The jurisdiction acquired by the district court through an
attachment of a vessel on a libel
in rem, and the power of
the court to subject the same vessel to a second attachment in a
second like action, are not ousted by a requisition of the use of
the vessel, made by the United States Shipping Board under
authority of the Act of June 15, 1917, c. 29, 40 Stat. 182, and an
order of the President, for war purposes, but without displacing
the custody and possession of the marshal. P.
249 U. S.
118.
And an order of the district court, made on application of the
Shipping Board, with the consent of the libelants, permitting such
vessel to be put at the service of the government for war purposes
while still remaining in the custody of the marshall, through the
master as special deputy, for the purposes of the court's
jurisdiction, is not subject to objection by an owner who had
entered no appearance for the ship.
Id.
Rule discharged; petition dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 249 U. S. 116
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a corporation of the State of New York, is the owner
of the Steamship
H. M. Whitney, her engines, etc., which
vessel, on April 18, 1918, while in petitioner's possession, was
attached by the United States Marshal for the Eastern district of
New York in an action
in rem brought by the Patent
Vulcanite Roofing Company in the district court of the United
States for that district. On April 27, 1918, while the vessel was
in the possession of the deputy marshal under the process in that
action, the United States Shipping Board established by Act of
September 7, 1916 (39 Stat. 728, c. 451), acting under authority of
the act of June 15, 1917, c. 451, 40 Stat. 182, and the President's
Executive Order of July 11, 1917,
* instructed
Page 249 U. S. 117
one Smith as its agent to take possession of the steamer in
behalf of the United States. This Smith did
pro forma on
April 29, but without dispossessing the marshal or his deputy. On
May 16, Theodore A. Crane's Sons Company filed its libel
in
rem against the steamer in the same court, and, under process
in this suit, the marshal, who already had her in custody, again
attached the vessel. Afterwards, and on May 29, the Shipping Board,
by its counsel, appeared before the court, stated that the use of
the vessel was needed by the government for war purposes, that the
marshal was still in custody by virtue of the writs of attachment
in the two suits referred to, and that the board did not desire to
raise an issue over the possession of the property as between two
departments of the government, and moved the court to direct the
marshal to release her. No appearance having been entered in behalf
of the ship, the court heard proctors for the libelants and counsel
for the Shipping Board, and on motion of the latter, with consent
of the former, made an order entitled in the two causes directing
that the marshal be permitted to appoint the master of the ship as
a special deputy United States marshal, that this deputy remain in
possession of the vessel in behalf of the marshal, that the vessel,
in his custody, be turned over to the Shipping Board for purposes
connected with the war, the special deputy marshal or his
substitutes to remain always in possession, and that the vessel be
returned to the custody of the marshal upon being released from
requisition by the Shipping Board.
Page 249 U. S. 118
Thereafter, the present petitioner, claimant of the vessel,
appeared specially by counsel and moved the district court to quash
the attachment in the Crane suit and dismiss the libel on the
ground of want of jurisdiction. These motions, after argument, were
overruled, and at a subsequent date motions for a rehearing and for
a certificate of jurisdiction as the basis of a direct appeal to
this Court were denied upon the ground that the claimant had no
standing to attack the validity of the attachment.
Thereafter this Court granted leave for the filing of a petition
for a writ of prohibition, and made an order upon the judges of the
district court to show cause why such writ should not issue. Return
was made by the judge who had acted in the proceedings above
mentioned, and, the matter having been argued here by counsel for
the petitioner and by counsel for the Crane Company, the question
for decision is whether the prohibition ought to be issued, or the
order to show cause discharged.
The validity of the attachment in the suit of the Vulcanite
Company and the continued possession of the marshal or his deputy
under that process are not in controversy. No bond was given or
deposit made for release of the vessel pursuant to ยง 941
Rev.Stats., or the admiralty rules of this Court or of the district
court. Hence, the vessel remained, for all purposes of the action
in the custody of the court. The requisition of the Shipping Board
extended merely to the use of the ship for war purposes, and did
not in fact take her out of the custody of the court. So far as any
interest of the petitioner was concerned, there was nothing to
prevent the vessel from being subjected to attachment under process
in the Crane Company suit, and as she actually was subjected to
that process by the action of the marshal, the jurisdiction of the
court in that suit was complete, and the owner's only recourse was
to enter appearance therein, with or without giving a bond or
making a deposit.
Page 249 U. S. 119
If the custody of the ship by the officer of the court was
inconsistent with the purposes of the Executive, acting through the
Shipping Board, this was not a matter of which petitioner could
take advantage. The application of the board through its counsel
for an order permitting the vessel to be put at the service of the
government for war purposes while still remaining in the custody of
the marshal for the purposes of the court's jurisdiction, consented
to by the only other parties who had a standing in court, was a
sufficient warrant for the order made.
Order to show cause discharged, and petition
dismissed.
*
"
EXECUTIVE ORDER"
"By virtue of authority vested in me in the section entitled
'Emergency Shipping Fund' of an act of Congress entitled 'An act
making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in
appropriations for the military and naval establishments on account
of war expenses for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen
hundred and seventeen, and for other purposes,' approved June 15,
1917, I hereby direct that the United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation shall have and exercise all power and
authority vested in me in said section of said act, insofar as
applicable to and in furtherance of the construction of vessels,
the purchase or requisitioning of vessels in process of
construction, whether on the ways or already launched, or of
contracts for the construction of such vessels, and the completion
thereof, and all power and authority applicable to and in
furtherance of the production, purchase, and requisitioning of
materials for ship construction."
"And I do further direct that the United States Shipping Board
shall have and exercise all power and authority vested in me in
said section of said act, insofar as applicable to and in
furtherance of the taking over of title or possession, by purchase
or requisition, of constructed vessels, or parts thereof, or
charters therein, and the operation, management and disposition of
such vessels, and of all other vessels heretofore or hereafter
acquired by the United States. The powers herein delegated to the
United States Shipping Board may, in the discretion of said Board,
be exercised directly by the said Board or by it through the United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, or through any
other corporation organized by it for such purpose."
"WOODROW WILSON"
"The White House"
"11 July, 1917"