1. Lands "in place" granted to a state for the support of
schools and subsequently included within a reservation by the
United States are exchangeable for unappropriated, nonmineral
public lands of equal acreage outside the reservation under the Act
of February 28, 1891, c. 384, 2 Stat. 796, amending §§ 2276, 2276,
Rev.Stats. P.
255 U. S.
493.
2. Although, under other general provision (Rev.Stats. §§ 441,
453, 2478), the lieu lands are selected by the state under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, this implies no
discretion in him or in the Land Department to refuse approval of
selections duly made, their function here being purely the judicial
one of determining whether selections, with accompanying surrenders
of base land, complied with the act of Congress and the Secretary's
directions under the conditions existing at the time when the
selections were made and completed. P.
255 U. S.
496.
Page 255 U. S. 490
3. When such a selection, with accompanying waiver or surrender,
has been duly made and completed in full conformity with the act
and the directions of the Secretary, the equitable title to the
tract selected passes to the state, the United States acquiring a
like title to the base land, and the rights of the state cannot be
affected by a subsequent attempt by the executive to reserve the
tract selected or a subsequent discovery that it contains mineral.
P.
255 U. S. 497.
Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U.
S. 496, and
Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil
Co., 190 U. S. 301,
explained.
4. It is a general rule that the question of the mineral or
nonmineral character of land selected or entered shall be
determined as of the time when the selector or entryman fully
complied with all conditions precedent resting upon him. P.
255 U. S.
500.
5. The exception to this rule found in the case of lands claimed
under railroad aid grants, where the question of mineral character
remains open until patent issues, is based upon the peculiar terms
and subject matter of the granting acts, their long administrative
interpretation, and their restrictive construction in favor of the
government. P.
255 U. S.
507.
6. Legislation of Congress designed to aid the common school
should be construed liberally, rather than restrictively. P.
255 U. S.
508.
7. The Act of June 25, 1910, c. 421, 36 Stat. 847, did not, and
constitutionally could not, authorize executive withdrawal of land
equitably vested in a state under a lieu election. P.
255 U. S. 509.
262 F. 675 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 255 U. S. 493
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit by the United States to establish title in it to
eighty acres of land and to the proceeds of oil taken therefrom.
The district court rendered as decree dismissing the bill on the
merits, which the circuit court of appeals reversed (
United
States v. Ridgely, 262 F. 675), and the defendants bring the
case here.
One of the defendants, the State of Wyoming,
* claims under a
lieu selection, made in 1912, and the other defendants under a
lease from the state made in 1916. It is against the selection and
the lease that the United States seeks to establish title.
By the Act of July 10, 1890, c. 664, § 4, 26 Stat. 222, Congress
granted to the state for the support of common schools certain
lands in place (sections 16 and 36 in each township), with
exceptions not material here, and by the Act of February 28, 1891,
c. 384, 26 Stat. 796, amending §§ 2275, 2276, Rev.Stats., the state
was invited and entitled, in the event any of the designated lands
in
Page 255 U. S. 494
place after passing under the school grant should be included
within a public reservation, to waive its right thereto and select
in lieu thereof other lands of equal acreage from unappropriated
nonmineral public lands outside the reservation and within the
state.
See California v. Deseret Water, etc., Co.,
243 U. S. 415;
Payne v. New Mexico, ante, 255 U. S. 367.
Other laws of general application, §§ 441, 453, 2478, Rev.Stats.,
required that the selections be made under the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior.
In 1907, a tract in place which had passed to the state under
the school grant was included within a public reservation called
the Big Horn National Forest. On April 4, 1912, the state, through
its Governor, Joseph M. Carey, and its Land Commissioner, S. G.
Hopkins, filed in the proper local land office a selection list
waiving its right to that tract and selecting in lieu thereof other
land of the same area from public lands within the state and
outside the forest reserve. The land so selected included the
eighty acres now in controversy. At that time, the state had a
perfect title to the tract in the reserve, and the land selected in
lieu thereof was vacant, unappropriated, and neither known nor
believed to be mineral. The list fully conformed to the directions
on the subject issued by the Secretary of the Interior, and was
accompanied by the requisite proofs and the proper fees. Notice of
the selection was regularly posted and published, proof thereof was
duly made, and the state paid the publisher's charge. Thus, as the
circuit court of appeals said,
"the state did everything necessary to show a perfect title to
the land relinquished and perfect relinquishment thereof to the
government, and everything that was required either by statute or
regulation of the Land Department"
in selecting the lieu land instead of the relinquished
tract.
No objection was called forth by the notice, and, in
Page 255 U. S. 495
regular course, the local officers transmitted the list and
other papers to the General Land Office with a certificate stating
that no adverse filing, entry, or claim to the selected land was
shown by the records in their office, and that the filing of the
list was allowed and approved by them. The list remained in the
General Land Office awaiting consideration by the Commissioner for
upwards of three years. In the meantime, on May 6, 1914, two years
after the selection, the selected land, with other lands
aggregating more than 88,000 acres, was included in a temporary
executive withdrawal as possible oil land under the Act of June 25,
1910, c. 421, 36 Stat. 847. On April 29, 1915, the Commissioner,
coming to consider the selection, declined to approve it as made
and called on the state either to accept a limited surface right
certification of the selected land or to show that it still was not
known or believed to be mineral. The state declined to accede to
either alternative, and insisted that its rights should be
determined as of the time when the waiver and selection were made,
and that, applying that test, it became invested with the equitable
title to the selected land two years prior to the temporary
withdrawal, and at a time when that land plainly was neither known
nor believed to be mineral. The Commissioner thereupon ordered the
selection cancelled -- not because it was in any respect
objectionable when made, but on the theory that he was justified in
rejecting it by reason of the subsequent withdrawal and subsequent
oil discoveries in that vicinity. The state appealed to the
Secretary of the Interior, and, on October 25, 1916, he affirmed
the Commissioner's action.
In the meantime, on May 24, 1916, the state had given to the
defendant Ridgely a lease permitting him to drill the selected land
for oil, and the lease had been assigned to the defendant oil
company. There was no oil discovery, nor any drilling, on the
selected land up
Page 255 U. S. 496
to the time the lease was given, but, thereafter, the oil
company began drilling and at large cost carried the same to
discovery and successful production. This was four years after the
selection.
The question presented is whether, considering that the
selection was lawfully made in lieu of the state-owned tract
contemporaneously relinquished, and that nothing remained to be
done by the state to perfect the selection, it was admissible for
the Commissioner and the Secretary to disapprove and reject it on
the ground that the selected land was withdrawn two years later
under the Act of June 25, 1910, and still later was discovered to
be mineral land -- that is, to be valuable for oil. Or, putting it
in another way, the question is whether it was admissible for those
officers to test the validity of the selection by the changed
conditions when they came to examine it, instead of by the
conditions existing when the state relinquished the tract in the
forest reserve and selected the other in its stead.
In principle it is plain that the validity of the selection
should be determined as of the time when it was made -- that is,
according to the conditions then existing. The proposal for the
exchange of land without for land within the reserve came from
Congress. Acceptance rested with the state and, of course, would be
influenced and controlled by the conditions existing at the time.
It is not as if the selection was merely a proposal by the state
which the land officers could accept or reject. They had no such
option to exercise, but were charged with the duty of ascertaining
whether the state's waiver and selection met the requirements of
the congressional proposal and of giving or withholding their
approval accordingly. The power confided to them was not that of
granting or denying a privilege to the state, but of determining
whether an existing privilege conferred by Congress had been
lawfully exercised; in other words,
Page 255 U. S. 497
their action was to be judicial in its nature, and directed to
an ascertainment and declaration of the effect of the waiver and
selection by the state in 1912. If these were valid, then, if they
met all the requirements of the congressional proposal, including
the directions given by the Secretary, they remained valid
notwithstanding the subsequent change in conditions. Acceptance of
such a proposal and full compliance therewith confer vested rights
which all must respect. Equity then regards the state as the owner
of the selected tract and the United States as owning the other,
and this equitable ownership carries with it whatever of advantage
or disadvantage may arise from a subsequent change in conditions,
whether one tract or the other be affected. Of course, the state's
right under the selection was precisely the same as if, in 1912, it
had made a cash entry of the selected land under an applicable
statute, for the waiver of its right to the tract in the forest
reserve was the equivalent of a cash consideration. And yet it
hardly would be suggested that the Commissioner or the Secretary,
on coming to consider the cash entry, could do otherwise than
approve it if, at the time it was made, the land was open to such
an entry and the amount paid was the lawful price.
The conclusion which we deem plain in principle is fully
sustained by prior adjudications. In
Benson Mining Co. v. Alta
Mining Co., 145 U. S. 428,
145 U. S. 431,
which presented the question of when under the public land laws a
right to the land becomes vested, it was said:
"When the price is paid, the right to a patent immediately
arises. If not issued at once, it is because the magnitude of the
business in the Land Department causes delay. But such delay in the
mere administration of affairs does not diminish the rights flowing
from the purchase, or cast any additional burdens on the purchaser,
or expose him to the assaults of third parties."
And again (p.
145 U. S.
432):
"It is a general rule in respect to the sales of real state
Page 255 U. S. 498
that, when a purchaser has paid the full purchase price, his
equitable rights are complete, and there is nothing left in the
vendor but the naked legal title, which he holds in trust for the
purchaser. And this general rule of real estate law has been
repeatedly applied by this Court to the administration of the
affairs of the Land Department of the government, and the ruling
has been uniform that, whenever, in cash sales, the price has been
paid, or, in other cases, all the conditions of entry performed,
the full equitable title has passed, and only the naked legal title
remains in the government in trust for the other party, in whom are
vested all the rights and obligations of ownership."
In
Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States,
123 U. S. 307,
123 U. S. 328,
a title obtained through preemption cash entries was assailed on
the ground that the land was shown by subsequent discoveries to be
mineral, but the attack failed; the court saying:
"A change in the conditions occurring subsequently to the sale,
whereby new discoveries are made, or by means whereof it may become
profitable to work the veins as mines, cannot affect the title as
it passed at the time of sale. The question must be determined
according to the facts in existence at the time of the sale."
In
United States v. Iron Silver Mining Co.,
128 U. S. 673,
128 U. S. 683,
a title acquired through an application for a placer patent was
sought to be annulled on the ground that subsequent mining
disclosed that the land was lode land; but the title was sustained,
the Court observing:
"The subsequent discovery of lodes upon the ground and their
successful working does not affect the good faith of the
application. That must be determined by what was known to exist at
the time."
Particularly in point is
Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.
S. 312, which related to what is called Baca Tract No.
4. Congress had accorded to the heirs of Luis Maria Baca the right
to relinquish their claim to a large body of land in New Mexico,
and to select
Page 255 U. S. 499
instead "an equal quantity of vacant land, not mineral" in not
exceeding five tracts in that territory. As here, there was no
provision for a patent. The original claim was relinquished, and
the lieu selection made conformably to directions given by the Land
Department, the selected land being represented as vacant and not
known to be mineral. Afterwards the selection of a part of tract
No. 4 was called in question on the ground that it was shown by
subsequent discoveries to be mineral. This Court sustained the
selection, and said, p
170 U. S.
332:
"The grantees, the Baca heirs, were authorized to select this
body of land. They were not at liberty to select lands already
occupied by others. The lands must be vacant. Nor were they at
liberty to select lands which were then known to contain mineral.
Congress did not intend to grant any mines or mineral lands, but,
with these exceptions, their right of selection was coextensive
with the limits of New Mexico. We say 'lands then known to contain
mineral' for it cannot be that Congress intended that the grant
should be rendered nugatory by any future discoveries of mineral.
The selection was to be made within three years. The title was then
to pass, and it would be an insult to the good faith of Congress to
suppose that it did not intend that the title, when it passed,
should pass absolutely, and not contingently upon subsequent
discoveries. This is in accord with the general rule as to the
transfer of title to the public lands of the United States. In case
of homestead, preemption, or townsite entries, the law excludes
mineral lands, but it was never doubted that the title, once
passed, was free from all conditions of subsequent discoveries of
mineral."
In
Leonard v. Lennox, 181 F. 760, a contention that an
application for a nonmineral final entry, even if regularly
presented and based on full compliance with the law, should be
disallowed and rejected where the land subsequently is discovered
to be mineral (coal) was
Page 255 U. S. 500
overruled by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit,
the court saying, p. 764:
"This insistence cannot prevail. It not only is opposed to the
settled rule that the character of the land -- whether agricultural
or known to be chiefly valuable for coal -- must be determined
according to the conditions existing at the time when the applicant
does all that he is required to do to entitle him to a patent, but
is grounded in a misapprehension of the authority and duty of the
officers of the Land Department in respect of such an application.
Whilst it undoubtedly is subject to examination and consideration
by them, this is not that they may elect whether or not they will
consent to its allowance, but that they may ascertain whether or
not the applicant has acquired a right to its allowance -- a right
which is acquired, if acquired at all, at that point of time when
the applicant has done all that he is required to do in the
premises, instead of at the time of its recognition by them."
The last expression on this subject in this Court is found in
Payne v. New Mexico, ante, 255 U. S. 367,
where it was held in respect of a state lieu selection like the one
in question here that the Commissioner and the Secretary, in acting
thereon, are required to give effect to the conditions existing
when it was made; that, if it was valid then, they are not at
liberty to disapprove or cancel it by reason of a subsequent change
in conditions; and that, in this regard, the statute under which
the selection was made does not differ from other land laws
offering a conveyance of the title to those who accept and fully
comply with their terms.
The Land Department uniformly has ruled that the states acquire
a vested right in all school sections in place which are not
otherwise appropriated and not known to be mineral at the time they
are identified by the survey -- or at the date of the grant where
the survey precedes it -- regardless of when the matter becomes a
subject of inquiry and decision, and that this right is not
defeated or affected
Page 255 U. S. 501
by a subsequent mineral discovery. California v. Poley, 4 Copp's
L.O. 18; Abraham L. Minor, 9 L.D. 408; Rice v. California, 24 L.D.
14;
United States v. Morrison, 240 U.
S. 192,
240 U. S. 207;
United States v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563,
245 U. S. 572.
And as respects cash entries and entries under the preemption,
homestead, desert land, and kindred laws, the Land Department
always has ruled that if, when the claimant has done all that he is
required to do to entitle him to receive the title, the land is not
known to be mineral, he acquires a vested right which no subsequent
discovery of mineral will divest or disturb. Harnish v. Wallace, 13
L.D. 108; Rea v. Stephenson, 15 L.D. 37; Reid v. Lavallee, 26 L.D.
100, 102; Aspen Consolidated Mining Co. v. Williams, 27 L.D. 1, 17;
Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.
S. 236,
233 U. S. 240.
And this rule has been applied by that department, although not
uniformly, to selections made in lieu of relinquished lands in
public reservations. Thus, in Kern Oil Co. v. Clarke, 30 L.D. 550,
where a lieu selection under the Act of June 4, 1897, c. 2, 30
Stat. 36, was under consideration, the Secretary of the Interior
said, p. 556:
"When do rights under the selection become vested? In the
disposition of the public lands of the United States under the laws
relating thereto, it is settled law: (1) that when a party has
complied with all the terms and conditions necessary to the
securing of title to a particular tract of land, he acquires a
vested interest therein, is regarded as the equitable owner
thereof, and thereafter the government holds the legal title in
trust for him; (2) that the right to a patent, once vested, is, for
most purposes, equivalent to a patent issued, and when in fact
issued, the patent relates back to the time when the right to it
became fixed, and (3) that the conditions with respect to the state
or character of the land, as they exist at the time when all the
necessary requirements have been complied with by a person seeking
title, determine the question whether the land is subject to
Page 255 U. S. 502
sale or other disposal, and no change in such conditions
subsequently occurring can impair or in any manner affect his
rights."
Again, p. 560:
"These established principles, in the opinion of the department,
are applicable to selections under the act of June 4, 1897. The act
clearly contemplates an exchange of equivalents. Such is the
unmistakable import of its terms. In the case of the relinquishment
of patented lands, title is to be given by the government for title
received."
And again, p. 564:
"It would be strange indeed if, by the latter [1897] act,
Congress intended that one who, accepting the government's offer of
exchange, relinquishes a tract to which he has obtained full title
in a forest reservation, and in lieu thereof selects a tract of
land which at the time is vacant and open to settlement, and does
all that is required of him to complete the selection and to
perfect the exchange, should thereby acquire only an inchoate right
to the selected tract, liable to be defeated by subsequent
discoveries of mineral at any time before patent, or before final
action upon the selection by the Land Department. Such a
construction would not only tend to defeat the objects for which
the act was passed by discouraging owners of lands in forest
reservations from giving up their titles, but would be against both
the letter and spirit of the act. Parties would be slow indeed in
relinquish their complete titles if it were once understood that
they could obtain only doubtful or contingent rights in return for
them. It could not have been the intention of Congress that parties
accepting the government's offer of exchange should be embarrassed
by any such conditions of doubt and uncertainty."
That view was repeated and applied in many other departmental
decisions dealing with lieu selections. But afterwards, the
Secretary, conceiving that the decisions of this Court in
Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U.
S. 496, and
Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil
Co., 190 U. S. 301,
justified him in so doing, ruled that
Page 255 U. S. 503
no right attached under such a selection unless and until it was
approved by him, and therefore that, even though the selection was
lawfully made, he possessed a discretion to reject it and give
effect to an intervening change in conditions, as where a new
claimant settled upon the land or sought to make entry of it while
the selection was pending.
Under this changed ruling, the Secretary rejected several
selections lawfully made by one Daniels and awarded and patented
the land to others. Daniels then brought suits against the
patentees charging that, by the selections, he acquired the
equitable title, that his selections were rejected and the patents
issued through a misapprehension of the law, and therefore that the
patentees took the legal title in trust for him. Ultimately the
suits came to this Court, and, after a full review, the changed
ruling of the Secretary was disapproved and Daniels' contention
sustained.
Daniels v. Wagner, 237 U.
S. 547. The substance of the decision was that, as the
selections were lawful when made, "it was the plain duty" of the
Secretary to approve them; that the contrary view found no
justification in
Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co.,
supra, and that the real authority and duty of the Secretary
in dealing with such selections were pointed out in
Weyerhaeuser v. Hoyt, 219 U. S. 380,
219 U. S.
387-388, where it was said:
"The requirement of approval by the Secretary consequently
imposed on that official the duty of determining whether the
selections were lawful at the time they were made, which is
inconsistent with the theory that anyone could appropriate the
selected land pending action of the Secretary. The scope of the
power to approve lists of selections conferred on the Secretary was
clearly pointed out in
Wisconsin Central Railroad v.
Price, 133 U. S. 496,
133 U. S.
511, where it was said that the power to approve was
judicial in its nature. Possessing that attribute, the authority
therefore involved not only the power, but implied the duty, to
determine the lawfulness of the selections
Page 255 U. S. 504
as of the time when the exertion of the authority was invoked by
the lawful filing of the list of selections."
As the circuit court of appeals in the present case, like the
Secretary in the other, regarded the decisions in the
Wisconsin
Central case and the
Cosmos case as showing that no
right attaches under a lieu selection unless and until approved by
the Secretary, it is well to point out just what was involved in
those cases, for it then will be apparent that there was no purpose
in either to go to the length suggested.
The
Wisconsin Central case was a suit to enjoin the
collection of a tax levied on land which at the time was covered by
a pending indemnity selection under a railroad land grant. The
Commissioner of the General Land Office had reported that the
company already had received indemnity lands largely in excess of
the losses for which it was entitled to indemnity, and the company
was disputing that report. Until that controversy was determined,
it could not be known whether the company was entitled to an
approval of the selection. In that situation, the United States had
such an interest in the land as made it nontaxable. Whether the
selection was valid or otherwise was primarily a question for the
Secretary of the Interior to determine. Ultimately he held it
valid, but not until after the tax was levied -- indeed, after the
suit was brought. The suit involved the validity of the tax, and
nothing more. Its purpose was not to control the action of the
Secretary by a writ of mandamus of injunction, nor to determine the
title as between the United States and the company or between the
company and a grantee of the United States. True, the court, after
commenting on the difference between the granted lands in place and
the indemnity lands as respects the mode of identification, very
broadly stated that an indemnity selection to be effective required
the approval of the Secretary, but it was not meant by this that
the Secretary arbitrarily could
Page 255 U. S. 505
defeat the right of selection by withholding his approval, nor
that if, through a mistake of law, he rejected a selection which
was valid at the time it was made, the company would be remediless.
There was no occasion to consider those questions, nor could they
properly be determined without the presence of parties not then
before the court. And that the court did not intend its words to be
taken so broadly is illustrated by the fact that it cited with
approval the case of
Saint Paul & Sioux City R. Co. v.
Winona & Saint Peter R. Co., 112 U.
S. 720,
112 U. S. 733,
wherein an indemnity selection lawfully made, but disapproved by
the Secretary, was sustained against an adverse certification on
the ground that "this erroneous decision of his" did not deprive
the selector "of rights which became vested by its selection of
those lands."
The
Cosmos case was a suit by a lieu land selector to
establish his title as against others who were claiming under
placer mining locations. The selection was not accompanied by proof
that the land was not then occupied adversely, although that was
required. Within the time prescribed by the regulations, the mining
claimants filed in the Land Office verified protests assailing the
regularity and validity of the selection, setting up locations of
the selected land made under the placer mining law prior to the
selection and alleging that the lands "were not subject to
selection" because "the same was mineral land and was included
within" the mining locations. The protests were entertained, and,
with the selection, were pending when the suit was begun, which was
shortly after the protests were filed. The suit was brought on the
theory that, by the selection, the selector acquired "the full,
complete, and equitable title" to the selected land,
notwithstanding he had not submitted any proof of nonoccupancy, and
that the protests were not such as could be entertained or
investigated by the Land Department. That case and another
(
Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.
S. 316),
Page 255 U. S. 506
wherein a writ of mandamus was sought against the Secretary by
another lieu land selector, were heard and disposed of as related
cases, and the decision in one should be read in connection with
that in the other. The full substance of the decision in the
Cosmos case is in the following excerpt from the opinion,
190 U.S.
190 U. S.
315:
"Concluding, as we do, that the question whether the complainant
has ever made a proper selection of land in lieu of the land
relinquished has never been decided by the Land Department, but is
still properly before that Department, the courts cannot take
jurisdiction and proceed to decide such question themselves. The
government has provided a special tribunal for the decision of such
a question arising out of the administration of its public land
laws, and that jurisdiction cannot be taken away from it by the
court.
United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S.
378,
102 U. S. 395. The bill is
not based upon any alleged power of the court to prevent the taking
out of mineral from the land, pending the decision of the Land
Department upon the rights of the complainant, and the court has
not been asked by any averments in the bill or in the prayer for
relief to consider that question. For the reasons stated, we think
the bill does not state sufficient facts upon which to base the
relief asked for, and that the defendants' demurrer to the same was
properly sustained."
There are general expressions in the opinion which, separated
from the rest, might be taken as declaring that no right vests
under a lieu selection unless the Secretary approves it; but that
such a ruling was intended is refuted by the opinion as a whole,
and particularly by the statements therein that the power of the
Secretary is not to be exercised arbitrarily, and that his
"decision of any legal question would not, of course, be binding on
the courts" should the question properly arise in future
litigation. The general expressions were relied upon in
Daniels
v. Wagner as interpretative of the decision, and this Court
answered: "But we are of opinion that this
Page 255 U. S. 507
interpretation of the Cosmos case cannot be justified." Besides,
it was adjudged in the
Daniels case that a lieu selection
which is lawful at the time it is made does invest the selector
with equitable rights which he may enforce in an appropriate way
where the Secretary, through an error of law, rejects the
selection. And that ruling was reaffirmed and applied in
Payne
v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., ante, 255 U. S. 228, and
Payne v. New Mexico, ante, 255 U. S. 367.
The only exception to the general rule before stated respecting
the time as of which the character of the land -- whether mineral
or nonmineral -- is to be determined is one which in principle and
practice is confined to railroad land grants. From the beginning,
the Land Department, by reason of the terms of those grants and the
restrictive interpretation to which they are subjected, uniformly
has construed and treated them as requiring that the character of
the land be determined as of the time when the patent issues. In
1890, Secretary Noble, in declining to disturb this construction
and practice, pointed out the reasons which had led the Department
to make a distinction in this regard between those grants and other
land laws, and said:
"This practice having been uniformly followed and generally
accepted for so long a time, there should be, in my judgment, the
clearest evidence of error, as well as the strongest reasons of
policy and justice controlling, before a departure from it should
be sanctioned. It has, in effect, become a rule of property."
Central Pacific R. Co. v. Valentine, 11 L.D. 238, 246. In 1893,
the matter came before this Court and the construction and practice
of the Land Department were sustained.
Barden v. Northern
Pacific R. Co., 154 U. S. 288. As
the opinion in that case shows, the court recognized that the
mineral land exception in other land laws simply operates to
exclude from sale, etc., "land known at the time to be mineral,"
and was careful to explain that its decision related to "grants in
aid of
Page 255 U. S. 508
railroads" and to "no other grants." The grounds on which the
decision was put were: (a) that the railroad land grants, besides
being confined in the granting clause to lands "not mineral,"
contain provisos declaring in words or effect "that all mineral
lands be, and the same hereby are, excluded from the operation of
this" grant; (b) that such grants, although expressly requiring
that the question whether the lands are otherwise excepted be
determined as of the time the map of definite location is filed,
contain no such provision in respect of the exception of mineral
land; (c) that it was well understood that many years would
necessarily elapse between the filing of the map and the time when
by construction of the road the grantee would be entitled to
patents, and, as the grants covered great areas, in one instance
nearly equal to that of Ohio and New York, it hardly could have
been intended to arrest mineral development in those areas in the
meantime; (d) that such grants "must be strictly construed," and
"if they admit of different meanings, one of extension and one of
limitation, they must be accepted in a sense favorable to the
grantor;" and (e) that the long prevailing construction and
practice of the Land Department ought not to be disturbed. Plainly
the decision in that case is without bearing here, save as it
recognizes that rights under other land laws are to be tested by a
different rule. And this is emphasized by the fact that, in
Shaw v. Kellogg, supra, where the selection of Baca tract
No. 4 was involved, the Court distinguished the
Barden
case, and applied the general rule before stated. And it is of
further significance that this Court has recognized that the
legislation of Congress designed to aid the common schools of the
states is to be construed liberally, rather than restrictively.
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517,
95 U. S. 526;
Johanson v. Washington, 190 U. S. 179,
190 U. S.
183.
Of the executive withdrawal of the land two years after
Page 255 U. S. 509
the lieu selection was lawfully made it suffices to say,
following the recent decision in
Payne v. Central Pacific Ry.
Co., ante, 255 U. S. 228,
that the Act of 1910, under which the withdrawal was made, is
confined to "public lands," that, by the selection, this land had
ceased to be public, and that the act could not be construed to
embrace it without working an inadmissible interference with vested
rights.
It results that the Secretary erred in matter of law in
rejecting the selection, and that the district court rightly
entered a decree for the defendants.
See Cornelius v.
Kessel, 128 U. S. 456,
128 U. S. 461;
United States v. Detroit Timber Co., 200 U.
S. 321,
200 U. S. 338.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
* The state was not made a party at first, but afterwards, at
its own request, was admitted as a defendant to enable it to defend
the lieu selection.