1. In view of the emergency declared by the legislature and
found by the district court in this case and in like cases by the
highest court of the state, the New York laws enacted on September
27, 1920, to be in effect only until November 1, 1922, and
regulating rights and remedies in respect of real property occupied
for dwelling purposes in and about the City of New York, do not
exceed the police power of the state in requiring that only
reasonable rents shall be exacted or in denying the right to
maintain actions to recover possession except upon the grounds that
the occupant is holding over and is objectionable, or that the
owner of record, being a natural person, seeks in good faith to
recover for immediate occupancy by himself and family as a
dwelling, or that the action is to recover possession for the
purpose of demolishing the building with intention to construct a
new one. P.
256 U. S. 198.
Block v. Hirsh, ante, 256 U. S. 135.
2.
Held that such regulation, as applied in favor of
tenants holding over under an expired lease in disregard of their
covenant to surrender, did
Page 256 U. S. 171
not deprive the landlord of rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Contract Clause of the Constitution, although the
lease was executed before and expired soon after the date of the
legislation and the landlord, before the enactment, had entered
into a new lease with a third party to go into effect shortly after
the expiration of the old one. P.
256 U. S.
198.
3. The legislation does not unduly discriminate in not including
cities of less than a specified population, or buildings occupied
otherwise than for dwelling purposes, or buildings in course of
construction. P.
256 U. S.
198.
4. Chapter 951 of the Laws of New York of 1920, insofar as it
makes it a misdemeanor for the owner of an apartment house, or his
agents, etc., willfully and intentionally to fail to furnish to the
tenant of an apartment such water, heat, light, elevator,
telephone, or other service as may be required by the terms of the
lease and necessary to the proper and customary use of the
building, cannot be said to impose involuntary service in violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment. P.
256 U. S.
199.
269 F. 306 affirmed.
This was a direct appeal, under § 266 of the Judicial Code, from
a decree of the district court in a suit brought by the owner of an
apartment house in New York City for the purpose of ousting certain
holding-over tenants through a mandatory injunction, and of
restraining the District Attorney of the County of New York from
taking criminal proceedings against the plaintiff or its agents for
failure to furnish water, heat, light, elevator, and other service.
The defendants relied on recent legislation of New York, referred
to in the opinion,
* regulating
the
Page 256 U. S. 172
tights and remedies of landlords and tenants in New York City
and vicinity -- which the plaintiff assailed as unconstitutional.
The district court sustained the legislation as it applied to the
case, and dismissed the bill.
See 269 F. 306. The facts
are given in the opinion,
post, 256 U. S.
196.
Page 256 U. S. 196
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill in equity brought by the Marcus Brown Holding
Company, the appellant, owner of a large apartment house in the
City of New York, against the tenants of an apartment in the house
and the District Attorney of the County of New York. The tenants
are holding over after their lease has expired, which it did on
September 30, 1920, claiming the right to do so under cc. 942 and
947 of the Laws of New York of 1920. The object of the bill is to
have these and other connected laws declared unconstitutional. The
district attorney is joined in order to prevent his enforcing by
criminal proceedings cc. 131 and 951 of the acts of the same year,
which make it a misdemeanor for the lessor or any agent
Page 256 U. S. 197
or janitor intentionally to fail to furnish such water, heat,
light, elevator, telephone, or other service as may be required by
the terms of the lease and necessary to the proper or customary use
of the building. The case was heard in the district court by three
judges upon the bill, answer, affidavits and some public documents,
all of which may be summed up in a few works. The bill alleges at
length the rights given to a lessor by the common law and statutes
of New York before the enactment of the statutes relied upon by the
tenants, a covenant by the latter to surrender possession at the
termination of their lease, and due demand, and claims protection
under Article I, Section 10 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. An affidavit alleges that,
before the passage of the new statutes, another lease of the
premises had been made, to go into effect on October 1, 1920. The
answer of the tenants relies upon the new statutes and alleges a
willingness to pay a reasonable rent and any reasonable increase as
the same may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. It
also alleges that they made efforts to obtain another suitable
apartment, but failed. The District Attorney moved to dismiss the
bill. The judges considered the case upon the merits, upheld the
laws, and ordered the bill to be dismissed.
By the above mentioned cc. 942 and 947, a public emergency is
declared to exist and it is provided by c. 947 that no action
"shall be maintained to recover possession of real property in a
city of a population of one million or more or in a city in a
county adjoining such city, occupied for dwelling purposes, except
an action to recover such possession upon the ground that the
person is holding over and is objectionable, . . . or an action
where the owner of record of the building, being a natural person,
seeks in good faith to recover possession of the same or a room or
rooms therein for the immediate
Page 256 U. S. 198
and personal occupancy by himself and his family as a dwelling;
or an action to recover premises for the purpose of demolishing the
same with the intention of constructing a new building. . . ."
The earlier c. 942 is similar, with some further details. Both
acts are to be in effect only until November 1, 1922. It is
unnecessary to state the provisions of c. 944 for disputes as to
what is a reasonable rent. They are dealt with in the decisions of
the Court of Appeals cited below and in
Edgar A. Levy Leasing
Co., Inc. v. Siegel, 230 N.Y. 634, by the same court. In this
as in the previous case of
Block v. Hirsh, ante,
256 U. S. 135, we
shall assume, in accordance with the statutes, the finding of the
Court below and of the Court of Appeals of the state in
People
ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Feltra, 230 N.Y. 429, and
Guttag v. Shatzkin, 230 N.Y. 647, that the emergency
declared exists.
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.
S. 297,
248 U. S. 303;
Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.
S. 598,
208 U. S.
607.
The chief objections to these acts have been dealt with in
Block v. Hirsh. In the present case, more emphasis is laid
upon the impairment of the obligation of the contract of the
lessees to surrender possession and of the new lease which was to
have gone into effect upon October 1, last year. But contracts are
made subject to this exercise of the power of the state when
otherwise justified, as we have held this to be.
Manigault v.
Springs, 199 U. S. 473,
199 U. S. 480;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.
S. 467,
219 U. S. 482;
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S.
67,
238 U. S. 76-77;
Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation,
248 U. S. 372,
248 U. S. 375;
Producers Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission of
California, 251 U. S. 228,
251 U. S. 232.
It is said, too, that the laws are discriminating, in respect of
the cities affected and the character of the buildings, the laws
not extending to buildings occupied for business purposes, hotel
property, or buildings now in course of erection, etc.
Page 256 U. S. 199
But as the evil to be met was a very pressing want of shelter in
certain crowded centers, the classification was too obviously
justified to need explanation, beyond repeating what was said below
as to new buildings, that the unknown cost of completing them and
the need to encourage such structures sufficiently explain the last
item on the excepted list.
It is objected, finally, that c. 951, above stated, insofar as
it required active services to be rendered to the tenants, is void
on the rather singular ground that it infringes the Thirteenth
Amendment. It is true that the traditions of our law are opposed to
compelling a man to perform strictly personal services against his
will, even when he had contracted to render them. But the services
in question, although involving some activities, are so far from
personal that they constitute the universal and necessary incidents
of modern apartment houses. They are analogous to the services
that, in the old law, might issue out of or be attached to land. We
perceive no additional difficulties in this statute, if applicable
as assumed. The whole case was well discussed below, and we are of
opinion that the decree should be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
* The following summary of the chief features of these New York
"housing acts" is added for the convenience of those who desire a
quick view.
C. 942, Law of 190, declares a public emergency to
exist, and provides that summary proceedings shall not be
maintainable to recover the possession of real property occupied
for dwelling purposes in a city of a population of one million or
more or in a city in a county adjoining such a city, except (1)
where the person holding over is objectionable, (2) where the owner
of record, being a natural person, desires the premises for
immediate and personal occupancy by himself and his family as a
dwelling, (3) where the owner intends to demolish the premises and
rebuild, or (4) where the building is to be taken over by a
cooperative ownership group. The landlord must show that the
proceeding is one mentioned in the enumerated exceptions. The act
is inapplicable to buildings in course of construction or commenced
after the date of the act, and is to be in effect only until
November 1, 1922.
C. 945, Laws of 1920, regulates stays on appeals from
final orders in summary dispossession proceedings.
C. 944, Laws of 1920, amending c. 156, Laws of
1920:
Section 1, after reciting the existence of a public emergency,
declares that it shall be a defense to an action for rent accruing
under an agreement for premises in a city of the first class, etc.,
occupied for dwelling purposes, that such rent is unjust and
unreasonable and that the agreement under which the same is sought
to be recovered is oppressive.
Section 2 requires the landlord, where the defense of
unreasonable rent is set up, to file a bill of particulars setting
forth certain material facts relevant to the issue of the
reasonableness of the rent.
Section 3 provides that, where it appears that the rent has been
increased over the rent as it existed one year prior to the time of
the agreement under which the rent is sought to be recovered, such
agreement shall be presumptively unjust, unreasonable and
oppressive.
Section 4 permits the landlord to plead and prove in such action
a fair and reasonable rent and to recover judgment therefor, or to
institute a separate action for the recovery thereof.
Section 5. Where, in an action for rent or rental value, the
landlord secures judgment by default, he shall, in addition to a
money judgment, be put in possession if payment be not promptly
made.
Section 6. If, in such action for rent or rental value, the
issue of reasonableness of the amount demanded be raised by the
defendant, he must deposit in court a sum equal to the amount paid
as last month's rent or the rent reserved as the monthly rent in
the agreement under which he obtained possession, such deposit to
be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment rendered, or
otherwise disposed of as justice requires. Where judgment is
rendered for the plaintiff, if the same be not fully satisfied from
the deposit or otherwise within five days after entry, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to the premises and a warrant shall
issue commanding the sheriff, etc., to remove all persons
therefrom.
Section 7 relates to the vacation of default judgments, to
vacation and amendment of process, etc., and granting of new
trials.
Section 8.
"In case of an appeal by the defendant, the execution of the
judgment and warrant shall not be stayed unless the defendant shall
deposit with the clerk of the court the amount of the judgment and
thereafter monthly until the final determination of the appeal an
amount equal to one month's rental computed on the basis of the
judgment. The clerk shall forthwith pay to the plaintiff the amount
or amounts so deposited."
Section 9 renders the act inapplicable to hotels containing 125
rooms or more or to lodging or rooming houses occupied under a
hiring of a week or less.
Section 10 exempts buildings in course of construction or
commenced after the date of the act. The act is to be in force only
until November 1, 1922.
C. 945, Laws of 1920, allows summary dispossession proceedings
for nonpayment of rent only where the petitioner alleges and proves
that the rent is no greater than the amount for which the tenant
was liable for the month preceding the default, and provides for
testing the reasonableness of the rent in substantially the same
manner as in an action for rent, which is regulated by c. 944,
supra. In effect only until November 1, 1922.
C. 947, Laws of 190, limits until November 1, 1922, the action
of ejectment, in substantially the same manner as c. 942,
supra, limits summary proceedings.
C. 951, Laws of 190, amending § 2040 of the Penal Law, makes it
a misdemeanor for any lessor or his agents, etc., wilfully or
intentionally to fail to furnish necessary hot or cold water, heat,
light, power, elevator service, telephone or any other service,
required by the lease, or willfully and intentionally to interfere
with the quiet enjoyment of the leased premises by the
occupant.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE VAN
DEVANTER, and MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS dissent.
This case was submitted with
Block, etc. v. Hirsh, No.
640,
ante, 256 U. S. 135.
Like that case, it involves the right of a lessee of property --
in this case, an apartment in an apartment house in New York City,
to retain possession of it under a law of New York after the
expiration of the lease. This case is an emphasis of the other, and
the argument in that applies to this. It may be more directly
applicable,
Page 256 U. S. 200
for, in this case, the police power of the state is the especial
invocation, and the court's judgment is a concession to it, and, as
we understand the opinion, in broader and less hesitating
declaration of the extent of the potency of that power. "More
emphasis," it is said, "is laid upon the impairment of the
obligation of the contract," than in the
Hirsh case. In
measurement of this as a reliance, it is said: "But contracts are
made subject to this exercise of the power of the state
when
otherwise justified, as we have held this to be." The italics
are ours, and we estimate them by the cases that are cited in their
explanation and support. We are not disposed to a review of the
cases. We leave them in reference, as the opinion does, with the
comment that our deduction from them is not that of the opinion.
There is not a line in any of them that declares that the explicit
and definite covenants of private individuals engaged in a private
and personal matter are subject to impairment by a state law, and
we submit, as we argued in the
Hirsh case, that, if the
state have such power -- if its power is superior to Article I, §
10, and the Fourteenth Amendment, it is superior to every other
limitation upon every power expressed in the Constitution of the
United States, commits rights of property to a state's unrestrained
conceptions of its interests, and any question of them -- remedy
against them -- is left in such obscurity as to be a denial of
both. There is a concession of limitation, but no definition of it,
and the reasoning of the opinion, as we understand it, and its
implications and its incident, establish practically unlimited
power.
We are not disposed to further enlarge upon the case or attempt
to reconcile the explicit declaration of the Constitution against
the power of the state to impair the obligations of a contract or,
under any pretense, to disregard the declaration. It is safer,
saner, and more consonant with constitutional preeminence and its
purposes
Page 256 U. S. 201
to regard the declaration of the Constitution as paramount, and
not to weaken it by refined dialectics, or bend it to some impulse
or emergency "because of some accident of immediate overwhelming
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment."
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.
S. 197,
193 U. S.
400.
We therefore dissent.