Where a fund has been appropriated by Congress for payment to a
specified person in satisfaction of a finding of the Court of
Claims, the duty of the Treasury officials to pay it over is
ministerial, and a suit by one who has an equitable right in the
fund, for attorney's fees, to establish such right as against the
owner, and to require the Treasury officials to pay the fund to a
receiver is not a suit against the United States, and may be
maintained in the courts of the District of Columbia if the owner,
as well as the officials, is made a party and bound by the decree
so that it may afford due acquittance to the government. P.
252 U. S.
472.
The situs of the debt in such cases is not material if its owner
voluntarily appears and answers without objecting to the
jurisdiction. P.
252 U. S.
474.
Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes does not prevent assignment
by operation of law after a claim has been allowed. P.
252 U. S.
473.
47 App.D.C. 364 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 252 U. S. 471
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit in equity, brought by the late Belva A. Lockwood
in her lifetime in the Supreme Court of the District Columbia to
establish an equitable lien for attorney's fees upon a fund of
$1,200 in the treasury of the United States, appropriated by
Congress (Act of March 4, 1915, c. 140, 38 Stat. 962, 981) to pay a
claim found by the Court of Claims to be due to one Susan Sanders,
who was made defendant together with the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Treasurer of the United States. There were appropriate
prayers for relief by injunction and the appointment of a receiver.
Defendant Sanders voluntarily appeared and answered, denying her
indebtedness to plaintiff; the other defendants answered, admitting
the existence of the fund and declaring that, as a matter of comity
and out of deference to the court, it would be retained under their
control to await the final disposition of the case, but objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the cause upon the ground
that debts due from the United States have no situs in the District
of Columbia, that there was nothing to show that either the United
States or the defendant Sanders had elected to make the sum alleged
to be due from the United States payable to her in the District,
and that, in the absence of personal service upon her, the court
could make no decree that would protect the United States. There
was a final decree adjudging that
Page 252 U. S. 472
the sum of $90 was due from the defendant Sanders to Mrs.
Lockwood, with costs, and appointing a receiver to collect and
receive from the Secretary of the Treasury the $1,200 appropriated
in favor of Sanders, directing the Secretary to pay the latter sum
to the receiver, and decreeing that his receipt should be a full
acquittance to the United States for any and all claims and demands
of the parties arising out of or connected with said claim. The
Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer appealed to the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, the defendant Sanders not
appealing. That court affirmed the decree, 47 App.D.C. 364, and a
further appeal, taken by the officials of the Treasury under § 250,
Judicial Code, brings the case here.
The principal contention is that, because the object of the suit
and the effect of the decree were to control the action of the
appellants in the performance of their official duties, the suit
was in effect one against the United States. But since the fund in
question has been appropriated by act of Congress for payment to a
specified person in satisfaction of a finding of the Court of
Claims, it is clear that the officials of the Treasury are charged
with the ministerial duty to make payment on demand to the person
designated. It is settled that, in such a case, a suit brought by
the person entitled to the performance of the duty against the
official charged with its performance is not a suit against the
government. So it has been declared by this Court in many cases
relating to state officers.
Board of Liquidation v.
McComb, 92 U. S. 531,
92 U. S. 541;
Louisiana v. Junel, 107 U. S. 711,
107 U. S. 727;
In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443,
123 U. S. 506.
In
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.
S. 373,
185 U. S. 386,
while holding that a suit against officers of the United States
might be in effect a suit against the United States, the Court
said:
"Of course, this statement has no reference to and does not
include those cases in which officers of the United States are
sued, in appropriate
Page 252 U. S. 473
form, to compel them to perform some ministerial duty imposed
upon them by law, and which they wrongfully neglect or refuse to
perform. Such suits would not be deemed suits against the United
States within the rule that the government cannot be sued except by
its consent, nor within the rule established in the
Ayers
case."
And in
Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U.
S. 124, the court upheld the right of a claimant in
whose favor an appropriation had been mad by Congress to have a
mandamus against the Secretary of the Treasury requiring him to pay
the claim. To the same effect,
Roberts v. United States,
176 U. S. 221,
176 U. S.
231.
In the present case, it is conceded, and properly conceded, that
payment of the fund in question to the defendant Sanders is a
ministerial duty, the performance of which could be compelled by
mandamus. But from this it is a necessary consequence that one who
has an equitable right in the fund as against Sanders may have
relief against the officials of the Treasury through a mandatory
writ of injunction, or a receivership, which is its equivalent,
making Sanders a party so as to bind her and so that the decree may
afford a proper acquittance to the government. The practice of
bringing suits in equity for this purpose is well established in
the courts of the District.
Sanborn v. Maxwell, 18
App.D.C. 245;
Roberts v. Consaul, 24 App.D.C. 551, 562;
Jones v. Rutherford, 26 App.D.C. 114;
Parish v.
McGowan, 39 App.D.C. 184, s.c. on appeal
McGowan v.
Parish, 237 U. S. 285,
237 U. S. 295.
Confined, as it necessarily must be, to cases where the officials
of the government have only a ministerial duty to perform, and one
in which the party complainant has a particular interest, the
practice is a convenient one, well supported by both principle and
precedent.
Section 3477, Rev.Stats., regulating the assignment of claims
against the United States, is not an obstacle. As has been held
many times, the object of Congress in this legislation
Page 252 U. S. 474
was to protect the government, not the claimant, and it does not
stand in the way of giving effect to an assignment by operation of
law after the claim has been allowed.
Erwin v. United
States, 97 U. S. 392,
97 U. S. 397;
Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556,
102 U. S. 560;
Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410,
173 U. S.
423-425.
In support of the contention that a court of equity may not
control the action of an officer of the United States within the
scope of his authority,
Wells v. Roper, 246 U.
S. 335, is cited, but it is not in point. The official
duty sought to be subjected to control in that case was not
ministerial, but required an exercise of official discretion, as
the opinion shows. 246 U.S.
246 U. S. 338.
It is further objected that debts due from the United States
have no situs at the seat of government, and
Vaughan v.
Northup, 15 Pet. 1,
40 U. S. 6,
Mackey v. Cox,
18 How. 100,
59 U. S. 105,
and
Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654,
109 U. S. 657,
are cited. But, in the present case, the question of situs is not
material. If the jurisdiction as to the defendant Sanders had
depended upon publication of process against her as a nonresident
under § 105 of the District Code (Act of March 3, 1901, c. 854, 31
Stat. 1189, 1206), upon the theory that her claim against the
government was "property within the District," the point would
require consideration. But the jurisdiction over her rests upon her
having voluntarily appeared and answered the bill without
objection. Hence, there is no question that the decree binds her,
and so constitutes a good acquittance to the United States as
against her.
The decree will be
Affirmed.