L went bail for G in a federal prosecution upon an understanding
that a fund standing in certain securities should be held for his
indemnification, and not knowing that it represented moneys of
which G had defrauded the United States through the crimes charged
in the indictment, and, upon G's default, suffered judgment on the
bond, which was paid by his estate. (
See s.c.
224 U. S. 224 U.S.
567;
245 U. S. 245 U.S.
1.)
Held:
(1) That since the duty to pay the judgment was absolute, L's
estate was not entitled to be reimbursed out of the fund for the
expense of defending against proceedings by the United States in
the Surrogate Court to secure payment of its judgment. P.
253 U. S.
95.
(2) That, since the upholding of L's claim of indemnity against
the United States could not have been contemplated in L's agreement
and he have the status of
bona fide purchaser upon which
his paramount equity depended, the expense of establishing and
protecting the claim in the suit by which the government impounded
the fund could be charged against the fund only as costs, which
would be inadmissible, the United States not being liable to costs
directly or indirectly. P.
253
U. S. 97.
(3) That, in allowing L's estate the amount paid on the judgment
on the bail bond, with interest, the district court properly
deducted the clerk's poundage of 1 percent under Rev.Stats. § 828.
P.
253 U. S.
95.
257 F. 246 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 253 U. S. 95
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States brought a bill to charge Kellogg with a trust
in respect of funds received by him from Greene and obtained from
the plaintiff by Greene through his participation in some well
known frauds. In
224 U. S. 224 U.S.
567, the representative of Leary was allowed to intervene and to
assert a paramount claim upon the funds. In
United States v.
Leary, 245 U. S. 1, it was
established that the funds were held by Kellogg primarily as
security to Leary against his liability upon a bail bond for
Greene. The United States having obtained a judgment on the bail
bond and the same having been paid by the Leary estate. the present
appellants filed a petition in the cause in the district court to
have the funds applied to the reimbursement (1) of expenditures in
defending against proceedings in the Surrogate Court to secure
payment of the judgment; (2) of expenditures in establishing and
protecting the trust, and (3) of the sum of $40,802, the amount
paid on the judgment, with interest from July 26, 1910, the date
when the judgment was paid. The district court allowed the last
claim with interest at six percent less the clerk's poundage of one
percent under Rev.Stats. § 828. (The details are immaterial.) It
denied the other claims, and its decree was affirmed by the circuit
court of appeals. 257 F. 246. Leary's administrators appealed.
The only reason suggested for the claim on account of defending
against proceedings on the judgment is that the United States in
the present suit had impounded the funds available for payment. But
the obligation to pay the judgment was absolute, not confined to a
payment from these funds, and the claim for the cost of resisting
it has no foundation. We also are of opinion that the deduction of
poundage by the clerk was proper, as in other
Page 253 U. S. 96
cases of money kept and paid out by him. But it is said that
this item and the expense of defending the trust should be borne by
the residue of the funds in the clerk's hands after deducting the
amount paid in respect of the judgment. It is argued that the trust
informally established by letters of Kellogg stating that he held
it for Leary's protection to be applied in payment of his
obligation in case it should be established, if construed with
reasonable liberality, must embrace these elements to make the
protection complete. Of course, the upholding of Leary's claim
against the United States was not contemplated in the terms of the
trust because Leary's ignorance of the interest of the United
States was essential to the validity of his position as a purchaser
without notice. But it is thought that indemnity includes defenses
of the indemnifying fund against unexpected attacks, that, if the
trustee fails to make it the
cestui que trust may do so,
and that, in either event, the fund should be charged. It does not
matter that the United States is the opposing party, as its rights
in the fund are inferior to those that Leary now has successfully
affirmed.
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the
Florida v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527.
To these arguments the government replies, in the first place,
that they come too late, that the decree of the circuit court of
appeals that was before this Court on the last occasion was treated
as a final decree, which therefore fixed the amount that the
appellants could recover beyond enlargement, and that, as the
prayer of the appellants was only for the transfer of so much of
the fund as would pay the judgment on the bail bond with interest,
nothing more can be asked now. This objection might raise
difficulty if otherwise our opinion were in favor of the
appellants, but, as we think that the circuit court of appeals was
right with regard to the merits, we will assume for purposes of
decision that the previous proceeding did not so precisely
determine the appellants'
Page 253 U. S. 97
rights as to prevent their demanding the foregoing items as
incident to the claim allowed.
To charge the fund with these expenses is to charge the United
States, and it begs the question to say that the United States in
this respect is subordinate to the Leary claim. It is not
subordinate unless Leary's costs ought to come out of the
government's pocket, even though limited to particular money there.
The government cannot be made to pay or to take subject to the
deduction, because Leary, even though a
bona fide
purchaser, had no contract for it, and because to charge the fund
apart from contract is merely a roundabout way of saying that the
owner of the fund must pay charges of a kind that the United States
never pays (
see National Bank of Genesee v. Whitney,
103 U. S. 103,
103 U. S. 104;
United States v.
Barker, 2 Wheat. 395) and charges for protecting
the fund not for, but against, the United States.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS took no part in the decision of this
case.