By the law as it was when he bought, a purchaser of state lands
in default as to interest on a deferred payment was liable to have
his interest in the land and in the contract foreclosed by a court
proceeding begun on summary notice, but subject to his right to
redeem by paying interest and costs within 20 days from
judgment.
Page 247 U. S. 485
An act was passed declaring forfeiture in such cases in which
the default had continued for five years and in which the state,
prior to the passage of the act, had issued another certificate for
the same land to a subsequent purchaser, unless all arrears of
interest were paid within 6 months of its passage.
Held a
change of remedy, not impairing the obligation of the contract of
purchase.
One whose contract for the purchase of state lands had been for
many years in default for nonpayment of interest both before and
after the passage of a law forfeiting such contracts if the
interest were not paid within a time stated, and who conceded the
default and offered no excuse,
held not in a position to
object that the law lacked due process in failing to allow time and
opportunity for testing the liability to forfeiture in a court
proceeding.
170 Cal. 674 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
On June 3, 1869, the State of California sold to Charles A. B.
Brackett three hundred and twenty acres of school land, and
delivered to him a "certificate of purchase" for it. Twenty percent
of the purchase money was payable at the time of the purchase, and
the remainder "within one year after the passage of any act of the
legislature requiring such payment, or before, if desired by the
purchaser."
The unpaid purchase money was to bear interest at the rate of
ten percent per annum, payable in advance.
The purchaser paid interest to January 1, 1873, and nothing
further for thirty-eight years, when, on October 26,
Page 247 U. S. 486
1911, a state official, without authority to waive the default,
accepted the amount of the unpaid purchase money and interest from
the plaintiff in error, as transferee of the certificate, who
thereupon demanded a patent for the land, which was refused for the
reason that, on December 29, 1886, a certificate of purchase for
the same land had been issued by the state to Michael Phillips, on
which the principal and interest was paid in full on August 28,
1911.
Upon this refusal by the state, the plaintiff in error filed the
petition in this case "for a writ of mandate" to compel the
defendant in error, as Commissioner of the Land Office of the state
to prepare a patent for the land in controversy and to send the
same to the governor of the state, together with a certificate that
the laws had been complied with, and that he, as transferee of
Charles A. B. Brackett, was entitled thereto. Such a suit is said
by the Supreme Court of California to be "in effect an action to
require specific performance on the part of the state" of the
contract evidenced by the certificate of purchase.
A judgment of the superior court granting the prayer of the
petition was affirmed by the district court of appeals, and this in
turn was reversed by the decision of the supreme court of the state
which is now before us for review.
In 1889, the Legislature of California passed an act providing
that, in all cases in which a certificate of purchase of public
land had been issued prior to March 27, 1872, on which arrears of
principal and interest had remained due and unpaid for five years,
and in which, prior to the passage of the act, the state had issued
to a subsequent purchaser another certificate for the same land,
the owner of the first issued certificate should be deemed to have
lost the right to the land or to complete the contract for the
purchase of it unless he should pay all unpaid interest within six
months from the passage of the act.
Page 247 U. S. 487
If this act is a valid law, it is obvious that it cut off the
plaintiff in error's transferor from all interest in the land in
controversy, for the Brackett certificate was issued prior to March
27, 1872, interest on it had been due and unpaid for sixteen years,
and another certificate had been issued to Phillips when the act
was passed, and nothing further was paid until 1911.
But the plaintiff in error claims that this Act of 1889 is
invalid because it impairs the obligation of his contract of 1869
and deprives him of his property without due process of law.
These are large claims, made in impressive terms, but in reality
the only obligations of this simple contract were that the state,
on the one hand, should furnish a patent to the land when it should
be paid for at the times and in the manner stipulated, and that the
purchaser, on the other hand, should make payment as he had agreed
to make it.
For the enforcement of the contract, the law gave to the state a
remedy by foreclosure, in a court proceeding, for default of the
purchaser, and to the purchaser or his assigns was given the
privilege to redeem at any time before the expiration of twenty
days from entry of judgment of foreclosure against him.
And now, after having neglected, if not repudiated, his
obligation under the contract by failing to pay the interest due
upon it for 16 years before the act was passed and for 22 years
thereafter, the plaintiff in error comes complaining that the
state, by the Act of 1889, impaired his right under it by taking
away the twenty-day period of redemption, which the prior law
allowed, even though a six months' period of redemption, from the
passage of the act, was substituted for it.
It is sufficient answer to this contention to say that:
The right of the state to foreclose such a contract for default
in payment, and the right of the purchaser to
Page 247 U. S. 488
redeem after a default decree, relate to the remedy, as
distinguished from the obligation of the contract, and both of
these rights are constitutionally subject to modification by the
state, within limits which were not exceeded in the act before us,
as is decided in
Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U.
S. 399, and in
Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U.
S. 595, which are strikingly similar in their facts and
in their applicable law to the case we are considering. The right
of the purchaser to redeem under the prior law was limited to
paying before the expiration of twenty days from entry of default
"the amount due the state and the costs of suit," and this right
was modified by the Act of 1889 so as to permit redemption by
"paying the interest remaining unpaid for such purchase within six
months from and after the passage of this act." The notice to
defendants in a suit for default under the prior law was of such a
summary character that we cannot doubt that the privilege of the
purchaser to redeem under the Act of 1889 is as liberal as it was
before the act was passed, and the change therefore did not deprive
him of any substantial right or benefit.
It is, however, pressed upon our attention as an important
difference between the Texas act involved in these cited cases and
the California act before us that the former, in terms, gives to
the purchaser of public land the privilege for six months after a
decree of forfeiture has been entered against him, by a designated
state officer, of resorting to a court proceeding to set aside such
default on the ground that it was not authorized, while no such
provision is contained in the latter. It is asserted that this
distinguishes the two acts, and that the absence of authority for
such a court proceeding renders the California act invalid by
depriving the plaintiff in error of his property without due
process of law.
It would be sufficient reply to this to say that the right to
redeem after default decreed, which the purchaser had
Page 247 U. S. 489
under the California statute when his contract was made, was
limited to payment of "the amount due the state and costs of suit,"
and that therefore the Act of 1889 did not deprive him of such a
privilege as the Texas act him of such a privilege as the Texas act
proceeding on the ground that it was not authorized.
But it is not important for us to consider such a question, for
it is not presented in the record before us. The plaintiff in error
comes admitting that, for thirty-eight years, he and the persons
through whom he claims were in default, and, since he does not
offer any excuse for such abandonment of the contract, even if the
California act had contained the provision of the Texas act
allowing a court review of the default defined in it, such remedy
could not have been of any avail to the plaintiff in error, for he
makes no case upon which he could possibly have made use of it, and
he is therefore not in any position to attack the constitutionality
of the act involved for an omission which does not injure him, and
which, if supplied, would not benefit him. He who would
successfully assail a law as unconstitutional must come showing
that the feature of the act complained of operates to deprive him
of some constitutional right.
Tyler v. Judges,
179 U. S. 405;
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
S. 531,
232 U. S. 544;
Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U. S.
53,
242 U. S. 56.
We quite agree with the Supreme Court of California that this
case is ruled in all essentials by the
Waggoner case,
supra, and this renders unnecessary the consideration of
the applicability of the doctrine of laches.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California must be
Affirmed.