 268 of the
Interstate Commerce Commission,
"The tariffs of certain carriers provide a 10-party fare from A
to B, but no such fare from B to C. Upon inquiry whether it would
be legal to ticket a party of 10 from A to C on the basis of the
party fare from A to B and the individual fares from B to C, when
such combination makes less than the joint through individual fare
from A to C,
held that, while a party of 10, acting on
their own initiative, would have the right to use the party fare
from A to B, and to purchase such transportation as is available
from B to C, the carriers may not ticket them through from A to C
on such a combination, and thus defeat their own published through
fare."
The contract under which some of the transportation was
furnished called for a rate of $12.80 per man for the full trip,
unless that rate should be found to be in excess of the "regular
tariff rate," less land grant deductions, in which event the "lower
rate" was to govern. The accounting officers proceeded on the
theory that the regular tariff rate was to be determined by
combining the party rate covering a part only of the distance and
the individual
Page 256 U. S. 208
rate for the remainder; and, finding that the rate so
constructed, less a land grant deduction, was lower than the
contract rate, they rejected the latter and gave effect to the new
rate which they had constructed. They proceeded on a mistaken
theory. The through individual rate was the only regular tariff
rate which was applicable. It, less any land grant deduction,
should have been compared with the contract rate ($12.80) and
whichever was lower should have been treated as controlling.
The findings relating to the transportation under the contract
do not show what the through individual rate was, and therefore the
suit cannot be finally determined here.
The judgment is accordingly reversed, and the suit is remanded
to the Court of Claims with directions to reexamine the company's
claim and award a judgment conforming to the views herein
expressed.
Judgment reversed.