By the general maritime law, the vessel owner is liable only for
the maintenance, cure, and wages of a seaman injured in the service
of his .ship, by the negligence of a member of the crew,
whether
Page 247 U. S. 373
a superior officer or not, and this liability is not subject to
be enlarged to full common law indemnity by the law of a state.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205. So
held in a case brought in a state
court of New York and removed to the district court, to recover
full common law damages from a Delaware owner for injuries received
at sea on a voyage to New York.
Section 20 of the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, c. 153, 38
Stat. 1185, declaring "seamen having command shall not be held to
be fellow servants with those under their authority," was not
intended to substitute the common law measure of liability for the
maritime rule in such cases.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, giving exclusive original
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the district courts, saves
"to suitor, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it."
Held that this,
recognizing the fundamental distinction between rights and
remedies, allows a right sanctioned by maritime law to be enforced
through an appropriate common law remedy, but does not give a
plaintiff his election to have the defendant's liability measured
by common law standards instead of those prescribed by the maritime
law.
243 F. 536 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 247 U. S. 378
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In December, 1915, petitioner was employed by respondent, a
Delaware corporation as fireman on board the steamship
J. L.
Luckenbach, which it then operated and controlled. While at
sea, twenty-four hours out from New York, the port of destination,
petitioner undertook to perform certain duties on deck during a
heavy wind; a wave came aboard, knocked him down, and broke his
leg. He received due care immediately; when the vessel arrived at
destination, he was taken to the marine hospital, where he remained
for three months; during that time, it became necessary to amputate
his leg. After discharge from the hospital, claiming that his
injuries resulted from the negligence and an improvident order of a
superior
Page 247 U. S. 379
officer, he instituted a common law action in Supreme Court, New
York County, demanding full indemnity for damage sustained. The
cause was removed to the United States district court because of
diverse citizenship. Counsel did not question seaworthiness of ship
or her appliances, and announced that no claim was made for
maintenance, cure, or wages. At conclusion of plaintiff's evidence,
the court directed verdict for respondent, and judgment thereon was
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 243 F. 536. The latter
court said:
"The contract of a seaman is maritime, and has written into it
those peculiar features of the maritime law that were considered in
the case of
The Osceola, [
189 U.S.
158], and although, because of these peculiarities, such
contracts are almost invariably litigated in admiralty courts,
still the contract must be the same in every court, maritime or
common law. The only difference between a proceeding in one court
or the other would be that the remedy would be regulated by the
lex fori. If a seaman who had been locked up or put in
irons for disobedience of orders were to sue the master for damages
in a court of common law, he could not recover like a shore
servant, such as a cook or chauffeur, who had received the same
treatment. So a seaman, bringing suit in a common law court for
personal injuries, could recover, even if guilty of contributory
negligence, although a shore servant suing in the same court could
not, and a seaman suing in a common law court for personal injuries
could recover (except in the case of unseaworthiness of the vessel
or failure to give proper care and medical attention) only wages to
the end of the voyage and the expenses for maintenance and cure for
a reasonable time thereafter, whereas in a similar case a shore
servant would be entitled to recover full indemnity. Therefore, by
virtue of the inherent nature of the seaman's contract, the
defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence
were totally immaterial
Page 247 U. S. 380
considerations in this case; the sole question for the jury to
determine being whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover
because he had not received from the defendant his wages to the end
of the voyage and the expense for his maintenance and cure for a
reasonable time thereafter."
"Has Congress changed the situation by § 20 of the Seamen's Act
[c. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185], as the plaintiff contends? He argues
that the act makes the master a fellow servant of the seaman, and
therefore that Congress intended to make the relation between the
seaman and all the officers throughout the same as at common law.
But the Supreme Court, in the case of
The Osceola, supra,
while reserving the question whether the master and seaman were
fellow servants, held that it made no difference whatever in
respect to the liability of the shipowners for an improvident order
of the master which resulted in personal injuries to the seaman. .
. ."
"It follows that whether the master and seaman are fellow
servants or not is quite immaterial in the case of a suit for
injuries resulting from an improvident order of the master. For
this reason, the court was right in directing a verdict for the
defendant, and the judgment is affirmed."
In
The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158,
189 U. S. 175,
a libel
in rem to recover damages for personal injuries to
a seaman while on board and alleged to have resulted from the
master's negligence, speaking through Mr. Justice Brown, we
held:
"1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman
falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the
extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages at least so
long as the voyage is continued."
"2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and
American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries
Page 247 U. S. 381
received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the
ship or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship.
Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N.Y.
211."
"3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master,
are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen
cannot recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of
another member of the crew beyond the expense of their maintenance
and cure."
"4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for
the negligence of the master or any member of the crew, but is
entitled to maintenance and cure whether the injuries were received
by negligence or accident."
After reference to Article I, § 8, and Article III, § 2, of the
Constitution, we declared in
Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205,
244 U. S.
215-216:
"Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as
settled doctrine that, in consequence of these provisions, Congress
has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which
shall prevail throughout the country. . . . And further, that, in
the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime law,
as accepted by the federal courts, constitutes part of our national
law, applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."
Concerning extent to which the general maritime law may be
changed, modified, or affected by state legislation, this was
said:
"No such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential
purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that
law in its international and interstate relations. This limitation,
at the least, is essential to the effective operation of the
fundamental purposes for which such
Page 247 U. S. 382
law was incorporated into our national laws by the Constitution
itself. These purposes are forcefully indicated in the foregoing
quotations from
The Lottawanna,"
21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S.
575.
Among such quotations is the following:
"One thing, however, is unquestionable: the Constitution must
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under
the disposal and regulation of the several states, as that would
have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character
affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with
foreign states."
The work about which petitioner was engaged is maritime in its
nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries
received were likewise maritime, and the parties' rights and
liabilities were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction.
Atlantic Transportation Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S.
52,
234 U. S. 59-60.
And unless in some way there was imposed upon the owners a
liability different from that prescribed by maritime law,
petitioner could properly demand only wages, maintenance, and cure.
Under the doctrine approved in
Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, no state has power to abolish the well recognized
maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute
therefor the full indemnity rule of the common law. Such a
substitution would distinctly and definitely change or add to the
settled maritime law, and it would be destructive of the
"uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on
all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of
the states with each other or with foreign states."
Two acts of Congress are relied upon, and it is said that, under
each, petitioner has the right to recover full indemnity
Page 247 U. S. 383
according to the common law. They are: (1) Section 9, Judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76, 77, whereby district courts of the United
States were given exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it" (Judicial Code, §§ 24, 256), and (2) § 20 of
Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen, approved March 4,
1915, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185, which provides:
"That in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on
board vessel or in its service, seamen having command shall not be
held to be fellow servants with those under their authority."
The precise effect of the quoted clause of the original
Judiciary Act has not been delimited by this Court, and different
views have been entertained concerning it. In
Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, we definitely ruled that it gave no authority
to the several states to enact legislation which would work
"material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interfere with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations."
In
The Moses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411,
71 U. S. 431, we
said:
"That clause only saves to suitors 'the right of a common law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.' It is not a
remedy in the common law courts which is saved, but a common law
remedy. A proceeding
in rem, as used in the admiralty
courts, is not a remedy afforded by the common law; it is a
proceeding under the civil law."
And in
Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey,
177 U. S. 638,
177 U. S. 644,
177 U. S.
648:
"Some of the cases already cited recognize the distinction
between a common law action and a common law remedy. Thus, in
The Moses Taylor, . . . it is said of the saving clause of
the Judiciary Act: 'It is not a remedy in the common law courts
which is saved, but a
Page 247 U. S. 384
common law remedy. . . . If the suit be
in personam
against an individual defendant, with an auxiliary attachment
against a particular thing or against the property of the defendant
in general, it is essentially a proceeding according to the course
of the common law, and within the saving clause of the statute . .
. of a common law remedy. The suit in this case being one in equity
to enforce a common law remedy, the state courts were correct in
assuming jurisdiction.'"
The distinction between rights and remedies is fundamental. A
right is a well founded or acknowledged claim; a remedy is the
means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury. Bouvier's
Law Dictionary. Plainly, we think, under the saving clause, a right
sanctioned by the maritime law may be enforced through any
appropriate remedy recognized at common law; but we find nothing
therein which reveals an intention to give the complaining party an
election to determine whether the defendant's liability shall be
measured by common law standards, rather than those of the maritime
law. Under the circumstances here presented, without regard to the
court where he might ask relief, petitioner's rights were those
recognized by the law of the sea.
Section 20 of the Seamen's Act declares "seamen having command
shall not be held to be fellow servants with those under their
authority," and full effect must be given this whenever the
relationship between such parties becomes important. But the
maritime law imposes upon a shipowner liability to a member of the
crew injured at sea by reason of another member's negligence
without regard to their relationship; it was of no consequence,
therefore, to petitioner whether or not the alleged negligent order
came from a fellow servant; the statute is irrelevant. The language
of the section discloses no intention to impose upon shipowners the
same measure of liability for injuries suffered by the crew while
at sea as the common
Page 247 U. S. 385
law prescribes for employers in respect of their employees on
shore.
The judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY, MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, and MR. JUSTICE
CLARKE, dissent.