Thornton v. Wynn
Annotate this Case
25 U.S. 183 (1827)
U.S. Supreme Court
Thornton v. Wynn, 25 U.S. 12 Wheat. 183 183 (1827)
Thornton v. Wynn
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 183
An unconditional promise by the endorser of a bill or note to pay it or the acknowledgement of his liability after knowledge of his discharge from his responsibility by the laches of the holder, amounted to an implied waiver of due notice of a demand from the drawee, acceptor, or maker.
So an acknowledgement of the drawer's or endorser's liability has the same effect. Knowledge of the fact of the laches of the holder is essential to charge the endorser upon his promise or acknowledgement.
Upon a sale with a warranty of soundness, or where, by the special terms of the contract, the vendee is at liberty to return the article sold, an offer to return it is equivalent to an offer accepted by the vendor, and the contract being thereby rescinded, it is a defense to an action for the purchase money, brought by the vendor, and will entitle the vendee to recover it back if it has been paid.
So, if the sale is absolute and the vendor afterwards consent unconditionally to take back the article, the consequences are the same.
But if the sale be absolute and there be no subsequent consent to take back the article, the contract remains open, and the vendee must resort to his action upon the warranty, unless it be proved that the vendor knew of the unsoundness of the article, and the vendee tendered a return of it within a reasonable time.
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