In actions against a railroad for injuries to employees
resulting from its negligence, it has long been the rule of the
federal courts that the negligence is to be established
affirmatively by the plaintiff.
In proceedings brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, rights and obligations depend upon it and applicable
principles of common law as interpreted and applied by the federal
courts, and negligence is essential to recovery.
Hence it is erroneous in such a proceeding to apply a state
statute (Mississippi Code, 1906, 1985, and Laws 1912, c. 215, p.
2911),
Page 247 U. S. 368
making proof of injury by an engine propelled by steam
prima
facie evidence of a railroad's negligence in an action against
it for damages.
Under the federal act, there is no cause of action for pain and
suffering if the employee die of his injuries without regaining
consciousness.
Under that act, no cause of action accrues for the benefit of a
dependent mother where the deceased employee leaves a widow who,
although she lived apart from him at the time of his death, was
neither remarried nor divorced, and where the rights and
liabilities consequent upon their marriage had not ceased under the
local law.
Reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.
While employed in interstate commerce by plaintiff in error, a
common carrier by railroad then engaging in such commerce, Van
Harris a brakeman was run over by the tender of an engine moving in
the yard at New Orleans, Louisiana, February 5, 1914. He died
within a few minutes without regaining consciousness. Having
qualified as administratrix, his mother (defendant in error),
charging negligence and relying upon the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, sued for damages in a state court for Lauderdale
County, Mississippi. A judgment in her favor was affirmed by the
supreme court without opinion.
Page 247 U. S. 369
The declaration contained no averment of conscious pain or
suffering by deceased. It alleged:
"That by reason of the negligence hereinabove set out, the
defendant railroad company is liable for the killing of said Van
Harris, and the administratrix is given the right to sue by the act
of Congress, she therefore brings this, her suit, and demands
judgment against the defendant for the sum of ten thousand
dollars."
It further charged that the dead son had been his mother's sole
support, but contained no reference to his widow.
One witness who claimed to have seen the accident gave evidence
tending to show negligence by the railroad, but his presence at the
scene was not left free from doubt, and other eyewitnesses narrated
the circumstances differently. Concerning deceased's contributions
to his mother's support, she said he was her sole dependence, paid
her house rent, gave her something to eat, looked after her, was
regularly at work, and would bring home $30 or $40 a month. Her
statements are the only evidence concerning the son's marriage and
widow. He duly married Mollie on an undisclosed date; after living
together for six months, he fell ill and she left; thereafter, her
whereabouts were unknown to him; she was alive at time of trial
(October, 1914); he left no child. Nothing indicates a divorce
proceeding. Answering "Do you know whether Mollie ever married
anybody else or not?" the witness replied: "I don't know, sir; I
hear them say she married."
Upon request of the administratrix, the following instructions
(among others) were given to the jury:
"No. 1. The court charges the jury for the plaintiff in this
case that, under the rule of evidence in the State of Mississippi,
all that is required of the plaintiff in this case is to prove that
injury was inflicted by the movement of the defendant's train or
engine, and then the law presumes negligence and then the burden of
proof shifts to the
Page 247 U. S. 370
defendant to prove all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the injury and from those facts so shown exonerate
itself from all negligence."
"No. 2. The court charges the jury for the plaintiff that, under
the rule of evidence under the Mississippi statutes known as the
prima facie statute, all that the plaintiff need prove to
entitle her to a judgment or verdict is that the defendant's engine
or train caused the injury complained of and then the plaintiff is
entitled to a verdict at the hands of the jury unless the defendant
has shown all of the facts surrounding the injury and from such
facts has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its
servants were not guilty of negligence."
"No. 3. The court charges the jury for the plaintiff that, if
you believe from the evidence that deceased was injured by the
running of defendant's engine, then the burden placed on defendant
by the
prima facie statute cannot be met or overcome by
mere speculation or conjecture, but it devolves on defendant the
duty of showing by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the injury and by such proof thus
exonerate itself from negligence."
"No. 8. The court charges the jury for the plaintiff in this
case that, if your verdict shall be for the plaintiff, then it
should be in such sum as you may believe from the evidence would
fully compensate the deceased for his pain and suffering, if any
have been shown by the evidence, and the value of his life reckoned
according to the American Mortality Table had the deceased
survived, and that such amount or the measure of same is peculiarly
within the province of the jury reckoned as above outlined. And
that the law does not require the plaintiff to prove the damages in
dollars and cents, but the amount thereof is to be fixed by the
jury in all not to exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars."
The so-called "Prima Facie Act" of Mississippi, set
Page 247 U. S. 371
out below,
* provides that in
actions against railroads for damages proof of injury inflicted by
an engine propelled by steam shall be
prima facie evidence
of negligence. Relying upon and undertaking to apply this statute,
the trial court gave the quoted instructions, and, in so doing, we
think, committed error.
The federal courts have long held that, where suit is brought
against a railroad for injuries to an employee resulting from its
negligence, such negligence is an affirmative fact which plaintiff
must establish.
The Nitro-Glycerine
Case, 15 Wall. 524,
82 U. S. 537;
Patton v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 179 U.
S. 658,
179 U. S. 663;
Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 200 U.
S. 480,
200 U. S. 487;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 233 U. S.
80,
233 U. S. 85. In
proceedings brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
rights and obligations depend upon it and applicable principles of
common law as interpreted and applied in federal courts, and
negligence is essential to recovery.
Seaboard Air Line v.
Horton, 233 U. S. 492,
233 U. S.
501-502;
Southern Ry. v. Gray, 241 U.
S. 333,
241 U. S. 339;
New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.
S. 147,
244 U. S. 150;
Erie R. Co. v.
Winfield, 244
Page 247 U. S. 372
U.S. 170,
244 U. S. 172.
These established principles and our holding in
Central Vermont
Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507,
238 U. S.
511-512, we think make it clear that the question of
burden of proof is a matter of substance, and not subject to
control by laws of the several states.
It was also error to give quoted instruction number eight. Since
the deceased endured no conscious suffering, he had no right of
action, and possible recovery was limited to pecuniary loss
sustained by the designated beneficiary.
Garrett v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 235 U. S. 308,
235 U. S. 312;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.
S. 485,
241 U. S.
489.
The act makes the widow sole beneficiary when there is no child,
and only in the absence of both may parents be considered. The
deceased left a widow, and although they had lived apart, no claim
is made that rights and liabilities consequent upon marriage had
disappeared under local law. Of course, we do not go beyond the
particular facts here disclosed. In the circumstances, proof of the
mother's pecuniary loss could not support a recovery.
The judgment below is reversed, and the cause remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
* Mississippi Code 1906, ยง 1985, as amended by c. 215, Laws
1912, p. 290:
"1985 (1808).
Injury to Persons or Property by Railroads
Prima Facie Evidence of Want of Reasonable Skill and Care,
etc. In all actions against railroad corporations and all
other corporations, companies, partnerships and individuals using
engines, locomotives, or cars of any kind or description
whatsoever, propelled by the dangerous agencies of steam,
electricity, gas, gasoline, or lever power and running on tracks,
for damages done to persons or property, proof of injury inflicted
by the running of the engines, locomotives or cars of any such
railroad corporations or such other corporation, company,
partnership, or individual shall be
prima facie evidence
of the want of reasonable skill and care of such railroad
corporation, or such other corporation, company, partnership, or
individual in reference to such injury. This section shall also
apply to passengers and employees of railroad corporations and of
such other corporations, companies, partnerships, and
individuals."