1. Where a case in the district court arising under the
Constitution has been reviewed by this Court under Jud.Code, § 238,
this Court retains jurisdiction to review a supplementary decree of
the district court not directly involving any constitutional
question. P.
255 U. S. 254.
Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.,
249 U. S. 134.
2. A tariff giving special rates on rough wood material on
shipment to mill on condition that certain percentages of it by
weight should be shipped over the same line after manufacture, and
which specified as rough materials "Rough Lumber, Staves, Flitches,
Bolts, and Logs," and among finished materials "Staves and
Heading,"
held applicable to "bolts" out of which barrel
headings were made, the term "bolts" in this connection having a
loose generic meaning.
Id.
3. Where the meaning of such a tariff was plain,
held
that an application for a construction by the state commission by
which it was promulgated was not necessary for enforcement of a
shipper's rights under it. P.
255 U. S.
256.
Affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is a sequel of
Allen v. St. Louis, Iron Mt. &
Southern Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 553, and
Arkadelphia Co.
v.
Page 255 U. S. 253
St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 249 U.
S. 134.
See also St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Ry. Co. v. McKnight, 244 U.
S. 368. The Arkansas Railroad Commission having, in
June, 1908, adopted Standard Distance Tariff No. 3, establishing
maximum intrastate freight rates, the present appellant railway
company attacked its validity in a suit brought against the
commission in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, contending that the rates were
noncompensatory, and therefore violative of the "due process of
law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A temporary injunction was
issued and continued in force until May 11, 1911, when the Circuit
Court entered a final decree making the injunction permanent and
discharging the surety from further liability on the injunction
bond. On appeal to this Court, the decree was reversed June 16,
1913, with directions to dismiss the bill without prejudice, and
for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion and decree
of this Court.
230 U. S. 230 U.S.
553. Upon the going down of the mandate, the United States district
court (successor of the Circuit Court) entered a decree in
obedience thereto, at the same time making a reference to a special
master for the purpose of ascertaining the claims of intervening
shippers for refund of the difference paid by them in freight rates
between those prescribed by the commission and the higher ones
maintained by the railway company during the pendency of the
injunction. Under this reference, the present appellees, J. F.
Hasty & Sons, presented a claim based upon the difference
between rates charged on rough material transported from forest to
milling points and the rates provided in the commission tariff on
such movements. That tariff contained maximum rates on such lumber
applicable generally, and in addition provided for a "milling in
transit privilege" by fixing certain "rough material rates" lower
than the others, conditioned upon a specified percentage of the
manufactured produce
Page 255 U. S. 254
being shipped out on the same line that brought in the rough
material. The railway company excepted to the claim on two grounds:
(a) that the rough material rates were discriminatory, and (b) that
they were not applicable to the shipments of Hasty & Sons
because these constituted interstate commerce, and hence were not
subject to the commissioner's rates. The district court sustained
both exceptions. The resulting decree, so far as adverse to Hasty
& Sons, was reversed by this Court (
249 U. S. 249 U.S.
134,
249 U. S.
147-152), and the cause remanded for further proceedings
in conformity with our opinion. Upon the going down of this
mandate, there were further hearings before the referee and the
district court upon the claim of Hasty & Sons and claims of the
same type presented by three other intervening shippers, and from
the resulting decree in their favor the present appeal is taken.
Although the only question immediately involved is the proper
construction of the Standard Distance Tariff, we have jurisdiction,
as we had in the
Arkadelphia case,
supra, because
the decree is but supplementary to the main cause, bringing to
effective conclusion, if not vitiated by error, the controversy
that arose out of the railway company's attack upon the rates on
constitutional grounds, and hence must be regarded as involving the
construction and application of the Constitution of the United
States within the meaning of § 238, Judicial Code.
See 249
U.S.
249 U. S.
140-142.
The disputed claims are based in the main upon alleged
overcharges on rough material shipped over appellant's road to the
respective mills of appellees, and there manufactured into heading
for barrels. The question is whether Item 79 of Distance Tariff No.
3 provided a rough material rate for heading. It reads as
follows:
"Item 79. Rough Material Rates."
"(a) Rough material rates applicable on rough lumber, staves,
flitches, bolts, and logs, carloads,
Page 255 U. S. 255
between all points in Arkansas, minimum weight. . . ."
"[Here follows a table of rates graduated according to
distance.]"
"(b) The above named rates are conditional upon the manufactured
product's being reshipped over the same line bringing in the rough
material, and may be only used subject to the following conditions:
the proportion of the tonnage of outbound manufactured product to
the tonnage of inbound rough material shall not be less than the
following: . . ."
"[Here follows a table of percentages applicable to various
products, among them:]"
"Finished staves, 40 percent of weight of rough staves. . .
."
"Staves and heading, 30 percent of weight of bolts."
At the hearing before the master, it was admitted that the
claimants shipped out over the line of road that brought in the
rough material the requisite percentages of manufactured product in
the usual course of business; nevertheless, appellant objected to
the allowance of the claims on the ground that Item 79 provided no
rate on inbound rough heading, but the same was covered by Item 41,
and since the general rates provided therein were higher than those
actually charged, there was no basis for a refund. The objection
was renewed in an exception to the master's report and urged at the
hearing before the court on the report and exceptions. The master
found that rough heading was covered as rough material in Item 79,
and the district court sustained that conclusion.
Appellant's contention is based upon a literal reading of the
opening sentence of Item 79: "Rough material rates applicable on
rough lumber, staves, flitches, bolts, and logs," etc., and since
"rough heading" is not mentioned here, while the associated
material "staves" is specified, it is contended that rough heading
is not provided for.
Page 255 U. S. 256
From the testimony taken before the master, it would appear that
the raw material from which barrel heads are made is variously
described as rough heading, sawed heading, split heading, and bolts
or heading bolts; but it also appears that, whatever may be the
distinctions, the terms are used loosely and indiscriminately in
the trade and in billing shipments, material of either description
being considered rough material, and all having been handled by the
railway company under the rough material rate on its own schedules,
without regard to particular terms.
We regard appellant's reading of Item 79 as altogether too
narrow. The scope and effect of the rough material rates should be
determined not by regarding the opening sentence alone, but by
looking also to the list of finished products to be manufactured
from the material, and considering the general purpose of Item 79.
In the table of percentages, there are specified "finished staves,
40 percent of weight of rough staves," and "staves and heading, 30
percent of weight of bolts." The purpose is manifest to give the
benefit of the milling in transit rate to rough material out of
which heading is manufactured, and no reason appears for limiting
it to material of a particular description. The word "bolts," used
in connection with staves and heading, should be taken not as
confining the privilege to rough material of a particular form, but
in the generic sense in which it is employed in wood working, as
meaning "[a] mass of wood from which anything may be cut or formed"
(Century Dict.); "[a] block of wood from which something is to be
made; as a shingle bolt, a stave bolt" (Standard Dict.); "[a] block
of timber to be sawed or cut into shingles, staves, etc."
(Webster's Dict.).
The matter is so free from doubt that there is no occasion to
apply to the commission for a construction, as insisted by
appellant under
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. American Tie
Co., 234 U. S. 138,
234 U. S.
146.
Decree affirmed.