When a case is here upon the ground that the court below denied
full faith and credit to a decree of a court of another state, a
motion to dismiss the writ of error based on the proposition that
the decree was accorded its due value under the statutes of the its
rendition merely begs the question in issue, and must be
denied.
The principles of estoppel by judgment are reviewed in the
opinion and held to apply (
semble with peculiar reason) to
decrees for divorce and alimony.
In a court of Arkansas, a wife, by her cross-bill, sought
absolute divorce, return of money lent her husband, and alimony "as
the facts and law warrant, and all other proper and necessary
relief," alleging that her husband owned certain real and personal
property, including land in Nebraska. The decree granted the
divorce as prayed, adjudged that the wife recover a stated sum "in
full of alimony and all other demands set forth in cross bill,"
recited that such judgment was rendered by the husband's consent on
condition that there he no appeal, made provisions for security,
which the husband complied with, and awarded her certain personal
property. After the husband had paid the judgment, the wife sued
him in Nebraska to obtain further alimony out of the Nebraska land,
claiming that the Arkansas court had no jurisdiction to take it
into consideration and did not do so.
Held that the face
of the decree, with the cross-bill, showed a plenary adjudication
of the liability for alimony with consent of parties; that this was
confirmed by the parties' conduct, and the weight of the testimony
in this case, concerning the former proceedings; that, in virtue of
the consent, if not under the Arkansas statutes (Kirby's Digest, §§
2681, 2684), the decree was within the jurisdiction of the Arkansas
court, and that the action of the court below in sustaining the
plaintiff's contentions and not accepting the decree as an estoppel
was a denial of full faith and credit.
99 Neb. 253 reversed.
Plaintiff in error, Bates, filed a complaint in divorce against
defendant in error in the chancery court of Benton
Page 245 U. S. 521
County, State of Arkansas, alleging cruelty and praying for an
absolute divorce.
Defendant in error filed an answer denying the charge against
her and a cross-complaint accusing him of cruelty.
In the cross-complaint, she alleged that Bates was the owner of
real and personal property of the fair value of $75,000, consisting
of 320 acres of land in York County, Neb., which she described, and
alleged further that she was the owner in her own right of $3,000,
$2,500 of which she loaned to Bates, taking his note therefor
bearing interest at 8% per annum.
She prayed for an absolute divorce, for the restoration of the
money borrowed from her, and "that the court award her such alimony
as the facts and law warrant, and all other proper and necessary
relief." The court, after hearing, dismissed Bates' complaint for
want of equity and granted her a divorce, and alimony was decreed
her as follows:
"It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the
defendant Lucie Bates have and recover of and from the defendant
[plaintiff] Edward Bates the sum of $5,111.00 in full of alimony
and all other demands set forth in cross-bill, which judgment is
rendered by the consent of the plaintiff on condition that no
appeal be taken by the defendant from the judgment and decree
herein rendered."
Certain personal property, consisting of silverware and
household furniture, was adjudged to her, and a lien was declared
on a lot in the City of Siloam Springs, State of Arkansas, and
certain notes and mortgages amounting to the sum of $2,801.06 were
required to be deposited with the clerk of the court as additional
security. He, however, was given the power to sell the same, but
required to deposit the proceeds of the sale with the clerk until
the sum awarded her be paid, for which no execution was to issue
for six months. It was
Page 245 U. S. 522
also decreed "that she be restored to her maiden name, . . . and
that the bonds of matrimony entered into" between her and Bates "be
dissolved, set aside, and held for naught."
She subsequently brought this suit against him in a Nebraska
state court, repeating the charges of cruelty against him and the
proceedings in Arkansas resulting in a decree for divorce and
alimony as stated above, and
"that the court of chancery did not have any jurisdiction of or
over the property of complainant which was situated outside of the
State of Arkansas, and that, in consequence of that fact, in
determining the amount of alimony to be granted the defendant in
that suit, he was limited and prohibited from taking into account
the above-mentioned property situated in York County, Nebraska.
Said court was limited by the laws of Arkansas from taking into
consideration said property lying in York County, Nebraska, in
determining the amount of alimony that should be granted to
defendant in that suit, who is plaintiff herein."
The laws of the State of Arkansas further provide, she alleged,
that:
"where the divorce is granted to the wife, each party is
restored to all property not disposed of at the commencement of the
action which either party obtains from or through the other during
the marriage and in consideration or by reason thereof, and the
wife so granted a divorce from the husband shall be entitled to
one-third of all lands of which her husband is seized of an estate
of inheritance at any time during the marriage, for her life,
unless the same shall have been released by her in legal form."
She further alleged that the land in Nebraska was worth the sum
of $48,000; that the amount of alimony allowed her by the Arkansas
decree was largely inadequate for her support and was not such a
fair proportion of the property of Bates owned by him at the date
of
Page 245 U. S. 523
the decree as she then was, and is entitled to in view of the
circumstances. She prayed that a reasonable sum be adjudged her out
of the York County property in addition to the amount allowed her
by the Arkansas decree. A copy of the decree was attached to the
complaint.
Bates demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and, she
declining to plead further, the cause was dismissed for want of
equity. The judgment was reversed by the supreme court.
On the return of the case to the trial court, Bates answered. He
set up the proceedings in Arkansas, and pleaded the decree and
alleged that it was made upon full consideration of the evidence
and the issues, and that the court took into consideration the
value of the land in York County, Nebraska, in determining the
amount of alimony to be awarded to plaintiff; that the decree
remained "in full force and effect, except that the amount of
alimony awarded therein has been fully paid" by him; that the
Arkansas court, in awarding the alimony "took into consideration
all of the property owned by" him,
"which decree, so far as it relates to alimony, having been
fully satisfied, has become a full and complete bar to further
proceedings on the part of the plaintiff in this suit, defendant in
that, to recover additional alimony under the laws of
Arkansas;"
and that, further, under the Constitution of the United States,
the findings and decree are entitled to full faith and credit in
the courts of Nebraska, and constitute a full and complete bar to
plaintiff's right to recover additional alimony under the laws of
the State of Nebraska.
It was adjudged and decreed that plaintiff (defendant in error
here) have and recover from the defendant (plaintiff in error here)
the "sum of $10,000, being the amount found due her as alimony."
The judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, to review which
this writ of error was prosecuted.
Page 245 U. S. 524
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after stating the case as above, delivered
the opinion of the court.
A motion is made to dismiss on the ground, as contended, that
the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska was based upon a
construction of the statutes of Arkansas, and concluded therefrom
that the district court of Arkansas
"had no jurisdiction to take the Nebraska lands of this
plaintiff in error into consideration in fixing the amount of
allowance to this defendant in error, and as a matter of fact did
not do so;"
that his conclusion was reached
"by reason of the peculiar statute of Arkansas which governs and
controls the courts of that state in fixing the allowance of
alimony to a wife,
in all cases in which the divorce
is granted on her petition"
(italics counsel's), and the court "was limited and controlled
by that statute." It is hence contended that the full faith and
credit which the Constitution of the United States requires to be
given to the judicial proceedings of another state was not denied
to the Arkansas decree, but that the Supreme Court of Nebraska,
considering the statutes of Arkansas, gave to the decree the value
those statutes gave to it.
But this is the question in controversy. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska is challenged for not according to the
decree the credit it is entitled
Page 245 U. S. 525
to, and it is no answer to the challenge to say that the supreme
court committed no error in responding to it, and that therefore
there is no federal question for review.
Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U. S. 14. The
motion to dismiss is denied.
The decision of the supreme court affirming the subsequent
judgment of the district court on the merits was by a divided
court, and the opinion and dissenting opinion were well reasoned
and elaborate. The ultimate propositions decided were that the
courts of Nebraska would entertain a suit for alimony out of real
estate situated in that state after a decree for absolute divorce
in another state, the latter state having no jurisdiction of the
land, notwithstanding the decree awarding alimony, the decree not
appearing to have been rendered by consent or not having taken such
land into account, and that, besides, the Arkansas court had no
jurisdiction to render a money judgment for alimony.
The propositions were supported and opposed by able discussion,
some of which was occupied in reconciling a conflict of decision in
Nebraska, a later decision made to give away to an earlier one. We
are not called upon to trace or consider the reasoning of the
opinion further than to determine the correctness of its elements,
and this determination can be made by reference to the divorce
proceedings in Arkansas and the decree of the court rendered
therein.
The case is not in broad compass, and depends upon the
application of the quite familiar principle that determines the
estoppel of judgments, and the principle would seem to have special
application to a judgment for divorce and alimony. They are usually
concomitants in the same suit -- some cases say must be -- or
rather that, as alimony is an incident of divorce, it must be
awarded by the same decree that grants the separation. And it is
the practice to unite them, as alimony
Page 245 U. S. 526
necessarily depends upon a variety of circumstances more
adequately determined in the suit for divorce, not only the right
to it, but the measure of it, all circumstances upon which it
depends then naturally brought under the view and judgment of the
court. Whether, however, the right to it should be litigated in the
suit for divorce, or may be sought subsequently in another, the
principle is applicable that what is once adjudged cannot be tried
again. And this Court has established a test of the thing adjudged
and the extent of its estoppel. It is: if the second action is upon
the same claim or demand as that in which the judgment pleaded was
rendered, the judgment is an absolute bar not only of what was
decided, but of what might have been decided. If the second action
was upon a different claim or demand, then the judgment is an
estoppel "only as to those matters in issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was
rendered."
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S.
351,
94 U. S. 353;
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U.
S. 252;
Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western R. Co., 227 U. S. 434;
Radford v. Myers, 231 U. S. 725;
Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.
S. 294.
But how find the matters in issue or the points controverted
upon the determination of which the judgment was rendered? The
obvious answer would seem to be that, for the issues we must go to
the pleadings; for the response to them and their determination, to
the judgment, and each may furnish a definition of the other.
National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Supply
Co., 183 U. S. 216,
183 U. S. 234.
If there be generality and uncertainty, to what extent there may be
specification and limitation by evidence
aliunde there is
some conflict in the cases. But we are not called upon to review or
reconcile them. Our rule is that an estoppel by judgment is
"not only as to every matter which was
Page 245 U. S. 527
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose."
Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra, p.
94 U. S. 352.
Is the rule applicable to the instant case?
We have set forth the proceedings in divorce in which, we have
seen, there were charges of cruelty, and countercharges. There was
display of property, prayers for divorce, and a prayer in addition,
on the part of defendant in error, that her husband, Bates, be
required to restore a sum borrowed from her, "and that the court
award her such alimony as the facts and law warrant, and all other
proper and necessary relief."
Responding to the issues thus made and the relief thus prayed,
the court adjudged plaintiff in error guilty of cruelty, granted
defendant in error a divorce, and awarded her the sum of "$5,111.00
in full of alimony and all other items set forth in the
cross-bill."
There were then presented the issues of divorce and alimony; the
first was made absolute, the second in a specified sum "in full,"
and the sum adjudged to her was made a lien on his property in the
state (Arkansas). We may remark that she was awarded other
property. It would seem therefore that there is no uncertainty upon
the face of the record, and that it is clear as to the issues
submitted and clear as to the decision upon them.
But it is answered that: (1) the court had no jurisdiction of
the Nebraska lands, and (2) that, besides, it did not take them
into account in its judgment.
(1) Counsel make too much of this point. It may be that the
Arkansas court had no jurisdiction of the Nebraska lands so as to
deal with them specifically, but it had jurisdiction over plaintiff
in error to require him to perform any order it might make. But
even this power need not be urged. The court had jurisdiction of
the controversy between the parties and all that
Page 245 U. S. 528
pertained to it, jurisdiction to determine the extent of the
property resources of plaintiff in error and what part of them
should be awarded to defendant in error. It was not limited to any
particular sum if it had jurisdiction to render a money judgment at
all.
But such jurisdiction does not exist, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska decides and counsel urges. The argument to sustain this is
that the Arkansas statute
* (§ 2684,
Kirby's Digest) provides that, when a divorce is granted to the
wife, the only power the court possesses is to restore to the
parties respectively the property one may have obtained from the
other during the marriage, and adjudge to the wife one-third of her
husband's personal property absolutely and one-third of all the
lands whereof he was seised of an estate of inheritance at any time
during the marriage for her life unless she shall have relinquished
the same in legal form. In other words, against a guilty husband,
the courts of Arkansas were without power to render a money
judgment for alimony, but were confined to an allotment of his
personal property and real estate in the proportions stated. But
the court was confronted with the question of the relation of that
section to § 2681 of the Digest, which provides that:
"when a decree shall be entered, the court shall make such order
touching the alimony of the wife and care of the children, if there
be any, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of
the case shall
Page 245 U. S. 529
be reasonable."
In answer to the question, the court decided that the latter
section is applicable only when a divorce is granted for the fault
of the wife.
Plaintiff in error contests the conclusion, and strong argument
may be made against it to show that the sections are reconcilable,
and each applicable to particular conditions. And such was the view
of the dissenting members of the court. However, we are not called
upon for a definitive decision on account of the view we entertain
of proposition 2 and the reason which, we think, induced the court
to render a money judgment.
2. This proposition is based on the record, which, the supreme
court said, "shows that the court [Arkansas court] did not in fact
make any allowance on account of the Nebraska lands," and resort is
had to parol testimony for the purpose of limiting the decree. But
we cannot give the testimony such strength. It is conflicting. It
consists of the impressions of opposing counsel and of the parties
of the opinion of the court orally delivered in direction for the
decree.
The Bodie version is supported by the clerk of the court, whose
recollection was that the court did not take into consideration
"the land outside of Benton County." But he further testified that
there was testimony of the rental value of the Nebraska lands, and
that
"the chancellor announced that, while he did not have
jurisdiction over the lands in Nebraska, he did have jurisdiction
over the person of Bates, as he was personally present in court.
The court required Bates to deposit security for the payment of the
alimony awarded. . . . As I recollect it, the decree rendered was
on the consent of Bates on condition that Bodie would not
appeal."
On the Bates side is the evidence of the chancellor, whose
opinion was the subject of the testimony of the others. He was
specific and direct, and the following, in summary, is his
testimony: depositions were introduced
Page 245 U. S. 530
showing the value of and rental income from the Nebraska lands,
which were supposed to be in the name of Bates' children or in his
name as trustee for his children. The decree for alimony was a lump
sum of $5,111 "in lieu of any interest that she might have or claim
she might have for any sum." (It does not appear from what this is
a quotation -- probably from the witness' opinion.) He, the
witness, intimated what he would do in the way of a property
finding, and the parties agreed upon a lump sum as a final
settlement, from which no appeal was to be taken. His view was that
the court had jurisdiction of the parties, and held it had not of
the land in Nebraska, but it did have jurisdiction to consider its
value in determining the amount of alimony. Knowing, as he
testified, the law, he did not think he stated that there was no
law justifying the court to take into consideration the Nebraska
lands. It was not the first time the proposition had been raised
before him.
He remembered that Bodie claimed $2,500 as borrowed money, but
the money had merged in Bates' estate. He did not understand that
it entered in the decree. It was a lump sum agreement provided cash
could be got to end the controversy both as to divorce and as to
property rights. Counsel adjusted it on the outside, for he was
quite sure that it was not the amount the court indicated it would
allow. The court understood that counsel on both sides agreed to
the amount; that the judgment was a complete and amicable
settlement between the parties of all property rights involved.
We must ascribe to the representation of the decree the same
judicial impartiality that induced its rendition, and the
representation was circumstantial, without material qualification,
doubt, or hesitation. It accords, besides, with the issues in the
case and the decree. As we have seen, the amount it awarded was "in
full of alimony and all other demands set forth in the
cross-bill."
Page 245 U. S. 531
It also recited that it was rendered by consent of plaintiff on
condition that no appeal be taken by defendant from the judgment
and decree. The amount was secured, as the chancellor declared he
would secure it; it was paid as it was required to be paid.
The evidence therefore confirms the face of the decree, and that
it was rendered by consent of the parties. It is admitted that
consent would give jurisdiction to the court to render a money
judgment for alimony.
We think, therefore, that due faith and credit required by the
Constitution of the United States was not given to the decree.
The judgment of the supreme court is reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
*
"And where the divorce is granted to the wife, the court shall
make an order that each party be restored to all property not
disposed of at the commencement of the action which either party
obtained from or through the other during the marriage and in
consideration or by reason thereof, and the wife so granted a
divorce against the husband shall be entitled to one-third of the
husband's personal property absolutely, and one-third of all the
lands whereof her husband was seised of an estate of inheritance at
any time during the marriage for her life, unless the same shall
have been relinquished by her in legal form."
Kirby's Digest § 2684.
