Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894, c. 138, 28
Stat. 107, purports to grant to the state upon her admission
sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 in every township, reserving lands
embraced in permanent reservations, etc., but making no mention of
mineral lands. Section 10 provides that land granted by the act for
educational purposes
"shall not be subject to preemption, homestead entry, or any
other entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes
only."
Held that the school section grant was not intended to
embrace land known to be valuable for coal.
It is the settled policy of Congress to dispose of mineral lands
only under laws specially including them. This is evinced by very
numerous enactments, beginning even with the Ordinance of May 20,
1785. It was expressed in its application to all grants, whether to
a state or not, by the particular acts whence came the general and
permanent provisions on the subject found in §§ 2318 and 2346 of
the Revised Statutes, and was even more firmly established by the
mining laws as a whole.
Taken collectively, the mining laws (including the coal land
laws), constitute a special code upon the subject of mineral lands,
intended not only to establish particular modes of disposing of
such lands,
Page 245 U. S. 564
but also to except and reserve them from all other grants and
modes of disposal where there is no express provision for their
inclusion.
The school land indemnity act of February 28, 1891, c. 384, 26
Stat. 796, in providing for lieu selections where sections 16 and
36 are mineral, affords a plain implication that those sections are
not to pas under the grant if known to be mineral when the grant
takes effect.
The school land grant to Utah must be read in the light of the
mining laws (which have always applied in Utah), the school land
indemnity law,
supra, and the settled policy of Congress
respecting mineral lands, and not as if it constituted the sole
evidence of the legislative will. As it contains no language
certainly showing an intention to depart from such policy, or
explicitly or clearly withdrawing from the operation of the mining
laws the designated sections when known to be mineral, its general
terms cannot he held to include them.
This conclusion is fortified by the fact that, although Utah was
known to be rich in minerals as well as salines, the Enabling Act,
in its extensive grants, is silent as to minerals, but includes an
express grant of salines; also by the committee reports in
Congress, uniform construction by the Land Department, and the Act
of May 3, 1902, c. 683, 32 Stat. 188, declaring that, as to Utah,
the school land indemnity law of February 28, 1891,
supra,
shall apply to sections 2 and 32 as well as 16 and 36.
Cooper v.
Roberts, 18 How. 173, distinguished, and some of
its observations disapproved.
228 F. 421 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 245 U. S. 566
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit by the United States to quiet the title to
section 32 of a designated township in Carbon County, Utah the suit
being specially directed against a claim asserted by the defendant,
as an assignee of the state, under the school land grant to the
latter. Whether this tract passed to the state under that grant or
was reserved to the United States as mineral land is the matter in
controversy. In the district court, the United States prevailed as
to all but 40 acres, but in the circuit court of appeals that
decree was reversed and one for the defendant was directed. 228 F.
421.
The evidence shows that the entire section, excepting 40 acres,
is valuable for coal, and has been known to be so since before Utah
became a state. Land valuable for coal is mineral land within the
meaning of the public land laws. Thus, the ultimate question for
decision is whether the school land grant to Utah embraces mineral
land. The grant is found in § 6 of the Act of Congress of July 16,
1894, c. 138, 28 Stat. 107, and is copied in the margin [
Footnote 1]
Page 245 U. S. 567
with another closely related section of the same act. It neither
expressly includes mineral lands nor expressly excludes them. If it
did either, it would be conclusive of the will of Congress upon the
point. But, as it makes no mention of such lands, it is permissible
-- indeed, is essential -- to inquire whether the congressional
will is otherwise made manifest -- that is to say, whether the
general words of the grant are to be read in the light of other
statutes and a settled public policy in respect of mineral
lands.
In the legislation concerning the public lands, it has been the
practice of Congress to make a distinction between mineral lands
and other lands, to deal with them along different lines, and to
withhold mineral lands from disposal save under laws specially
including them. This practice began with the ordinance of May 20,
1785, 10 Journals of Congress (Folwell's ed.) 118, and was
observed
Page 245 U. S. 568
with such persistency in the early land laws [
Footnote 2] as to lead this Court to say in
United States v.
Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, "It has been the policy of
the government at all times, in disposing of the public lands, to
reserve the mines for the use of the United States," and also to
hold in
United States v.
Gear, 3 How. 120, that an act making no mention of
lead-mind lands and providing generally for the sale of "all the
lands" in certain new land districts, "reserving only" designated
tracts, "any law of Congress heretofore existing to the contrary
notwithstanding," could not be regarded as disclosing a purpose on
the part of Congress to depart from "the policy which had governed
its legislation in respect to lead mine lands," and so did not
embrace them. A like practice prevailed in respect of saline lands,
and in
Morton v.
Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660, where a disposal of such
lands under an act providing generally for the sale of lands in
certain territories was drawn in question, this Court said that it
could not be supposed "without an express declaration to that
effect" that Congress intended by such an act to permit the sale of
saline lands, and thus to depart from "a long established policy by
which it had been governed in similar cases."
While the early land laws occasionally and specially provided
for the sale of mineral lands, they very generally evinced a
purpose to reserve such lands for future disposal, and this purpose
was given particular emphasis following the discovery of gold in
California in 1848, as is shown in the Oregon Donation Act, the
Homestead Act (which
Page 245 U. S. 569
adopted the mineral land reservation of the Preemption Act of
1841), the grant to the several states for the benefit of
agricultural colleges, the railroad land grants, and other land
acts of that period. [
Footnote
3] Noticeable among those acts is one which, in dealing with
grants to Nevada and surveys in that state, declared, "in all
cases, lands valuable for mines of gold, silver, quicksilver, or
copper shall be reserved from sale," c. 166, § 5, 14 Stat. 86, and
another declaring,
"no act passed at the first session of the Thirty-Eighth
Congress, granting lands to states or corporations, to aid in the
construction of roads or for other purposes, or to extend the time
of grants heretofore made, shall be so construed as to embrace
mineral lands, which in all cases shall be, and are, reserved
exclusively to the United States, unless otherwise specially
provided in the act or acts making the grant."
13 Stat. 567. Although applied in one instance to lands in
Nevada and in the other to grants made at a particular session of
Congress, these declarations were but expressive of the will of
Congress that every grant of public lands, whether to a state or
otherwise, should be taken as reserving and excluding mineral lands
in the absence of an expressed purpose to include them, and upon
this theory both declarations were carried into the Revised
Statutes as being general and permanent
Page 245 U. S. 570
in their nature -- the first in enlarged terms as § 2318,
[
Footnote 4] and the other as §
2346.
By the act of March 3, 1853, c. 145, 10 Stat. 244, Congress
granted to the State of California sections 16 and 36 in each
township for school purposes and large quantities of lands for
other purposes. Mineral lands were neither expressly excepted from
nor expressly included in the grant of the school sections, but
were specially excepted from the other grants. This difference led
to a controversy over the true meaning of the school grant, the
state authorities taking the view that it did, and the land
officers of the United States that it did not, include mineral
lands. Ultimately the controversy came before this Court in
Mining Co. v. Consolidated Mining Co., 102 U.
S. 167, and the position taken by the land officers of
the United States was sustained, the Court saying, p.
102 U. S.
174:
"Taking into consideration what is well known to have been the
hesitation and difficulty in the minds of Congressmen in dealing
with these mineral lands, the manner in which the question was
suddenly forced upon them, the uniform reservation of them from
survey, from sale, from preemption, and above all from grants,
whether for railroads, public buildings, or other purposes, and
looking to the fact that from all the grants made in this act they
are reserved, one of which is for school purposes besides the
sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections, we are forced to the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to depart from its uniform
policy in this respect in the grant of those sections to the
state."
"It follows from the finding of the court and the undisputed
facts of the case that the land in controversy being mineral land,
and well known to be so when the surveys of it were made, did not
pass to the state under the school-section grant. "
Page 245 U. S. 571
That ruling was reaffirmed and followed in
Mullan v. United
States, 118 U. S. 271,
where valuable coal lands, known to be such, were held not to be
open to selection by the state as indemnity school lands.
The conditions ensuing from the discovery of gold and other
minerals in the western states and territories resulted in a
general demand for a system of laws expressly opening the mineral
lands to exploration, occupation, and acquisition, and Congress,
responding to this demand, adopted from 1864 to 1873 a series of
acts dealing with practically every phase of the subject and
covering all classes of mineral lands, including coal lands.
[
Footnote 5] These acts, with
some before noticed, were carried into a chapter of the Revised
Statutes entitled "Mineral Lands and Mining Resources." Taken
collectively, they constitute a special code upon that subject, and
show that they are intended not only to establish a particular mode
of disposing of mineral lands, but also to except and reserve them
from all other grants and modes of disposal where there is no
express provision for their inclusion. Thus, the policy of
disposing of mineral lands only under laws specially including them
became even more firmly established than before, and this is
recognized in our decisions.
Mining Co. v. Consolidated Mining
Co., supra, 102 U. S. 174;
Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392,
115 U. S. 402;
Davis v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507,
139 U. S. 516.
And while the mineral land laws are not applicable to all the
public land states, some being specially excepted, [
Footnote 6] there has been no time since
their enactment when they were not applicable to Utah.
Page 245 U. S. 572
Another statute indicative of the policy of Congress and
pertinent to the present inquiry is the act of February 28, 1891,
c. 384, 26 Stat. 796, which defines the indemnity to which a state
or territory is entitled in respect of its school grant. In
addition to dealing with deficiencies occurring in other ways, it
provides,
"And other lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated
and granted, and may be selected by said state or territory where
sections sixteen or thirty-six are mineral lands."
In this there is a plain implication that where those sections
are mineral -- known to be so when the grant takes effect -- they
do not pass under the grant. And it does not militate against this
implication that, under another provision, the state may surrender
those sections and take other lands in lieu of them where, although
not known to be mineral when the grant takes effect, they are
afterwards discovered to be so.
See California v. Deseret Oil
Co., 243 U. S. 415.
What has been said demonstrates that the school grant to Utah
must be read in the light of the mining laws, the school land
indemnity law, and the settled public policy respecting mineral
lands, and not as though it constituted the sole evidence of the
legislative will.
United States v. Barnes, 222 U.
S. 513,
222 U. S. 520.
When it is so read, it does not, in our opinion, disclose a purpose
to include mineral lands. Although couched in general terms
adequate to embrace such lands if there were no statute or settled
policy to the contrary, it contains no language which explicitly or
clearly withdraws the designated sections, where known to be
mineral in character, from the operation of the mining laws, or
which certainly shows that Congress intended to depart from its
long prevailing policy of disposing of mineral lands only under
laws specially including them.
Page 245 U. S. 573
It therefore must be taken as neither curtailing those laws nor
departing from that policy.
This conclusion is fortified by other considerations. When the
grant was made, Utah was known to be rich in minerals and salines.
Besides this grant, the act contains others aggregating 1,570,080
acres. In none is there any mention of mineral lands. As to 110,000
acres, there is an express inclusion of saline lands. This silence
as to mineral lands, when contrasted with the special inclusion of
saline lands, indicates that the former are not included.
See
Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U. S. 452,
221 U. S. 466.
The committees of Congress, upon whose recommendation the act was
passed, construed it as not embracing mineral lands, for in their
reports, [
Footnote 7] they
stated that "[a]ll mineral lands are exempt from any grant made
under the act." The Land Department has uniformly placed the same
construction upon it. [
Footnote
8] And Congress acted upon that construction when, by the Act
of May 3, 1902, c. 683, 32 Stat. 188, it declared that, as to the
State of Utah, "all the provisions" of the school land indemnity
law of February 28, 1891, before noticed, should apply to sections
2 and 32 as well as to sections 16 and 36 -- the grant to that
state covering all of these sections, instead of the latter two, as
in other western states.
The case of
Cooper v.
Roberts, 18 How. 173, is relied upon as making for
a different conclusion. Part of a school section in Michigan known
to be mineral was there in controversy, and was held to have passed
to the state under its school grant. At the time the section was
surveyed, which was the date when the grant was to take effect,
there was a statute which, in a single section, provided for
Page 245 U. S. 574
the sale of mineral lands, and also of other lands, and
concluded with a reservation of the school sections "from such
sales." The real question was whether those sections were reserved
from both classes of sales, and this the court answered in the
affirmative. Some observations in the opinion are not in accord
with our present conclusion. These were relied upon in
Mining
Co. v. Consolidated Mining Co., supra, as our records show,
and were in effect disapproved. Besides, when they were made, the
public policy respecting mineral lands had not been expressed in
general and permanent laws, such as were afterwards enacted and
carried into the Revised Statutes.
See Lindley on Mines,
3d ed., § 136. The case, therefore, is neither controlling nor
persuasive here.
It results that the decree of the circuit court of appeals must
be reversed, and that of the district court affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
"Sec. 6. That, upon the admission of said state into the Union,
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every
township of said proposed state, and where such sections or any
parts thereof have been sold or otherwise disposed of by or under
the authority of any act of Congress other lands equivalent
thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which the
same is taken, are hereby granted to said state for the support of
common schools, such indemnity lands to be selected within said
state in such manner as the legislature may provide, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior:
Provided, that
the second, sixteenth, thirty-second, and thirty-sixth sections
embraced in permanent reservations for national purposes shall not
at any time be subject to the grants nor to the indemnity
provisions of this Act, nor shall any lands embraced in Indian,
military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the
grants or to the indemnity provisions of this Act until the
reservation shall have been extinguished and such lands be restored
to and become a part of the public domain. . . ."
"Sec. 10. That the proceeds of lands herein granted for
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided,
shall constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which
only shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such
land shall not be subject to preemption, homestead entry, or any
other entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes
only."
[
Footnote 2]
Acts May 18, 1796, c. 29, § 2, 1 Stat. 465; March 3, 1807, c.
46, § 2, 2 Stat. 445; March 3, 1807, c. 49, § 5, 2 Stat. 449;
February 15, 1811, c. 14, § 10, 2 Stat. 620; March 3, 1811, c. 46,
§ 10, 2 Stat. 665; May 6, 1812, c. 77, § 1, 2 Stat. 728; February
17, 1815, c. 45, § 1, 3 Stat. 211; March 25, 1816, c. 35, § 1, 3
Stat. 260; April 29, 1816, c. 164, 3 Stat. 332; March 3, 1829, c.
55, 4 Stat. 364; September 4, 1841, c. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 455; July
11, 1846, c. 36, 9 Stat. 37; March 1, 1847, c. 32, 9 Stat. 146;
March 3, 1847, c. 54, 9 Stat. 179; September 26, 1850, c. 72, 9
Stat. 472; Public Domain (Donaldson) 306.
[
Footnote 3]
Acts September 27, 1850, c. 76, §§ 5, 14, 9 Stat. 498, 500;
February 14, 1853, c. 69, § 7, 10 Stat. 159; Jury 22, 1854, c. 103,
§ 4, 10 Stat. 308; May 20, 1862, c. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392; May 30,
1862, c. 86, §§ 7, 10, 12 Stat. 410; July 1, 1862, c. 120, § 3, 12
Stat. 492; July 2, 1862, c. 129, § 3, 12 Stat. 503; July 2, 1862,
c. 130, 12 Stat. 503; July 2, 1864, c. 216, §§ 4, 19, 13 Stat. 358,
364; July 2, 1864, c. 217, § 3, 13 Stat. 367; June 21, 1866, c.
127, § 1, 14 Stat. 66; July 4, 1866, c. 166, § 5, 14 Stat. 86; July
23, 1866, c. 219, § 1, 14 Stat. 218; July 25, 1866, c. 242, §§ 2,
10, 14 Stat. 239, 241; July 27, 1866, c. 278, § 3, 14 Stat. 294;
July 28, 1866, c. 300, § 1, 14 Stat. 338; June 21, 1860, c. 167, §
6, 12 Stat. 72; July 4, 1866, c. 165, 14 Stat. 83; May 4, 1870, c.
69, 16 Stat. 94; March 3, 1871, c. 122, § 9, 16 Stat. 576; Lindley
on Mines (3d ed.) § 47.
[
Footnote 4]
"Sec. 2318. In all cases, lands valuable for minerals shall be
reserved from sale, except as otherwise expressly directed by
law."
[
Footnote 5]
Acts July 1, 1864, c. 205, § 1, 13 Stat. 343; March 3, 1865, c.
107, § 1, 13 Stat. 529; July 26, 1866, c. 262, 14 Stat. 251; July
9, 1870, c. 235, 16 Stat. 217; May 10, 1872, c. 152, 17 Stat. 91;
March 3, 1873, c. 279, 17 Stat. 607.
[
Footnote 6]
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas, Alabama, and
Oklahoma have been wholly or partly excepted. Acts February 18,
1873, c. 159, 17 Stat. 465; May 5, 1876, c. 91, 19 Stat. 52; March
3, 1883, c. 118, 22 Stat. 487; March 3, 1891, c. 543, 26 Stat.
1026; June 6, 1900, c. 813, 31 Stat. 680.
[
Footnote 7]
House Report No. 162, 53d Cong., 1st sess., p. 18; Senate Report
No. 414, 53d Cong., 2d sess., p. 19.
[
Footnote 8]
Utah v. Allen, 27 L.D. 53; Richter v. Utah, 27 L.D. 95; Utah, 29
L.D. 69; Utah, 32 L.D. 117; Mahoganey No. 2 Lodge Claim, 33 L.D.
37; Charles L. Ostenfeldt, 41 L.D. 265.