In a prosecution for having cocaine in possession in violation
of a state law, it is a defense that the drug was in transit
through the state to an adjacent foreign country, and defendants
are entitled to prove such fact in the state court and therein to
explain their relations to the shipment at the international
boundary where they are charged with having taken the unlawful
possession.
McGinis v. California, ante, 247 U. S. 91.
Error in excluding such evidence
held, in the
circumstances of this case, not to have been made harmless by proof
that more of the drug was added at the international boundary,
where the whole prosecution was based upon the original shipment
and such proof involved only one of the defendants, and
cross-examination upon it was not allowed, and the source of the
added drug was not shown.
Reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 247 U. S. 96
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was submitted with No. 133,
ante,
247 U. S. 91.
As in the latter case, plaintiffs in error, whom we shall call
defendants, were charged in a justice's court of Imperial County
with having cocaine in their possession in a quantity forbidden by
the statute of the state regulating the sale and use of poisons.
After and verdict of guilty, there was judgment exactly the same as
in No. 133, which judgment, after motion for new trial made and
denied, and upon appeal to the superior court of the county, was
modified, and as modified affirmed as in that case.
The drug was shipped from St. Louis in the same box as the opium
in case No. 133. The testimony in this case, however, as to its
being in transit to Mexico is somewhat fuller. In addition to the
exclusion of such testimony, the defendants were prevented from
showing permission from the Treasury Department to export a
quantity of cocaine to Mexico. Such permission and the purpose of
weighing the contents of the box were decided to be immaterial,
possession alone being determinative of guilt.
We think the rulings were error. But it is said that the error
was without detriment to defendants, that the testimony showed that
there were only 100 ounces of cocaine in the original package from
St. Louis, and that 85 ounces were added in the repacking. However,
it is not shown from whence it came, and the trial of the case and
the submission of it were based on the shipment from St. Louis. The
judgment of the Superior Court was rendered in both actions, and
made no distinction between them. And, besides, McGinis was not
shown to have had any connection with the 85 ounces, and we may
remark that cross-examination as to the fact was, on the objection
of the
Page 247 U. S. 97
prosecution, prevented. We think, therefore, the error in
excluding the testimony cannot be said to have been without
detriment to defendants.
The court was asked to instruct the jury as in No. 133, and
refused. It gave, however, a number of instructions requested by
the prosecution, some abstract, as to the extent of the police
power of the state, and others directed to the effect of possession
of the drug, if found by the jury, and its determination of
defendants' guilt. We do not consider it necessary to comment upon
them further than to say that they give emphasis to the rulings
upon the testimony offered by the defendants.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
