A decree of the Circuit Court of Appeal in a suit for
infringement of patent and copyright and for unfair competition, is
reviewable by this Court on certiorari, as if on appeal. P.
253 U. S. 140.
Jud.Code, §§ 128, 240.
Page 253 U. S. 137
An order of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing an order of
the district court awarding a preliminary injunction will not be
reversed by this Court unless clearly erroneous. P.
253 U. S.
141.
Upon appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction, it
is proper for the circuit court of appeals to consider a change of
circumstances resulting from the reversal of a decree in another
circuit upon which the district court relied.
Id.
Upon an appeal under Jud.Code § 129 from an order granting a
preliminary injunction against the defendant, it would be erroneous
for the circuit court of appeals to grant a final decree for the
plaintiff upon proof by affidavit of a recent decree in another
circuit claimed to work an estoppel in plaintiff's favor, for
defendant must have opportunity to set up and establish its
defenses.
Id.
A conflict of views claimed to exist between the circuit court
of appeals in this case and a circuit court of appeals of another
circuit in a suit over the same subject and, as claimed, between
the same parties in interest,
held not to justify this
Court in deciding the merits on interlocutory appeal. P.
253 U. S. 142.
250 F. 450 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Proceeding against Wagner and others in the United States
District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Meccano, Limited,
obtained a decree (July 8, 1916) affirming the validity, and
restraining infringement, of its patent for mechanical toys, also
restraining unfair competition in making and selling such toys and
the further infringement of its copyright upon trade catalogue and
illustrated
Page 253 U. S. 138
manual relating thereto.
Meccano v. Wagner, 234 F. 912.
An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
The same corporation instituted the present suit in the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York (December 9,
1916) seeking like relief against John Wanamaker, a customer of
Wagner.
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction, asked upon the
bill, supporting affidavits and exhibits -- January 12, 1917. It
expressed general agreement with the conclusions announced in the
Ohio cause, and said:
"It seems quite apparent that the patent is infringed and that
diagrams and directions as to construction have been borrowed by
defendant from complainant's copyrighted catalogues, and that the
system of construction adopted by the defendant is a direct
imitation of complainant's system."
An appeal followed, pending which the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit (November, 1917), reversed the Ohio district court's
decree so far as it sustained the patent, approved it otherwise,
and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
Wagner v.
Meccano, 246 F. 603.
January 25, 1918, after argument, but before determination of
appeal from the preliminary order, petitioner moved for final
decision on the merits, claiming that the decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, "is final and conclusive as to the
case at bar, under principles enunciated by the Supreme Court."
Being opposed, the motion was denied March 24, 1918. The court said
of it:
"This was a motion for a 'decision on the merits of this cause'
by this court under the following circumstances: a suit was brought
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York for an
injunction for infringement of a copyright, and of a patent, and
for unfair competition in the manufacture of a mechanical toy in
absolute imitation of the plaintiff's. The plaintiff applied for
and got
Page 253 U. S. 139
an injunction
pendente lite, from which the defendant
appealed. That appeal is still pending undetermined in this Court.
Meanwhile, the plaintiff had in the district court required the
defendant to answer certain interrogatories, by which it appeared
that the defendant procured from one Wagner the toys which it sold
in alleged unfair competition and in violation of the patent, and
also the 'manuals' which went with the toys and explained their
uses, which are alleged to infringe the copyright. The
interrogatories further showed that Wagner had agreed to hold the
defendant harmless for any sales of the toys and manuals, and that,
in pursuance of that undertaking, he had taken a share in the
defense of this suit. While it did not appear exactly what that
share was, it may be assumed, for the purpose of the motion only,
that Wagner has assumed the chief conduct of the case, and that the
defendant remains only formally represented."
"The plaintiff sued Wagner in Ohio upon the three same causes of
equity and obtained a decree upon all. Later, an appeal was taken
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the
decree was affirmed except as to the patent, which was declared
invalid, and which the plaintiff has now withdrawn from this suit.
No final decree has been entered, and the Ohio cause now stands for
an accounting in the district court. This motion is upon the record
in the Ohio suit, which is made a part of the moving papers, and it
presupposes that this Court may pass a final decree for the
plaintiff upon the appeal from the injunction
pendente
lite, upon the assumption that that record is a complete
estoppel against the defendant here, and leaves open no issues for
determination between the parties."
"We pass the question of practice whether this court, under the
doctrine of
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co.,
177 U.
S. 488, may enter a decree for the plaintiff upon
such
Page 253 U. S. 140
an appeal as that now pending.
Mast, Foos & Co. v.
Stover Mfg. Co., supra, was a case where the bill was
dismissed, and no case has so far held that the plaintiff could
obtain an affirmative decree. As we think the motion must be denied
upon the merits, we leave open the question whether the plaintiff
may, in any event, so terminate the litigation. . . . It is
apparent that some of the issues are different from those litigated
in Ohio; they involve not only the defendant's rights to sell
Wagner's toys and manuals, but any others which it may procure
elsewhere. . . . At best, the rule in
Mast, Foos & Co. v.
Stover Mfg. Co., supra, is limited to those cases in which the
court can see that the whole issues can be disposed of at once
without injustice to the parties. Whatever may be the result here,
it is apparent that the case involves more than can be so
decided."
250 F. 250.
April 15, 1918, the court below reversed the challenged
preliminary order. After stating that the trial court very
naturally followed the Ohio district court, it referred to the
partial reversal of the decree there announced and expressed entire
agreement with the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in
holding the patent invalid. And, having considered the evidence
relating to copyright and unfair competition, it found no adequate
ground for an injunction. 250 F. 450. The cause comes here by
certiorari.
See Ex parte Wagner, 249 U.
S. 465.
Decrees by circuit courts of appeals are declared final by § 128
Judicial Code in cases like the present one. We therefore had
authority to bring this cause up by certiorari, and may treat it as
if here on appeal. Section 240, Judicial Code;
Harriman v.
Northern Securities Co., 197 U. S. 244,
197 U. S. 287;
Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.
S. 123,
229 U. S. 136.
The power of circuit courts of appeals to review preliminary orders
granting injunctions arises from § 129 Judicial Code, which has
been often considered.
Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works,
165 U. S. 518;
Page 253 U. S. 141
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Manufacturing Co.,
177 U. S. 485,
177 U. S. 494;
Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., supra; United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bray, 225 U.
S. 205,
225 U. S. 214;
Denver v. New York Trust Co., supra. This power is not
limited to mere consideration of, and action upon, the order
appealed from, but, if insuperable objection to maintaining the
bill clearly appears, it may be dismissed and the litigation
terminated.
The correct general doctrine is that whether a preliminary
injunction shall be awarded rests in sound discretion of the trial
court. Upon appeal, an order granting or denying such an injunction
will not be disturbed, unless contrary to some rule of equity, or
the result of improvident exercise of judicial discretion.
Rabley v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 122 F. 623;
Texas
Traction Co. v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 195 F. 65, 66;
Southern Express Co. v. Long, 202 F. 462;
City of
Amarillo v. Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co., 253 F.
638. The informed judgment of the circuit court of appeals
exercised upon a view of all relevant circumstances is entitled to
great weight. And, except for strong reasons, this Court will not
interfere with its action. No such reasons are presented by the
present record.
Pending the New York appeal, the situation underwent a radical
change -- the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed the
decree upholding petitioner's patent. Evidently the trial court had
granted the preliminary injunction in entire reliance upon that
decree, and after its reversal, the court below properly took
notice of and considered the changed circumstances.
Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U.
S. 503,
224 U. S.
505-506.
Petitioner maintains that its motion for final decree upon the
merits should have been sustained. But the appeal was from an
interlocutory order, and the court could only exercise powers given
by statute. On such an appeal, a cause may be dismissed if it
clearly appears that
Page 253 U. S. 142
no ground exists for equitable relief; but finally to decide a
defendant's rights upon the mere statement of his adversary,
although apparently supported by
ex parte affidavits and
decrees of other courts is not within the purview of the act. He is
entitled to a day in court with opportunity to set up and establish
his defenses. The motion for final judgment was properly overruled.
Eagle Glass & Manufacturing Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.
S. 275,
245 U. S.
281.
Petitioner's motion to enter a disclaimer must be denied.
If the two circuit courts of appeals have expressed conflicting
views, we cannot now declare which is right or undertake finally to
decide the several issues involved upon their merits. The matter
for review here is the action of the courts below upon the
preliminary order for injunction, and we may go no further.
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,
213 U. S. 301,
213 U. S. 311;
Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Knight, 217 U.
S. 257,
217 U. S.
267.
The judgment of the circuit court of appeals is affirmed. The
cause will be remanded to the district court for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Affirmed.