The fact that one who paid unreasonable freight charges has
shifted the burden by collecting from purchasers of the goods does
not prevent him from recovering the overpayments from the carrier
under an order of reparation made by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. He is the proximate loser; his cause of action accrues
immediately, without waiting for later events; the purchaser,
lacking privity, cannot recover the illegal profits from the
carrier; and, practically, to follow each transaction to its
ultimate result would be endless and futile. Cases like
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co.,
230 U. S. 184,
involving damages for discrimination, are distinguished.
Page 245 U. S. 532
An objection that error will not lie in this case not decided,
as the pending application for certiorari would be granted if the
objection were held good.
Semble that cases brought under § 16 of the Act to
Regulate Commerce, to enforce reparation orders, stand on peculiar
ground as respects review by certiorari.
229 F. 1022 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 245 U. S. 533
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit brought by the defendants in error to recover
reparation from the railroads for charging a rate on hardwood
lumber alleged to be excessive. The Interstate Commerce Commission
had found the rate to be excessive and had made an order for
reduction from 85 to 75 cents, which was obeyed, and also one for
reparation to the extent of the excess, which was not obeyed. 13
I.C.C. 668. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by the
circuit court on the ground that it was not alleged that the
plaintiffs had paid the excessive rates or that they were damaged
thereby. 190 F. 659. The declaration was amended, but at the trial
the judge directed a verdict for the defendants, presumably on the
ground argued here -- that it did not appear that the plaintiffs
were damaged. The judgment was reversed by the circuit court of
appeals. 221 F. 890. At a new trial, the jury were instructed that,
if they found the rate charged unreasonable and that prescribed by
the Interstate Commerce Commission reasonable, they should find for
the plaintiffs in accordance with the Commission's award. The jury
found for the plaintiffs, and this judgment was affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals. 229 F. 1022.
The only question before us is that at which we have hinted:
whether the fact that the plaintiffs were able to pass on the
damage that they sustained in the first instance by paying the
unreasonable charge, and to collect that amount from the
purchasers, prevents their recovering the overpayment from the
carriers. The answer is not difficult. The general tendency of the
law, in regard to damages, at least, is not to go beyond the first
step. As it does not attribute remote consequences to a defendant,
so it holds him liable if proximately
Page 245 U. S. 534
the plaintiff has suffered a loss. The plaintiffs suffered
losses to the amount of the verdict when they paid. Their claim
accrued at once in the theory of the law, and it does not inquire
into later events.
Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Construction Co.,
177 Mass. 41, 44. Perhaps, strictly, the securing of such an
indemnity as the present might be regarded as not differing in
principle from the recovery of insurance, as
res inter
alios, with which the defendants were not concerned. If it be
said that the whole transaction is one from a business point of
view, it is enough to reply that the unity in this case is not
sufficient to entitle the purchaser to recover, any more than the
ultimate consumer who in turn paid an increased price. He has no
privity with the carrier.
State v. Central Vermont Ry.
Co., 81 Vt. 459.
See Nicola, Stone & Myers Co. v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 14 I.C.C. 199, 207-209; Baker
Manufacturing Co. v. Chicago Northwestern Ry. Co., 21 I.C.C. 605.
The carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit,
and the only one who can take it from him is the one that alone was
in relation with him, and from whom the carrier took the sum.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Ballou &
Wright, 242 F. 862. Behind the technical mode of statement is
the consideration, well emphasized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, of the endlessness and futility of the effort to follow
every transaction to its ultimate result. 13 I.C.C. 680. Probably,
in the end, the public pays the damages in most cases of
compensated torts.
The cases like
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal
Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184,
where a party that has paid only the reasonable rate sues upon a
discrimination because some other has paid less, are not like the
present. There, the damage depends upon remoter considerations. But
here, the plaintiffs have paid cash out of pocket that should not
have been required of them,
Page 245 U. S. 535
and there is no question as to the amount of the proximate loss.
See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.
S. 412,
236 U. S. 429;
Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 238 U.
S. 473.
An objection is taken to the jurisdiction of this court upon
writ of error. An application is made for a certiorari in case the
objection is held good, and, as we should grant the latter writ in
that event, the question has no importance here except as a
precedent. We are inclined to take the course followed
sub
silentio in
Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., and to
treat cases brought under § 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce
which authorizes the joinder of all plaintiffs and all defendants
as standing on a peculiar ground.
Judgment affirmed.