A railroad employee was injured through a collision while
traveling on his company's line between points in Ohio by means of
a pass, good only between those points and within that state and
containing a release from liability for negligence. His purpose was
to continue the journey, partly over a line of another carrier in
Ohio on which he would pay fare and thence over one of his company
into another state by means of another pass, the terms of which
were not disclosed by the evidence.
Held that his travel
at time of injury was intrastate, so that the validity of the
release depended on the laws of Ohio. P.
252 U. S.
155.
A stipulation on a free pass purporting to release the carrier
from all liability for negligence is ineffective where injury to
the passenger results from the willful and wanton negligence of the
carrier's servants. P.
252 U. S.
157.
Affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, whom we shall refer to as the plaintiff, brought
suit against the petitioner, defendant, to recover damages for
severe injuries which he sustained in a rear-end collision on
defendant's railroad which he averred was caused by the gross
negligence of the engineer of the
Page 252 U. S. 153
train following that on which he was a passenger in failing to
look for and heed danger signals which indicated that the track
ahead was occupied. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as
an engineer, with a run between Air Line Junction at Toledo and
Collingwood, a suburb of Cleveland, wholly within the State of
Ohio. As an incident to his employment, he was given an annual
pass, good between Air Line Junction and Collingwood, which
contained the release following:
"In consideration of receiving this free pass, each of the
persons named thereon, using the same, voluntarily assumes all risk
of accidents, and expressly agrees that the company shall not be
liable under any circumstances, whether of negligence of itself,
its agents, or otherwise, for any injury to his or her person, or
for any loss or injury to his or her property, and that, as for him
or her, in the use of this pass, he or she will not consider the
company as a common carrier and liable to him or her as such."
"And, as a condition precedent to the issuing and use thereof,
each of the persons named on the face of this pass states that he
or she is not prohibited by law from receiving free transportation,
and that the pass will be lawfully used."
Having been informed that his mother had died at her home near
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the plaintiff, desiring to attend her
funeral, applied to the defendant for and obtained a pass for
himself and wife from Toledo to Youngstown, Ohio, via Ashtabula,
and was promised that another pass for himself and wife would be
left with the agent of the company at Youngstown, good for the
remainder, the interstate part, of the journey to Pittsburgh. But
the line of the defendant via Ashtabula to Youngstown was much
longer, and required a number of hours more for the journey than it
did to go via Cleveland, using the Erie Railroad from that city to
Youngstown, and for this reason, the record shows, the plaintiff
Mohney,
Page 252 U. S. 154
before leaving home, decided that his wife should not accompany
him and that he would make the journey by a train of the defendant,
which used its own rails to Cleveland, and from Cleveland to
Youngstown used the tracks of the Erie Railroad Company, and at
Youngstown returned to the road of the defendant, over which it ran
to Pittsburgh. The transportation which he had received via
Ashtabula could not be used over the shorter route, and therefore
the plaintiff presented his annual pass for transportation from
Toledo to Cleveland, intending to pay his fare from Cleveland to
Youngstown over the Erie Railroad, leave the train at the Erie
station at Youngstown, inquire by telephone as to the time and
place of the burial of his mother, and then go to the New York
Central station, a half mile away, obtain the pass which was to be
left there for him, and go forward to Pittsburgh on the next
convenient train.
The train on which Mohney was a passenger was wrecked between
Toledo and Cleveland. It had come to a stop at a station and the
second section of the train ran past two block signals, indicating
danger ahead, and collided with the rear car of the first section,
in which Mohney was riding, causing him serious injury.
The case was tried on stipulated facts and the testimony of the
plaintiff. The trial court concluded that Mohney, at the time he
was injured, was on an intrastate journey using an intrastate pass,
and that, by the law of Ohio, the release upon it was void as
against public policy. Thereupon, a jury being waived, the court
entered judgment in plaintiff's favor.
The state court of appeals, differing with the trial court,
concluded that Mohney was an interstate passenger when injured, and
that the release on the pass was valid under the ruling in
Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Thompson,
234 U. S. 576. But
the court went further and affirmed the judgment on two grounds --
by a divided
Page 252 U. S. 155
court on the ground that the pass was issued to Mohney as part
consideration of his employment, and, all judges concurring, for
the reason that "we are clearly of the opinion that the negligence
in this case, under the evidence, was willful and wanton." For
these reasons, it was held that the release on the pass did not
constitute a defense to the action.
The supreme court of the state denied a motion for an order
requiring the court of appeals to certify the record to it for
review, and the case is here on writ of certiorari.
The propriety of the use of the annual pass by Mohney for such a
personal journey and that the release on it was not valid under
Ohio law, were not questioned, and the sole defense urged by the
railroad company was, and now is, that his purpose to continue his
journey to a destination in Pennsylvania rendered him an interstate
passenger, subject to federal law from the time he entered the
train at Toledo, and that the release on the pass was valid under
234 U. S. 234 U.S.
576,
supra.
The three freight cases on which the defendant relies for its
contention that the plaintiff was an interstate passenger when
injured all proceed upon the principle that the essential character
of the transportation, and not the purpose or mental state of the
shipper determines whether state or national law applies to the
transaction involved.
Thus, in
Coe v. Errol, 116 U.
S. 517, the owner's state of mind in relation to the
logs, his intent to export them, and even his partial preparation
to do so did not exempt them from state taxation, because they did
not pass within the domain of the federal law until they had
"been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for
transportation to another state, or had been started upon such
transportation in a continuous route or journey."
In
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission and Young, 219 U. S. 498,
219 U. S. 527, the
cotton seed
Page 252 U. S. 156
cake and meal, although billed to Galveston, were
"all destined for export, and, by their delivery to the
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway, they must be
considered as having been delivered to a carrier for transportation
to their foreign destination. . . . The case therefore comes under
Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517."
The mental purpose of Young, and his attempted practice by
intrastate billing, was to keep within the domain of the state law,
but his contracts, express and implied, brought the discrimination
complained of in the case within the scope of the Interstate
Commerce Act.
In
Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington,
225 U. S. 101, the
Commission attempted to regulate the rate on "lake cargo coal,"
because it was often billed from the mines to Huron, or other ports
within the state, but this Court found that the established "lake
cargo coal" rate was intended to apply, and in practice did apply,
only "to such coal as was in fact placed on vessels for carriage
beyond the state," and obviously, "by every fair test,
transportation of this coal from the mines to upper lake ports is
an interstate carriage." For this reason, the enforcement of the
order of the state commission was enjoined as an attempt to
regulate and control interstate commerce. Here again, it was the
committing of a designated kind of coal to a carrier for
transportation in interstate commerce that rendered the federal law
applicable.
To what extent the analogy between the shipments of property and
the transportation of passengers may profitably be pressed we need
not inquire, for, in this case, the only contract between the
carrier defendant and the plaintiff was the annual pass issued to
the latter. This written contract, with its release, is the sole
reliance of the defendant. But that contract, in terms, was good
only between Air Line Junction and Collingwood, over a line of
track wholly within Ohio, and the company was charged
Page 252 U. S. 157
with notice when it issued the pass that the public policy of
that state rendered the release upon it valueless. The purpose of
the plaintiff to continue his journey into Pennsylvania would have
been of no avail in securing him transportation over the Erie Line
to Youngstown; for that, he must pay the published fare, and very
surely the release on the pass to Collingwood would not have
attached to the ticket to Youngstown. Whether there was a similar
release on the pass to Pittsburgh, which Mohney expected to get at
Youngstown, the record does not disclose, and it is of no
consequence whether there was or not. The contract which the
defendant had with its passenger was in writing, and was for an
intrastate journey, and it cannot be modified by the purpose of
Mohney to continue his journey into another state under a contract
of carriage with another carrier for which he would have been
obliged to pay the published rate, or by an intended second
contract with the defendant in terms which are not disclosed. The
mental purpose of one of the parties to a written contract cannot
change its terms.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
249 U. S. 472. For
these reasons, the judgment of the trial court was right, and
should have been affirmed.
But the court of appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds,
one of which was that all of the judges were "clearly of the
opinion that the negligence in the case, under the evidence, was
willful and wanton." This Court does not weigh the evidence in such
cases as we have here, but it has been looked into sufficiently to
satisfy us that the argument that there is no evidence whatever in
the record to support such a finding cannot be sustained.
A carrier by rail is liable to a trespasser or to a mere
licensee willfully or wantonly injured by its servants in charge of
its train (Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, Thompson, ยงยง
3307, 3308, and 3309, and the same sections in White's Supplement
thereto), and a sound public policy forbids that a less onerous
rule should be applied to a
Page 252 U. S. 158
passenger injured by like negligence when lawfully upon one of
its trains. This much of protection was due the plaintiff as a
human being who had entrusted his safety to defendants' keeping.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.
S. 601, 603 [argument of counsel -- omitted];
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Maucher,
248 U. S. 359,
248 U. S. 363.
The evidence in the record as to the terms and conditions upon
which the pass was issued to the plaintiff is so meager that, since
it is not necessary to a decision of the case, we need not and do
not consider the extent to which the case of
Charleston &
Western Carolina Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 234 U.
S. 576, is applicable to an employee using a pass
furnished to him seemingly as a necessary incident to his
employment.
The judgment of the court of appeals is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DAY and MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER concur in the
result, being of opinion that Mohney was using the annual pass in
an interstate journey, and that to such a use of the pass the Ohio
law was inapplicable, but that the releasing clause on the pass did
not cover or embrace his injury, because the latter resulted from
willful or wanton negligence, as to which such a clause is of no
force or effect.