The requirement of the Safety Appliance Acts that all trains
used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall have a
certain percent of their car equipped with power or train brake
under control of the engineer applies to "transfer trains" moving
between two yards of a railroad company, over a "transfer" track
which crosses at grade streets and lines of independent railroad
companies where freight and passenger trains are run, and which
also is used, in part, by independent railroad companies for their
freight trains. P.
254 U. S.
253.
A moving locomotive and cars attached are without the provision
of the act only when they are not a train, as where the locomotive
is
Page 254 U. S. 252
engaged in switching, classifying, and assembling cars in a yard
to make up a train. P.
254 U. S.
254.
It is not the duty of courts applying the act to weigh dangers
incident to particular railway operations. P.
254 U. S. 255.
255 F. 655, reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Northern Pacific Railway Company owns and uses in interstate
commerce a terminal railroad along the waterfront of Duluth
extending from Rice's Point to Furnace, a distance of four miles.
It was sued in the District Court of the United States for the
District of Minnesota for violating the Safety Appliance Act
[
Footnote 1] by operating over
the whole of this road, in September, 1916, two transfer trains
without complying with the requirement that 85 percent of the train
brakes be coupled so as to be under engine control. One train
consisted of a locomotive and 48 cars; the other, of a locomotive
and 40 cars. The company contended that the provision of the Safety
Appliance Act did not control the operation, because this terminal
road was not part of a main line; that neither passenger nor
freight trains, through or local, moved on it; that, on it, trains
are not operated by timetables, train
Page 254 U. S. 253
orders, or timecards, nor is the use of the track controlled by
block signals; that on it, no train has right of way over another,
but that there the single operating rule applies, which requires
all trains to move at such speed that they can be stopped at
vision, and that trains are under the yardmaster's orders. The
company's contention was sustained by the district court, which
directed a verdict for defendant, and the judgment entered thereon
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. 225 F. 655. The case comes here on writ of certiorari. 249
U.S. 597.
These additional facts are material: the road,. for a distance
of a mile at the beginning and for less at the end, is single
track. It crosses at grade two streets, on one of which run
streetcars. It crosses at grade, at five places in all, lines of
three independent railroad companies which run freight trains to
piers situated between Rice's Point and Furnace. One of these
companies also runs passenger trains across defendant's tracks. In
addition, two other independent companies use, under the usual
traffic right agreement, about a mile of this railroad as a part of
their freight lines to piers situated between Rice's Point and
Furnace. These four miles of railroad owned by the Northern Pacific
are not used by it for switching or assembling cars. The switching,
assembling, and classification of cars for its through and local
freight is done in the Rice's Point yard, where there are
fifty-five tracks, each 4,000 feet long, and at Furnace, where
there are fifteen tracks, cars are also switched and assembled. At
Berwind and Boston, two intermediate points, where there are
respectively nine and six tracks, cars are frequently set out or
picked up by transfer trains. The transfer trains here in question
appear to have run solid between Rice's Point and Furnace. Trains
are run by the Northern Pacific on this line at a speed varying
from three to eighteen miles an hour.
Page 254 U. S. 254
The company contends that the rule applied in
United States
v. Erie R. Co., 237 U. S. 402,
United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co.,
237 U. S. 410, and
Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v. United
States, 249 U. S. 534,
[
Footnote 2] is not applicable,
because here, unlike those cases, no part of the trains' journey
was performed on a track used as part of the main line of the
Northern Pacific system. If use of the road as part of a main line
were essential in order that operations on it be controlled by the
Safety Appliance Act, the requirement would be satisfied in this
case by the fact that two independent companies use the road for
freight trains under air control, and that the passenger trains of
another company cross it.
"Not only were these [the defendant's] trains subject to the
hazards which that provision was intended to avoid or minimize,
but, unless their engineers were able readily and quickly to check
or control their movements, they were a serious menace to the
safety of other trains which the statute was equally designed to
protect."
United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co.,
supra. But there is nothing in the act which limits the
application of the provision here in question to operations on main
line tracks. The requirement that train brakes shall be coupled so
as to be under engine control is, in terms (32 Stat. 943),
applicable to "all trains . . . used on any railroad engaged in
interstate commerce." It is admitted that this railroad is engaged
in interstate commerce, and the cases cited show that transfer
trains, like those here involved, are "trains" within the meaning
of the act. A moving locomotive with cars attached is without the
provision of the act only when it is not a train, as where the
operation is that of switching, classifying, and assembling cars
within railroad yards for the purpose of making
Page 254 U. S. 255
up trains. Congress has not imposed upon courts applying the act
any duty to weigh the dangers incident to particular operations,
and we have no occasion to consider the special dangers incident to
operating trains under the conditions here presented.
The judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Act March 2, 1893, c.196, § 1, 27 Stat. 531 as amended by Act
March 2, 1903, c. 976, § 2, 32 Stat. 943, and order of Interstate
Commerce Commission dated June 6, 1910.
[
Footnote 2]
That case was decided by this Court April 21 1919. The decision
of the circuit court of appeals in the case at bar was rendered
January 15, 1919.