Two railroad companies, between them owning all the stock and
controlling completely the property and operations of a third
company, which had legal title to terminal tracks, caused separate
switching charges to be made in its name on traffic moved by them
over those tracks, although for substantially the same service over
terminal which each owned separately, neither made any charge in
addition to its line-haul rates. A state commission, finding that
the practice discriminated against shippers on the third company's
tracks, ordered that the separate charges be discontinued and that
the tracks be operated as a part of the terminal properties of the
other companies in intrastate traffic.
Held: (1) upon
examination of the findings and evidence, that the commission and
the courts below were justified in holding the third company a mere
agency or instrumentality of the other two; (2) that its technical
corporate individuality and its technical ownership of the tracks
in question did not entitle it to be treated as an independent
carrier, and that the order did not deprive it or the other
companies of property without compensation or due process of law;
(3) that the order imposed no unlawful burden on interstate
commerce.
134 Minn. 169 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 247 U. S. 491
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We shall adopt the designation of the parties which is used in
the record: the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
as the "Milwaukee Company;" the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis
& Omaha Railway Company as the "Omaha Company;" the Minneapolis
Eastern Railway Company as the "Eastern Company;" the Minneapolis
Civic and Commerce Association as the "Civic Association," and the
Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the Minnesota as the
"Commission."
This proceeding originated in a petition filed by the Civic
Association with the Commission against the three railway
corporations plaintiffs in error, in which it is alleged that the
tracks of the Eastern Company are mere switching or terminal
facilities, in the City of Minneapolis, of the Milwaukee and Omaha
Companies, and that an unreasonable extra charge is made for the
receipt and delivery of cars over them. The prayer is that the
plaintiffs in error be required to treat the tracks of the Eastern
Company as if they were a part of the terminal systems of the
Milwaukee and Omaha Companies, and that they be required to publish
and maintain fair and reasonable tariffs applicable to traffic
moving over them.
A hearing upon this petition resulted in findings of fact by the
Commission, among others, that the Eastern Company was then
operating only one mile of main track and one mile and a half of
yard track and sidings in the City of Minneapolis; that the
Milwaukee and Omaha Companies each owned one-half of its capital
stock and were in control of its operations, and that, assuming to
be
Page 247 U. S. 492
an independent railroad company, the Eastern Company had filed
tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with the
Minnesota Commission, pursuant to which it was charging and
collecting, in addition to the line rate from point of origin, an
extra charge of $1.50 per car for inbound loaded cars and 10 cents
per ton, with a minimum of $1.50 per car, for outbound loaded cars,
moving over its tracks.
As conclusions of law, the Commission found that the tracks of
the Eastern Company were a part of the terminal property of the
Milwaukee and Omaha Companies; that it was the legal duty of these
companies to deliver cars to and to receive them from industries on
the tracks of the Eastern Company without charge other than that
made for the line haul, and that the extra charge which the Eastern
Company was making resulted in discrimination against inbound
shippers of grain to industries located upon its tracks.
Upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law the
Commission entered an order requiring that the three companies
cease charging $1.50 per car for inbound shipments over either the
Milwaukee or Omaha lines which are delivered over the Eastern
Company's tracks to industries located upon them or to connecting
carriers; that the Eastern Company cease from charging any sum for
delivering carload shipments of freight moving from connecting
carriers to the Milwaukee or Omaha Companies, or moving from mills
and elevators located on the Eastern Company's tracks to the
Milwaukee or Omaha Companies, and that the Omaha and Milwaukee
companies in the future shall operate the tracks of the Eastern
Company as a part of the terminal property of each of them in the
City of Minneapolis. The order is made applicable only to
intrastate shipments of freight.
On appeal to a state district court, the order of the Commission
was affirmed and adopted as the order of the
Page 247 U. S. 493
court, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
affirming his judgment is now before us for review.
The contention of the railway companies in this Court is stated
by them "to be reduced to the single proposition:" that the Supreme
Court of Minnesota erred in affirming the judgment of the district
court in finding, as did the Commission, that
"the tracks operated by the Eastern Company are important,
convenient, and necessary terminal facilities of the Milwaukee and
Omaha Companies, and that these companies directly control and
operate the Eastern Company,"
and in adjudging
"that the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies be required to operate
the Eastern Company's tracks as a part of their terminal property
at Minneapolis, without making any extra charge for moving traffic
over them."
Review by this Court is prayed for on the ground that to give
effect to the judgment and order of the Minnesota court will
deprive each of the three railroad companies of its property
without compensation and without due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and, earnestly insisting that the findings of fact upon which the
judgment proceeds are without support in the evidence, the
plaintiffs in error urge that it be determined from the entire
record before us whether substantial evidence was introduced to
sustain the denial of their claimed federal right.
Interstate
Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 560,
239 U. S. 566;
Jones National Bank v. Yates, 240 U.
S. 541,
240 U. S.
552.
Thus, the question presented for our decision is whether the
Eastern Company, in form a corporate entity separate and distinct
from the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies, is in reality an
independent carrier, exercising an independent control over the
railroad to which it holds the legal title and over the conduct of
its business affairs, or whether it is a mere agency or
instrumentality of the two corporations, which own all of its
capital stock,
Page 247 U. S. 494
through which they collect an extra charge from the public for
rendering by indirection a service which as common carriers they
are legally required to render without such charge under the
conditions of operation which prevail at Minneapolis.
It is obvious that this is a mixed question of fact and of law,
and from the findings of fact made by the Commission and by the
district court, which differ only in unimportant details, and from
evidence undisputed in the record, we derive the following
statement, which we think embraces all that is essential to a
decision of the case:
The Eastern Company is a Minnesota corporation, with an
authorized capital stock of $1,000,000, organized in 1878 for the
declared purpose of building and operating a railroad from the City
of Minneapolis to the City of St. Paul, with branches connecting
with all railroads now built or hereafter to be built to or into
said cities, and with branches to the mills and manufacturing
establishments located therein.
The formal organization of the company was by a group of mill
owners, but, before any right of way was acquired or construction
work done, the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies came into exclusive
control of the corporation and a board of directors satisfactory to
them was elected, with the result that the only road which the
company ever built or operated (omitting small fractions) was one
mile of main track and one mile and a half of yard track and
sidings in the City of Minneapolis. At the time of the trial the
Eastern Company served several mills and warehouses and one
elevator, it had no stations or freight depots, its only rolling
stock was two engines, and the average number of its employees
varied from 20 to 30 men. Its tracks are used for interchange by
the Milwaukee and Omaha lines, but other companies use them for
this purpose to such a limited extent that the part of the
Commission's order relating to such use is
Page 247 U. S. 495
neglected in the evidence and arguments and in the decisions of
the state courts.
Almost immediately after the organization of the Eastern
Company, the three companies entered into a written contract,
effective for over 39 years, until May 1, 1918, which is of much
significance in determining the decisive fact in the case as we
have stated it.
This contract provides:
(1) That only 300 shares of the authorized 10,000 shares of
capital stock of the Eastern Company shall be issued, and, of
these, 75 shares each must be issued to the Omaha and Milwaukee
Companies, 145 shares to a trustee for the Eastern Company, and the
remaining 5 shares shall be issued as qualifying shares to
directors. The 145 trust shares
"shall not be transferable, except by the written consent of all
(3) of the said parties hereto, and any transfer thereof without
such consent shall be void and of no effect."
(2) The Eastern Company shall execute in proper form 150 bonds
of $1,000 each and a mortgage on all property and franchises of the
company to secure their payment. The Milwaukee and Omaha Companies
agree each to purchase at 80% of their par value, one-half the
amount of such of these bonds as it may be necessary to issue to
pay for the right of way, construction, and equipment of the
railroad;
(3) That the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies shall have "equal and
the same rights in and to said railway . . . in all respects," that
they shall pay the same charge for switching their respective cars
by said railway, and that no partiality or favor shall be shown to
either;
(4) That the superintendent having charge of the operation of
the railroad shall be appointed "by the consent and mutual
agreement of all parties to these presents;"
Page 247 U. S. 496
(5) That the Eastern Company shall charge all parties one dollar
for switching each loaded car, but a rebate of fifty percent of
this charge shall be made to the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies;
(6) If any other company having equal facilities with the
Eastern Company for reaching mills in Minneapolis shall promptly
and satisfactorily do the switching for the second and third
parties (the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies), then the Eastern
Company, with the written consent of the Omaha and Milwaukee
Companies, will do switching for such railroad companies over the
said railroad of the Eastern Company on the same terms that
switching is done for the said second and third parties (the
Milwaukee and Omaha Companies) over such other railroad but without
rebate to any company.
It is quite true, as is argued, that some of the provisions of
this contract have been departed from, and that others have been
rendered unlawful and void by statutes enacted, and by decisions of
courts rendered, since its date. But this does not lessen its
evidential value in determining whether the interest of the
Milwaukee and Omaha Companies in the Eastern Company was that of
mere stockholders in an independent public service corporation, or
whether they intended to and did exercise the power which they
possessed as stockholders to immediately and directly control the
property and the conduct of the business of the Eastern
Company.
Whether because the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies distributed
each other or for other cause, it is plain that this contract was
designed to take away from the board of directors of the Eastern
Company, the usual and lawful governing body of a corporation, the
normal legal control of the company's affairs in several most
important respects. It deprived the board of the power to issue the
capital stock of the company and to finance its affairs, to select
a superintendent to operate the company's two
Page 247 U. S. 497
and one-half miles of track by requiring that such selection be
made only with the consent and mutual agreement of the three
companies, to make mutual agreements for the interchange of
business with any other company except with the mutual consent of
the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies, and it renders one-half (save
five shares) of the stock which it permits to be issued,
transferable only with the written consent of the Milwaukee and
Omaha Companies. Thus, the making of this contract was an obvious
surrender by the Eastern Company of substantially all freedom of
corporate action and an assumption of control over that company by
the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies which converted it largely into a
mere agency or instrumentality for doing their bidding.
That this preliminary program of control was carried forward to
realization is abundantly shown by the record.
An accumulated surplus of $95,000 was distributed by the Eastern
Company in the form of stock dividends in 1906 by dividing it
equally between the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies, and when the
original seven percent loan of $150,000 was refunded into a four
and one-half percent loan, the new bonds were taken equally by the
two companies. Thus, the equal interest of the two owning companies
and the financial dependence of the Eastern Company were
maintained.
The management and control of all the operations of the Eastern
Company has always been kept in charge of a "managing committee" of
two members, one of whom for many years before the evidence was
taken was the general manager of the Omaha Company and the other
the general superintendent of the Milwaukee Company. The Eastern
Company did not pay either of these men any salary for their
services.
The auditor of the Omaha Company has been the auditor of the
Eastern Company, which paid no part of
Page 247 U. S. 498
his salary, and the established practice has long been for the
one bookkeeper of the Eastern Company to take his journal and
ledger to the auditor of the Omaha Company monthly for
verification.
Seven of the nine directors of the Eastern Company at the time
the evidence was taken were officers either of the Milwaukee or
Omaha Company; the eighth, the attorney of the Eastern, had desk
room in the Milwaukee Company's legal department, of which he had
recently been a member, and the ninth director, the president, was
not an employee of either of the two owning companies.
With the facts thus summarized, it is difficult to conceive of a
plan for the control of a jointly owned company and for the
operation of a jointly owned track more complete than this one is,
and it is sheer sophistry to argue that, because it is technically
a separate legal entity, the Eastern Company is an independent
public carrier, free in the conduct of its business from the
control of the two companies which own it, and therefore free to
impose separate carrying charges upon the public.
The record further shows that the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies
separately own many tracks in Minneapolis on which large mills and
elevators are located, and that they render to such industries
"substantially the same service" as is required in delivering and
receiving cars to and from like industries on the Eastern Company's
track for which they make no charge whatever in addition to the
line-haul rate. The general manager of the Omaha Company, who was
one of the two members of the "managing committee" of the Eastern
Company, testifies that the line-haul rate to Minneapolis on the
Omaha line "includes switching to any industry on its tracks" in
that city regardless of the relative distance or expense of such
delivery; that this rule prevails at all points on the Omaha line;
that, generally
Page 247 U. S. 499
speaking, this is the custom of all railroads, and that, if the
Eastern tracks were exclusively owned by the Omaha Company,
deliveries to and from industries located upon them would be made
without any switching charge additional to the line-haul rate. The
Milwaukee Company also delivers on tracks exclusively owned by it
at Minneapolis, with charge additional to the line-haul rate.
The Eastern Company, assuming the character of an independent
common carrier, pursuant to tariffs filed, collects the switching
charge, which is objected to, of $1.50 per car on inbound loaded
cars and a charge of 10 cents per ton, with a minimum charge of
$1.50 per car, on outbound loaded cars, which move over its tracks,
in addition to the line-haul rate. But the practice of the
Milwaukee and Omaha Companies (with negligible exceptions) is to
"absorb" this extra charge made against outbound cars, so that, as
both the Commission and the court find, "from a practical
standpoint, shippers on inbound grain are the only persons who have
to pay the charge" of the Eastern Company.
The Eastern Company does not issue bills of lading and does not
make any collection from shippers, but charges its switching rate
against the Omaha and Milwaukee Companies, and it is paid by them
from the line-haul rate on outbound traffic, and from the line-haul
rate plus the switching charge, which they also collect, on inbound
grain. Under such a system of doing business, the controversy in
the case really relates only to the charge of the Eastern Company
on inbound grain, for as to all other traffic, the charge by the
Eastern Company is simply a bookkeeping one which does not involve
any extra switching charge to the shipper. Thus, the charge of the
Eastern Company, when paid by the shipper in addition to the
line-haul rate, is obviously a discrimination against industries
located on the Eastern Company's
Page 247 U. S. 500
tracks when compared with those similarly situated on other
industrial spur delivery tracks which are wholly owned by either
company.
This discussion of the evidence in the case renders it very
clear that the purpose of the Milwaukee and Omaha Companies from
the beginning was to construct and operate but one track to the
group of industries to be served, instead of each building and
maintaining its own track, and to construct and use that track in
common, so that each might have the benefit of it as fully as if it
were the sole owner. To accomplish this end, they resorted to the
familiar device of incorporating the Eastern Company, and in order
that their purpose might not be defeated in the future by the
design or business necessity of either company, the contract
between them which we have discussed was entered into to prevent
the corporate organization of the Eastern Company and the control
of its operations from being changed by either owning company
without the consent of the other, and the evidence makes it very
clear that, all through its corporate life, the Eastern
organization has been consistently used as a mere agency of the two
owning companies to accomplish their original purpose.
Much emphasis is laid upon statements made in various decisions
of this Court that ownership, alone, of capital stock in one
corporation by another does not create an identity of corporate
interest between the two companies, or render the stockholding
company the owner of the property of the other, or create the
relation of principal and agent or representative between the two.
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.,
115 U. S. 587;
Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co.,
205 U. S. 364,
205 U. S. 391;
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.
S. 366,
213 U. S. 413;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney, 215 U. S.
98,
215 U. S. 108;
United States v. Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 238
Page 247 U. S. 501
U.S. 516,
238 U. S.
529-530. And it is argued that, since the order of the
Commission requires that the tracks, the title to which is in the
Eastern Company, be treated as the property of the stock owning
companies, the effect of it, if enforced, will be to deprive the
Eastern Company of its property without compensation and to render
valueless its capital stock owned by the Milwaukee and Omaha
Companies.
While the statements of the law thus relied upon are
satisfactory in the connection in which they were used, they have
been plainly and repeatedly held not applicable where stock
ownership has been resorted to not for the purpose of participating
in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and usual manner, but
for the purpose, as in this case, of controlling a subsidiary
company so that it may be used as a mere agency or instrumentality
of the owning company or companies.
United States v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 220 U. S. 257,
220 U. S. 273;
United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.
Co., 238 U. S. 516. In
such a case, the courts will not permit themselves to be blinded or
deceived by mere forms or law but, regardless of fictions, will
deal with the substance of the transaction involved as if the
corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may
require.
Satisfied as we are by the evidence that the Eastern Company is
a completely controlled agency of the two companies which own its
capital stock, we agree with the Supreme Court of Minnesota that
the fact that the legal title to what are obviously terminal or
spur delivery tracks is in the Eastern Company should not be
permitted to become the warrant for permitting a charge upon
shippers greater than they would be required to pay if that title
were in the owning companies. The order of the Commission, affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, so far from being arbitrary, is
plainly just, and clearly it does not deprive the plaintiffs in
error of their
Page 247 U. S. 502
property without compensation or without due process of law by
requiring, as it does, that for ratemaking purposes the Milwaukee
and Omaha Companies shall extend to shippers over their tracks the
legal title to which is in the Eastern Company, equality of
treatment with that which they give to shippers over their
separately owned tracks, where similar service is rendered.
The claim that an unlawful burden is imposed upon interstate
commerce by requiring that the one delivery track here involved
shall be treated with respect to intrastate traffic precisely as
many other similarly used and situated tracks have always been
treated by the owning companies is too unsound to merit
consideration.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is
Affirmed.