Under Jud.Code, § 237, as amended by the Act of September 6,
1916, this Court cannot consider a claim of federal right which was
not made in the state court at the proper time and in the proper
manner under the state system of pleading and practice and which,
without evasion or for the purpose of defeating the claim, was
denied consideration on that ground. P.
249 U. S.
493.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, following its established
practice, refused to consider a sister state judgment which was
rendered six months after the judgment of the Missouri trial court
and was not set up in any pleading or introduced in evidence, but
was brought to the notice of the appellate courts only in argument
and as an exhibit to a brief.
Held that full faith and
credit was not denied.
Id.
Whether a charter granted to an insurance company by a
resolution of a state legislature is a public act or record within
the meaning of the "full faith and credit clause" not decided. P.
249 U. S.
494.
The exercise of their independent judgment by the courts of one
state in construing a charter granted by the legislature of another
can raise no federal question if no statute or decision of the
other state, construing the charter, was pleaded or put in
evidence.
Id.
Writ of certiorari to review 271 Mo. 562 dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 249 U. S. 491
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit, on a life insurance policy or certificate, in
which judgment was rendered against the company, petitioner,
successively by three courts of the State of Missouri. The case is
in this Court on writ of certiorari granted on the asserted ground
that the state supreme court failed and refused to give full faith
and credit to the judgment and decree of a superior court of the
State of Connecticut, and also to the petitioner's charter, "a
public record and act of the State of Connecticut," in violation of
the rights secured to it by Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution of
the United States.
Respondent moves to dismiss the writ for want of
jurisdiction.
The decree of the Superior Court of Connecticut, to which it is
claimed full faith and credit was denied, was rendered in the case
of
Charles H. Dresser et al. v. Hartford Life Insurance
Company, of Hartford, Connecticut, the petitioner. The
character of this decree and
Page 249 U. S. 492
the effect which must be given to it when properly pleaded and
introduced in evidence in courts of other states are both
sufficiently stated in
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs,
237 U. S. 662, and
in
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Barber, 245 U.
S. 146.
The respondent, on this motion to dismiss, does not seek to have
the decisions in the cases cited modified, but asserts that the
claim of right now made was not so "set up or claimed" in the state
courts that full faith and credit could be or was denied to the
Dresser decree.
The judgment in this case in the trial court was rendered
against the petitioner in September, 1909, and the decree in the
Dresser case was not rendered until six months later, in
March, 1910. The latter decree was not set up in any pleading, and
was not introduced in evidence in this case. The only way in which
it came to the notice of the Missouri courts was in argument and as
an exhibit to a brief filed in the appellate courts, and the
Supreme Court of Missouri dealt with it in this single
paragraph:
"The case at bar was tried below on May 12, 1909, which was
prior in time to the entering of the decree in the
Dresser
case, and the record in the
Dresser case was therefore not
offered or presented in the trial of this case. Since the record of
the
Dresser case is in no manner properly raised or lodged
in this case, we do not deem it to be within the scope of our
review, and likewise the federal question based thereon. Under such
circumstances, the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States in
Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs,
supra, [
237 U.S.
662], should not be applied to this case."
The jurisdiction of this Court to review the final judgment or
decree of the highest court of a state in such a case as we have
here is defined in § 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911,
c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), as amended September 6, 1916, c. 448, 39
Stat. 726, which provides that it shall be competent for this
Court, by certiorari, to require any such cause to be certified
to
Page 249 U. S. 493
it for review when there is claimed in it any title, right,
privilege, or immunity under the Constitution of the United States
and
"the decision is either in favor of or against the title right,
privilege or immunity especially set up or claimed, by either
party, under such Constitution."
It is the settled law that this provision means:
"that the claim must be asserted at the proper time and in the
proper manner by pleading, motion, or other appropriate action
under the state system of pleading and practice, . . . and, upon
the question whether or not such a claim has been so asserted, the
decision of the state court is binding upon this Court when it is
clear, as it is in this case, that such decision is not rendered in
a spirit of evasion for the purpose of defeating the claim of
federal right."
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U.
S. 532,
242 U. S. 535;
Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U. S. 367,
242 U. S. 371, and
cases cited.
No suggestion is or could be made that the Missouri state
supreme court's holding in this case was framed to evade the
consideration of the federal right now asserted, for it had long
been the established law of that state that, under its system of
practice, the construction of either the federal or state
constitution would not be treated as involved in a case, in a
jurisdictional sense, unless it appeared that such question was
raised and ruled on in the trial court, and also that
constitutional questions could not be injected into a case for the
first time in an appellate court by argument or brief of counsel
for the purpose of giving jurisdiction.
Miller v. Connor,
250 Mo. 677, 684. It has further been uniformly held by that court
since 1836 that it will not take judicial notice of the laws of
other states, but that they must be proved, as other facts, by
evidence introduced at the trial.
Southern Illinois &
Missouri Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1.
On the authorities thus cited, we are obliged to conclude
Page 249 U. S. 494
that the question as to the faith and credit which should be
given to the
Dresser decree was not so presented to or
ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Missouri as to present a federal
question for review by this Court.
But, as if anticipating the result we have just reached, the
petitioner contends that full faith and credit were denied to its
charter, "a public record and act of the State of Connecticut,"
which was introduced in evidence, for the reason that the Supreme
Court of Missouri, interpreting that charter, erroneously approved
the charge to the jury by the trial court "that it devolved upon
the defendant to prove that the assessment," the nonpayment of
which was relied upon as forfeiting the policy sued upon, was made
by the directors of the defendant. The petitioner introduced
evidence tending to prove that the assessment under discussion was
made, not by formal action of the board of directors, but by
executive officers of the company, "the president and secretary . .
. or the vice-president and secretary, or possibly the
vice-president and assistant secretary," and it contended that this
was sufficient in law because it had long been the practice of the
company and was recognized by the directors as action taken in
their behalf under authority delegated by them.
Even if this charter, which was granted by a resolution of the
Assembly of Connecticut, be regarded as a public act or record of
that state within the scope of the constitutional provision,
Article IV, § 1 (which is not decided), nevertheless, since no
statute of Connecticut or decision of any court of that state was
pleaded or introduced in evidence in this case giving a
construction to the provision of the charter which the Missouri
courts, treating as valid, interpreted, the exercise by those
courts of an independent judgment in placing a construction upon it
cannot present a federal question under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution.
Louisville &
Nashville
Page 249 U. S. 495
R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36,
218 U. S. 50,
and
Western Life Indemnity Co of Illinois v. Rupp,
235 U. S. 261,
235 U. S.
273-275.
It is asserted that the record presents other constitutional
questions which give this Court jurisdiction to review the case,
but an examination shows the claims to be too unsubstantial to
merit discussion, and the writ must be
Dismissed.