Where the district court, in a case depending on diverse
citizenship, having appointed a receiver to take charge of and
disburse and distribute the assets of an insolvent state
corporation, permitted a receiver later appointed for the same
corporation by a court of the state to intervene and, after full
hearing, denied his application to vacate the federal receivership
and to have the assets turned over to him upon the ground that the
proceedings in the state court had deprived the district court of
jurisdiction,
held that the order of the district court
denying the application was a final decision, within the meaning of
Jud.Code, § 128, appealable to the circuit court of appeals. P.
252 U. S.
36.
The words "final decision" in that section mean the same thing
as "final judgments and decrees" used in former acts regulating
appellate jurisdiction.
Id.
When there is a right to a writ of error or appeal, resort may
not be had to mandamus or prohibition. P. 37.Rule discharged.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 252 U. S. 34
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an application of J. Raymond Tiffany as receiver,
appointed by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, of William
Necker, Incorporated, for a writ of mandamus, or, in the
alternative, a writ of prohibition, the object of which is to
require the district judge and the District Court of the United
States for the District of New Jersey to order the assets of the
corporation, in the hands of a federal receiver, to be turned over
to applicant for administration by him as receiver appointed by the
New Jersey Court of Chancery.
An order to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not
be granted was issued, a return was made by the district judge, and
the matter was argued and submitted. The pertinent facts are: on
September 30, 1916, creditors and shareholders of William Necker,
Incorporated, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, filed a
bill in the United States District Court of New Jersey alleging
the
Page 252 U. S. 35
insolvency of the corporation, praying for the appointment of a
receiver and a distribution of the corporate assets among the
creditors and shareholders. The bill alleged diversity of
citizenship as a ground for jurisdiction. The defendant corporation
appeared and answered, admitting the allegations of the bill, and
joined in the prayer that its assets be sold and distributed
according to law. Upon consent, the district court appointed a
receiver. The estate is insolvent, and the assets in the hands of
the federal receiver are insufficient to pay creditors, and
shareholders will receive nothing. On April 1, 1919, 2 1/2 years
after the appointment of the federal receiver, creditors of William
Necker, Incorporated, filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey alleging the corporation's insolvency, praying that it be
decreed to be insolvent, that an injunction issue restraining it
from exercising its franchises, and that a receiver be appointed to
dispose of the property and distribute it among creditors and
shareholders. A decree was entered in said cause adjudging the
corporation insolvent and appointing the petitioner, J. Raymond
Tiffany, receiver. Thereupon Tiffany made application to the United
States district court asking that its injunction enjoining the
corporation and all of its officers and all other persons from
interfering with the possession of the federal receiver be
dissolved, that the federal receivership be vacated, and that the
federal receiver turn over the assets of the company then in his
hands, less administration expenses, to the chancery receiver for
final distribution -- the contention being that the appointment of
the chancery receiver and the proceedings in the state court
superseded the federal proceeding, and deprived the federal court
of jurisdiction.
The federal receiver had made various reports and conducted the
business of the corporation up until the time of the application in
the Court of Chancery of New
Page 252 U. S. 36
Jersey, in which the applicant was appointed receiver. It
appears that the applicants in the state court also filed their
verified claims with the federal receiver, and that no creditor or
shareholder made objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the federal court until the application in the state court.
The federal district court permitted the chancery receiver to
intervene, heard the parties, and delivered an opinion in which the
matter was fully considered. As a result of such hearing and
consideration, an order was entered in which it was recited that
Tiffany, the state receiver, had made an application to the federal
district court for an order directing it to turn over to the
chancery receiver all of the assets of the corporation in the
possession of the federal receiver, and the district court ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the said application of J. Raymond
Tiffany, receiver in chancery, "be and the same hereby is
denied."
By Judicial Code, § 128, the circuit court of appeals is given
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal or writ of error final
decisions in the district courts, with certain exceptions not
necessary to be considered. It is clear that the order made in the
district court refusing to turn over the property to the chancery
receiver was a final decision within the meaning of the section of
the Judicial Code to which we have referred, and from which the
chancery receiver had the right to appeal to the circuit court of
appeals. By the order, the right of the state receiver to possess
and administer the property of the corporation was finally denied.
The words "final decision in the district court" mean the same
thing as "final judgments and decrees," as used in former acts
regulating appellate jurisdiction. Loveland on Appellate
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, § 39. This conclusion is amply
sustained by the decisions of this Court.
Savannah v.
Jesup, 106 U. S. 563;
Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U. S. 545;
Page 252 U. S. 37
Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276,
110 U. S. 287.
See also a well considered case in the Circuit Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit --
Dexter Horton National Bank v.
Hawkins, 190 F. 924.
It is well settled that, where a party has the right to a writ
of error or appeal, resort may not be had to the extraordinary writ
of mandamus or prohibition.
In re Harding, 219 U.
S. 363;
Ex Parte Oklahoma, 220 U.
S. 191. As the petitioner had the right of appeal to the
circuit court of appeals, he could not resort to the writ of
mandamus or prohibition. It results that an order must be made
discharging the rule.
Rule discharged.