This Court will determine only matters actually in controversy
essential to the decision of the particular case before it. P.
253 U. S.
115.
In a suit in which the Interstate Commerce Commission was
temporarily enjoined from requiring interstate and water carriers
to use certain forms of bills of lading in domestic and export
transportation upon the ground that the Commission lacked power to
prescribe them,
held that, since the Transportation Act of
February 28, 1920, passed pending the interlocutory appeal,
contained provisions which would necessitate changes in both forms
of bills, the case had become moot, and the Court could not pass
upon the Commission's authority, but would reverse the order of
injunction, no longer needed to protect the complainants against
the order of the Commission involved in the suit, without prejudice
to the right to assail any such order adopted after the new
legislation, and without costs to either party.
Id.
259 F. 713 reversed.
Page 253 U. S. 114
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
A petition was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York by numerous interstate carriers and
carriers by water against the United States and the Interstate
Commerce Commission to set aside an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission dated March 14, 1919, requiring the carriers to
use two certain modified bills of landing, one pertaining to
domestic and the other to export transportation. The cause came on
for hearing upon application for a temporary injunction and upon a
motion to dismiss the petition. The hearing was had before three
judges, a circuit judge and two district judges. A majority
concurred in holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had no
authority to prescribe the terms of carrier's bills of lading, and
that, in any event, there was no power to prescribe an inland bill
of lading depriving the carriers of the benefits of certain
statutes of the United States limiting the liability of vessel
owners.
Alaska S.S. Co. v. United States, 259 F. 713. One
of the district judges dissented, holding that the Commission had
the power to prescribe bills of lading and that the particular
bills of lading in question were within the authority of the
Commission. An order was entered refusing to dismiss the petition,
and an injunction
pendente lite was granted. From this
order an appeal was taken directly to this Court under the statute
of 1913. 38 Stat. 220.
Page 253 U. S. 115
It appears that the matter in controversy as to the authority of
the Commission and the character of the bills of lading were
subjects of much inquiry before the Commission, where hearings were
had, and an elaborate report upon the proposed changes in carriers'
bills of lading resulted in the adoption by the Commission of the
two bills of lading. 52 I.C.C. 671.
Pending this appeal, Congress passed on February 28, 1920, the
act known as the "Transportation Act of 1920," which terminated the
federal control of railroads, and amended in various particulars
previous acts to regulate interstate commerce. In view of this act
of Congress, this Court, on March 22, 1920, entered an order
requesting counsel to file briefs concerning the effect of the act
upon this cause. Briefs have been filed, and we now come to
consider the altered situation arising from the new legislation,
and what effect should be given to it in the disposition of this
case.
The thing sought to be accomplished by the prosecution of this
suit was an annulment of the order of the Commission, and an
injunction restraining the putting into effect and operation of
such order, which prescribe the two forms of bills of lading. The
temporary injunction granted was against putting into effect the
Commission's order prescribing the forms of the bills of
lading.
The Transportation Act of 1920, passed pending this appeal,
makes it evident (and it is in fact conceded in the brief filed by
appellants) that changes will be required in both forms of bills of
lading in order that they may conform to the requirements of the
statute. We need not now discuss the details of these changes. It
is sufficient to say that the act requires them as to both classes
of bills. We are of opinion that the necessary effect of the
enactment of this statute is to make the cause a moot one. In the
appellant's brief, it is insisted that the power of the Commission
to prescribe bills of lading is still existent,
Page 253 U. S. 116
and has not been modified by the provisions of the new law. But
that is only one of the questions in the case. It is true that the
determination of it underlies the right of the Commission to
prescribe new forms of bills of lading, but it is a settled
principle in this Court that it will determine only actual matters
in controversy essential to the decision of the particular case
before it. Where, by an act of the parties or a subsequent law, the
existing controversy has come to an end, the case becomes moot, and
should be treated accordingly. However convenient it might be to
have decided the question of the power of the Commission to require
the carriers to comply with an order prescribing bills of lading,
this Court
"is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases,
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the
thing in issue in the case before it. No stipulation of parties or
counsel, whether in the case before the court or in any other case,
can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the Court in this
regard."
California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co.,
149 U. S. 308,
149 U. S. 314;
United States v. Hamburg American Line, 239 U.
S. 466,
239 U. S.
475-476, and previous cases of this Court therein
cited.
In the present case, what we have said makes it apparent that
the complainants do not now need an injunction to prevent the
Commission from putting in force bills of lading in the form
prescribed. The subsequent legislation necessitates the adoption of
different forms of bills in the event that the power of the
Commission be sustained. This legislation having that effect
renders the case moot.
Berry v. Davis, 242 U.
S. 468.
In our view, the proper course is to reverse the order, and
remand the cause to the court below with directions to dismiss the
petition, without costs to either party and without prejudice to
the right of the complainants to assail in the future any order of
the Commission prescribing
Page 253 U. S. 117
bills of lading after the enactment of the new legislation.
United States v. Hamburg American Line, supra; Berry v. Davis,
supra.
And it is so ordered.