The lien of a judgment on the lands of the debtor, created by
statute and limited to a certain period of time, is unaffected by
the circumstance of the plaintiff not proceeding upon it (during
that period) until a subsequent lien has been obtained and carried
into execution.
Universal principle that a prior lien is entitled to prior
satisfaction out of the thing it binds unless the lien be
intrinsically defective or is displaced by some act of the party
holding it, which shall postpone him at law or in equity.
Mere delay in proceeding to execution is not such an act.
Distinction created by statute as to executions against personal
chattels and reasons on which it is founded.
This was an action of ejectment brought in the court below by
the defendant in error, Scott, to recover the possession of a house
and lot in the Town of St. Louis. At the trial, a special verdict
was found stating that in the year 1816, John Little married Marie
Antoinete Labadie, who was then seized in fee of the house and lot
in question. She died without issue, leaving the husband seized in
fee of a moiety of the premises. He soon afterwards died without
issue and intestate. In April, 1821, judgment was rendered in the
circuit court of the county where the premises lay against the
administrator of Little in favor of Schatzell and another for
$2,747.19. In March following, another judgment was rendered
against the same in favor of B. Pratte, for $1,241. Execution was
immediately issued upon the latter judgment, and the premises in
question sold under it to Scott, the plaintiff in ejectment; and
soon afterwards another execution issued upon the first judgment,
and the same premises were sold to Schatzell, one of the defendants
below, and conveyed to him by the sheriff's deed. Rankin, who was
tenant to Little in his lifetime, remained in possession of the
premises after his death,
Page 25 U. S. 178
and attorned to Schatzell. The question raised upon these facts
was whether the sale by the sheriff under the second judgment and
first execution devested the lien of the first judgment? The court
below determined it in the affirmative, and the cause was brought
by writ of error before this Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court,
and after stating the case, proceeded as follows:
The act of the then territorial government of Missouri, on which
this question depends, is in these words:
"Judgments obtained in the general court shall be a lien on the
lands and tenements of the person or persons against whom the same
has been entered, situate in any part of this territory, and
judgments obtained in a court of common pleas of any district shall
be a lien on the lands and tenements of the person against whom the
same has been entered, situate in such district."
The act contains a proviso
"That no judgment hereafter entered in any court of record
within this territory shall continue a lien on the lands and
tenements against whom the same has been entered during a longer
term than five years from the first return day of the term of which
such judgment may be entered, unless the same shall have been
revived by
scire facias,"
&c.
Page 25 U. S. 179
Since the Territory of Missouri was erected into a state, the
general court has received the appellation of the superior court,
and the court of common pleas for the district has been denominated
the circuit court for the county. The execution on the first
judgment was issued within a short time after it was rendered, and
while the lien it created was in full force, unless it was removed
by the execution and sale under the second judgment.
There is no expression in the law of Missouri which can suggest
a doubt on this subject. By that law, judgments are to be a lien on
all the lands of the debtor. This lien commences with the judgment
and continues for five years. The principle is believed to be
universal that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled
to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it binds, unless the lien
be intrinsically defective or be displaced by some act of the party
holding it, which shall postpone him in a court of law or equity to
a subsequent claimant. The single circumstance of not proceeding on
it until a subsequent lien has been obtained and carried into
execution, has never been considered as such an act. Take the
common case of mortgages. It has never been supposed that a
subsequent mortgage could, by obtaining and executing a decree for
the sale of the mortgaged property, obtain precedence over a prior
mortgage in which all the requisites of the law had been observed.
If such a decree should be made without preserving the rights of
the prior mortgagee, the property would remain subject to those
rights in the hands of the purchaser. So in cases of judgment,
where an
elegit may be sued out against the lands of the
debtor. The implied lien created by the first judgment retains the
preference over the lien created by a second judgment, so long as
an
elegit can issue on the first. A statutory lien is as
binding as a mortgage, and has the same capacity to hold the land
so long as the statute preserves it in force.
The cases cited of executions against personal property do not,
we think, apply. In those cases, the lien is not created by the
judgment or by any matter of record. The purchaser of the goods
cannot suppose that the officer has committed any impropriety in
the performance of his duty
Page 25 U. S. 180
and this circumstance has induced Parliament to secure him. It
is stated by Ashhurst, Justice, in 1 Term 731, that this was the
sole object of that part of the statute of frauds which relates to
this subject. In the case at bar, the judgment is notice to the
purchaser of the prior lien, and there is no act of the legislature
to protect the purchaser from that lien.
We think, then, that the deed made by the sheriff to the
purchaser, under the first judgment, conveyed the legal title to
the premises, and that the judgment on the special verdict ought to
have been in favor of the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed.
