A state statute giving an attorney a lien on the cause of action
or its proceeds for an agreed portion of any recovery, and
rendering the actual or proposed defendant directly liable to him
for its satisfaction in case of settlement after notice without his
consent, does not deprive the party thus made liable of any
constitutional right, even where the settlement is made under a
judgment recovered upon the cause of action through another
attorney in the federal court and by satisfying such judgment by
payment to the clerk of that court.
A contrary contention raises no substantial federal
question.
So
held where the cause of action (for personal
injuries) arose in another state.
Writ of error to review 196 Mo.App. 541 dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Xedes, a section hand on the Union Pacific Railroad, was injured
in Kansas while in the performance of his duties. Laughlin, an
attorney at law, was employed by him in Missouri to prosecute and
settle his claim against the company, and Xedes agreed that
Laughlin should receive as compensation one-half of whatever amount
he
Page 247 U. S. 205
might obtain in settlement of the claim. The Revised Statutes of
Missouri (1909), §§ 964 and 965, authorizing such agreements, give
to the attorney a lien on the cause of action and on the proceeds
if notice of the lien is duly given to the defendant or "proposed
defendant," and, as construed by the Supreme Court of Missouri,
[
Footnote 1] they also provide
that if, after such notice, the claim is settled in any manner
without first procuring the written consent of such attorney, the
defendant or "proposed defendant" shall be liable to the attorney
in an independent suit to an amount equal to that for which he held
the lien.
Laughlin gave to the company this statutory notice. Later and
without his consent, Xedes brought, through other counsel, in a
state court, suit against the company which was removed to the
district court of the United States for the Western Division of the
Western District of Missouri, and judgment was entered therein for
$550. The company paid this amount to the clerk of court in
satisfaction of the judgment, and it was paid by him to Xedes and
his new counsel. When Laughlin learned these facts, he brought suit
against the company in Missouri before a justice of the peace, for
$275, and recovered a judgment therefor which was affirmed in the
state circuit court and again by the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
A rehearing applied for in June, 1917, was denied by that court,
which also refused to transfer the case to the supreme court. The
company, contending that the federal Constitution has been
violated, brings the case here under § 237 of the Judicial Code as
amended.
It does not appear here, as it did in
Dickinson v.
Stiles, 246 U. S. 631,
that the suit of the employee against the railroad was brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and no claim is made
that the attorney's lien
Page 247 U. S. 206
statute of the state is inconsistent with that law or the
constitutional provision concerning interstate commerce. The
company's contention, as set forth in its assignment of error in
this Court, is that the decision below takes its property and
denies to it equal protection of the law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because the decision imposes a liability not
imposed by the judgment recovered by Xedes in the federal court,
deprives it of the protection afforded by the Acts of Congress to
those who pay to the clerks of the United States district courts
money in satisfaction of judgments entered therein, [
Footnote 2] and gives to two attorneys liens
for the same service. The defendant in error moves to dismiss on
the ground that the case does not present a federal question
reviewable under § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act
of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726, because there is not
drawn in question the validity of a statute of or an authority
exercised under any state on the ground of their being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and that,
if such question is presented, the Kansas City Court of Appeals was
not "the highest court of a state in which a decision in the suit
could" have been had, since the Supreme Court of Missouri has
appellate jurisdiction in cases where "the validity of a treaty or
statute of or authority exercised under the United States is drawn
in question," and no application was made to nor any action taken
by it.
The Missouri statute simply gives a cause of action against one
who, with knowledge of the existence of a lien, deforces it. To
grant such a remedy against the wrongdoer clearly does not deprive
him of any right guaranteed by the federal Constitution, even if
the
Page 247 U. S. 207
instrument by means of which the wrong is accomplished happens
to be the judgment of a federal court. No substantial federal
question is involved. We have no occasion, therefore, to consider
whether the validity of the Missouri statute was drawn in question
(
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v.
Gilbert, 245 U. S. 162),
nor whether "a decision in the suit" might not have been had in the
Supreme Court of Missouri (
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway
Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. S.
530).
Writ of error dismissed.
[
Footnote 1]
O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 645;
Taylor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 715, 730;
Wait v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 204 Mo. 491, 501.
[
Footnote 2]
Revised Statutes, §§ 966, 967, 995, and § 996 as amended by Act
of February 19, 1897, c. 265, § 3, 29 Stat. 578, and Act of March
3, 1911, c. 224, 36 Stat. 1086; Act of August 1, 1888, c. 729, §§ 1
and 2, 25 Stat. 357.