The Act of March 3, 1917, prohibiting the transportation in
interstate Commerce of intoxicating liquors into a state whose law
prohibit manufacture or sale of such liquors for beverage purposes,
is not repugnant to Art. I, § 9, cl. 6, of the Constitution,
prohibiting any regulation of commerce which gives preference to
the ports of one state over those of another state. P.
255 U. S.
338.
Affirmed.
Writ of error to review directly a sentence in the district
court under an indictment charging interstate transportation of
whisky in violation of the Reed Amendment.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway
Co., 242 U. S. 315,
the Webb-Kenyon Law (Act March 1, 1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699), which
prohibited the movement in interstate commerce into any state of
intoxicating liquor for purposes prohibited by the laws of such
state, was sustained. It was held: (a) that the law in question was
appropriate as a regulation of commerce; (b) that any want of
uniformity which might arise in its operation
Page 255 U. S. 337
caused from differences in the laws of the several states was to
be attributed to such divergent state laws, and not to any inherent
want of uniformity in the act of Congress; (c) that it was
competent for Congress, in regulating commerce as to the movement
of intoxicants, to adapt its laws, as far as it deemed advisable,
to the regulations prevailing in the several states; (d) that, in
regulating such commerce, the authority of Congress was as complete
as that which government possessed over intoxicants, and was to be
measured by the extent of such power, and not by the authority
which controlled the power of government as to other subjects.
In
United States v. Hill, 248 U.
S. 420, there came under consideration an indictment for
violating the statute known as the Reed Amendment (Act March 3,
1917, c. 162, § 5, 39 Stat. 1058, 1069), prohibiting the
transportation in interstate commerce of intoxicating liquor into
any state whose laws prohibited the manufacture or sale therein of
intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. Reiterating the grounds
upon which the constitutionality of the statute considered in the
Clark Distilling Co. case was upheld, and additionally
pointing out the reasons why the statute under consideration was
within the authority of Congress to enact as a regulation of
commerce, the indictment was sustained, and the statute of
necessity upheld.
The decided cases in this Court and in the lower federal courts
which are noted in the margin
* make it
certain
Page 255 U. S. 338
that the
Clark Distilling Company and the
Hill
cases were accepted as determining the validity of both the
Webb-Kenyon Law and the Reed Amendment.
The case before us concerns an indictment found and conviction
thereon had for a violation of the Reed Amendment after the
decision in the
Hill case, and was brought directly here
upon the theory that that law was repugnant to Art. I, § 9, cl. 6,
of the Constitution, prohibiting any regulation of commerce which
gives a preference to the ports of one state over those of another.
We do not pause to consider whether the constitutional validity of
the Reed Amendment had been in terms so completely settled by the
Clark Distilling Company and the
Hill cases as to
cause the contention here relied upon to be frivolous at the time
the writ of error was sued out, but content ourselves with saying
that, in any event, the want of merit in the constitutional
question relied upon is so plainly and unequivocally established by
the cases in question and the authorities which have followed them
as to require us to do no more than direct attention to that
condition, and consequently to affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
*
United States v. Gudger, 249 U.
S. 373;
United States v. Simpson, 252 U.
S. 465;
United States v. James, 256 F. 102;
Hardy v. United States, 256 F. 284;
Malcolm v. United
States, 256 F. 363;
United States v. Simpson, 257 F.
860;
Robilio v. United States, 259 F. 101;
United
States v. Luther, 260 F. 579;
Laughter v. United
States, 261 F. 68;
Whiting v. United States, 263 F.
477;
District of Columbia v. Gladding, 263 F. 628;
Collins v. United States, 263 F. 657;
United States v.
Collins, 264 F. 380;
Moran v. United States, 264 F.
768;
Berman v. United States, 265 F. 259;
Payne v.
United States, 265 F. 265;
Hockett v. United States,
265 F. 588;
Gross v. United States, 265 F. 606;
Durst
v. United States, 266 F. 65;
Ciarfidini v. United
States, 266 F. 471;
Block v. United States, 267 F.
524.