Suits brought by carriers to restrain state officials from
interfering with the establishment and maintenance of intrastate
rates which the carriers have adopted in pursuance of an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring the removal of
discrimination against interstate commerce are not suits to
"enforce" the order in the sense of the jurisdictional provision of
the Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219, and need not be
brought in the district "wherein is the residence of the party or
any of the parties upon whose petition the order was made." They
come within the provision in § 1 of the Act of June 18, 1910, c.
309, 36 Stat. 539, repeated in Jud.Code, § 207, by which the
general jurisdiction over cases not therein enumerated is
preserved.
In such a suit, neither the United States nor the Commission is
a necessary party, either by statute or under the rules governing
suits in equity.
As, by the jurisdictional provision of the Act of October 22,
1913,
supra, a suit to set aside an order of the
Commission, relating to transportation and made upon petition, may
be brought only in the district of the petitioner's residence, and
as the United States has not consented to be thus impleaded in any
other district, and its immunity from suit recognizes no
distinction between cross and original bills, or ancillary and
original suits, it follows that the district court of another
district, in a suit by a carrier against state officials in aid of
such an order, cannot entertain a cross-bill seeking to have the
order declared void and to enjoin the United States and the
Commission from enforcing it and the carrier from complying with
it.
Page 245 U. S. 494
Nor may such cross-bill be entertained as against the Commission
and the carrier only; under Jud.Code, §§ 208, 211, the United
States is a necessary party, as the representative of the
public.
When, in the exercise of the power constitutionally reposed in
it by the Act to Regulate Commerce, the Commission finds that a
disparity in interstate and intrastate rates is resulting in unjust
discrimination against interstate commerce, and also determines
what are reasonable rates for the interstate traffic and directs
the removal of the discrimination, the carrier is not only entitled
to put in force the interstate rates found reasonable, but is free
to remove the forbidden discrimination by bringing the intrastate
rates (though fixed by state authority) to the same level.
The
Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342;
Adams Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.
S. 617.
In such case, the Commission may make the order as broad as the
wrongful discrimination, but the extent of the discrimination found
and of the remedy applied must be gathered from the reports and
order of the Commission; and, to be effective in respect of
intrastate rates established and maintained under state authority,
the order must have a definite field of operation, and not leave
uncertain the territory or points to which it applies. Such an
order should not be given precedence over a state rate statute,
otherwise valid, unless, and except insofar as, it conforms to a
high standard of certainty.
Affirmed.
These cross-appeals present a controversy over the validity,
scope, and effect of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
dealing with discrimination found to result from a disparity in
interstate and intrastate passenger rates. The facts and
proceedings to be considered are these: the Mississippi River forms
the boundary between the States of Missouri and Iowa on the west
and the State of Illinois on the east. East St. Louis, in
southwestern Illinois, is directly across the river from St. Louis,
Missouri, and Hamilton, in western Illinois, is directly across the
river from Keokuk, Iowa. At both places, the river is spanned by
railroad bridges whereby the lines of railroad on one side are
connected with those on the other. For some years prior to December
1, 1914, interstate passenger rates between St. Louis and Keokuk,
on the one hand, and points in Illinois, on the other, were on
a
Page 245 U. S. 495
substantial parity with intrastate rates between East St. Louis
and Hamilton, respectively, and points in Illinois. All were on a
basis of 2 cents per mile, save that the rates to and from St.
Louis and Keokuk included a bridge toll over the river. All other
rates between points in Illinois were also on the same basis, any
intrastate rate in excess of 2 cents per mile being prohibited by a
statute of that state. On December 1, 1914, the rates between St.
Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois were
increased by the carriers to 2 1/2 cents per mile, plus bridge
tolls, the parity theretofore existing being thereby broken.
Following this increase, the Business Men's League of St. Louis, a
corporate body of that city engaged in fostering its interests,
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a petition against
the carriers charging that the rates between St. Louis and points
in Illinois were unreasonable in themselves, and, in connection
with the lower intrastate rates, worked an unreasonable
discrimination against St. Louis and in favor of Illinois cities,
particularly East St. Louis and Chicago, and a like discrimination
against interstate passenger traffic to and from St. Louis and in
favor of intrastate passenger traffic to and from East St. Louis
and Chicago. An association representing interests in Keokuk, Iowa,
intervened and urged that any relief granted with respect to St.
Louis be extended to Keokuk, so the former would not have an undue
advantage over the latter. The State of Illinois, the Public
Utilities Commission of that state, an association representing
interests in Chicago and another association representing interests
in East St. Louis also intervened, and opposed any action
contemplating or requiring an increase in intrastate rates. After a
hearing in which all the parties and intervenors participated, the
Interstate Commerce Commission filed a report (41 I.C.C. 13)
finding that the existing bridge tolls at St. Louis and Keokuk were
unobjectionable, that rates between
Page 245 U. S. 496
either of those cities and points in Illinois were reasonable
when not in excess of 2.4 cents per mile, plus bridge tolls, and
that the service, equipment, and accommodations provided for
intrastate passengers to and from East St. Louis, Hamilton, and
Chicago, were the same as those provided for interstate passengers
to and from St. Louis and Keokuk. In that report, the Commission
also found that the contemporaneous maintenance between East St.
Louis [
Footnote 1] and
Hamilton, [
Footnote 2]
respectively, and other points in Illinois, of rates on a lower
basis than those maintained via the same routes between St. Louis
and Keokuk, respectively, and the same points in Illinois, bridge
tolls excepted, gave an undue preference to East St. Louis and
Hamilton and to intrastate passenger traffic to and from the latter
points and subjected St. Louis and Keokuk and interstate passenger
traffic to and from those cities to an unreasonable disadvantage;
that the existing disparity in interstate and intrastate rates
worked an unjust discrimination against St. Louis and in favor of
Chicago insofar as the rates between St. Louis and points in
Illinois approximately equidistant from those cities exceeded, by
more than the bridge toll, the rates between Chicago and the same
points; that the disparity worked a like discrimination against
Keokuk and in favor of Chicago, and that the existence on the
reasonably direct lines of the carriers in the territory between
Chicago, on the one hand, and St. Louis and Keokuk, on the other,
of intrastate rates on a lower basis per mile than the rates
between that territory and St. Louis and Keokuk, bridge tolls
excepted, operated to subject interstate traffic to an unreasonable
disadvantage.
Page 245 U. S. 497
The Commission then made an order intended to result in the
installation of rates not exceeding 2.4 cents per mile between St.
Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois, and to
remove the discrimination shown in the report; but, shortly
thereafter, the Commission recalled that order and filed a
supplemental report (41 I.C.C. 503) indicating that lawful
interstate rates between St. Louis and Keokuk, on the one hand, and
Illinois points, on the other could be defeated by the use of two
tickets, one purchased at the interstate rate for a part of the
journey and the other at the lower intrastate rate for the
remainder, and therefore that the order should be so framed as to
cover the rates between the intermediate points. In this
connection, it was said that the discrimination against interstate
traffic resulting from the lower intrastate rates "would not be
removed merely by an increase in the intrastate fares to and from
the east bank points," and that
"any contemporaneous adjustments of fares between St. Louis or
Keokuk and points in Illinois, and generally within Illinois, which
would permit the defeat of the St. Louis, Keokuk, East St. Louis,
or any other east side city fares by methods such as described
above, and which would thereby permit the continuance of the undue
prejudice which we have found is suffered by St. Louis and Keokuk,
and continue to burden interstate commerce,"
would not comply with the order about to be copied in the
margin. [
Footnote 3]
Page 245 U. S. 498
In obedience to that order, the carriers, of whom there were 29,
took the requisite steps to establish and put in force interstate
rates on a basis of 2.4 cents per mile between St. Louis and
Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois, and those rates
became effective. Then,
Page 245 U. S. 499
believing the order required all intrastate rates in Illinois to
be on a level with those interstate rates, bridge tolls excepted,
the carriers proceeded to establish and put in force new rates
between all points in that state on a basis of 2.4 cents per mile.
This met with opposition
Page 245 U. S. 500
on the part of the state authorities and the carriers severally
brought suits against them, in the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, to enjoin them from interfering, by civil or
criminal proceedings, or otherwise, with the establishment and
maintenance of such intrastate rates under the Commission's
order.
Page 245 U. S. 501
The suits were consolidated, and the present appeals are from
decrees dismissing the bills for want of equity and dismissing
cross-bills of the state authorities for want of jurisdiction.
Page 245 U. S. 502
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions to which attention is first invited relate to the
power of the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois to
entertain the suits and the cross-bills, in view of the
jurisdictional provision in the Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38
Stat. 219, that a suit "to enforce, suspend or set aside, in whole
or in part," an order of the Commission relating to transportation
and made upon petition may be brought only in the district "wherein
is the residence of the party or any of the parties upon whose
petition the order was made."
It was objected in the district court that the suits were
brought to enforce the Commission's order, and therefore could be
entertained only in the Eastern District of Missouri, which
embraces the residence of the party upon whose petition the order
was made. But the court sustained its jurisdiction, ruling that the
suits were not of the nature indicated by the objection.
In common acceptation, a suit to enforce an order of the
Commission is one which seeks to compel the carrier to whom the
order is directed to yield obedience to its command. Nothing in the
jurisdictional provision suggests that this is not what is
intended, and that it is shown by the provision in § 16 of the Act
to Regulate Commerce, as amended by Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36
Stat. 554, that, if an order respecting transportation be not
obeyed by the carrier, the same may be enforced at the suit of the
Commission, an injured party, or the United States by an
appropriate writ of process restraining the carrier from further
disobedience and enjoining upon it due compliance with the order. A
reading of both provisions leaves no room to doubt that the suit to
enforce so clearly outlined in one is the suit intended by the
other.
Page 245 U. S. 503
But these were not suits of that type. They were begun by the
carriers, not against them, and proceeded upon the theory not that
the carriers were in default, but that they were proceeding to obey
the order. What was alleged and sought to be enjoined was
threatened action on the part of the defendants, the state
authorities, whereby obedience on the part of the carriers would be
obstructed and made the occasion for subjecting them to divers
criminal proceedings, suits for penalties and the like. In other
words, the suits were brought to prevent complete obedience by the
carriers from being wrongfully obstructed and embarrassed, but not
to enforce the order in the sense of the jurisdictional provision.
Therefore, that provision was not applicable to them. They properly
came within the provision in § 1 of the Act of June 18, 1910, c.
309, 36 Stat. 539, repeated in Judicial Code, § 207, which
preserves and continues the general jurisdiction of the district
courts over cases and proceedings not therein enumerated.
At this point, it will be convenient to dispose of another
objection relating to the principal suits, but not turning on the
jurisdictional provision. Shortly after the carriers' bills were
filed, the court, acting upon a motion of the defendants, ruled
that the United States and the Commission were necessary parties,
ordered that they be made defendants, and directed the issue of
process against them. After they were thus brought in, the matter
was considered again, and the bills were dismissed as to them for
want of jurisdiction. The defendants now say that, after this
dismissal, the court did not have before it the requisite parties
to enable it to entertain the bills. But the point is not tenable.
There was no statute making the United States or the Commission a
necessary party to bills of that nature, nor was the relief sought
such as to render the presence of either essential under the rules
applicable to suits in equity.
Page 245 U. S. 504
It well may be that either or both, if desiring to intervene,
would have been permitted to do so, but there is no warrant for
thinking that without their presence the bills could not be
entertained.
The cross-bills assailed the validity of the Commission's order
on various grounds, and concluded with a prayer that it be set
aside and annulled and that the United States and the Commission be
enjoined from enforcing it and the carriers from complying with it.
Passing the fact that they were presented as cross-bills, it is
apparent that, in subject matter and purpose, they were suits to
set aside the order. By statute, such suits are required to be
brought against the United States, Jud. Code, §§ 208, 211, c. 32,
38 Stat. 219, 220, and the jurisdictional provision before
mentioned permits them to be brought only in designated districts.
Here, the Eastern district of Missouri was the one designated, the
order being one that was made upon the petition of a resident of
that district. The United States had consented to be sued there,
but not elsewhere, and, being suitable only by its consent, could
not be sued in a district not within the consent given.
See
Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227,
123 U. S.
232-233;
Schillinger v. United States,
155 U. S. 163,
155 U. S. 166.
It therefore is certain that the cross-bills could not be
entertained in the Northern District of Illinois unless in this
regard there be, as is asserted, a valid distinction between a
cross-bill and an original bill. No doubt there are situations in
which a cross-bill against an ordinary suitor may be considered and
dealt with in virtue of the jurisdiction over the principal suit,
even though, as an original bill it could not be entertained
(
see Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.
S. 123,
229 U. S. 135,
and cases cited); but it is otherwise where the cross-bill is
against the United States, for no suit against it can be brought
without its consent given by law. Its immunity recognizes no
distinction between cross-bills
Page 245 U. S. 505
and original bills, or between ancillary suits and original
suits, but extends to suits of every class.
United
States v. McLemore, 4 How. 286;
Hill v.
United States, 9 How. 386;
Reeside v.
Walker, 11 How. 272,
52 U. S. 290;
De Groot v. United
States, 5 Wall. 419,
72 U. S.
431-433;
Carr v. United States, 98 U. S.
433,
98 U. S. 437;
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10,
161 U. S. 16.
Thus, the cross-bills as such had no better standing than they
would have had as original bills.
The claim is made that, in any event, the cross-bills should
have been retained as to the defendants therein other than the
United States. But this is not an admissible view. As before
indicated, the United States is made by statute a necessary party
to a suit to set aside an order of the Commission, and this means
that it is to stand in judgment as representing the public. If the
state authorities thought the order should be set aside and wished
to test their right to affirmative relief along that line, they
should have resorted to the court empowered by law to entertain a
suit of that nature.
It follows that the district court rightly disposed of the
jurisdictional questions by entertaining the principal suits and
declining to entertain the cross-bills.
Whether the suits by the carriers were rightly dismissed on the
merits is the principal question, and its solution turns on the
power of the Commission to deal with discrimination arising out of
a disparity in interstate and intrastate rates, and on the scope
and effect of the order made.
In their answers, the state authorities took the position that,
insofar as the order purports to authorize or require a removal of
the discrimination found to exist by a change in intrastate rates,
it is in excess of any power that has been or can be conferred on
the Commission, and therefore neither relieves the carriers from
full compliance with the state rate law nor prevents that law from
being fully enforced against them. If
Page 245 U. S. 506
the premise were sound, the conclusion doubtless would follow,
for where the Commission makes an order which it has no power to
make, the order is necessarily void, not merely voidable. But that
the premise is not sound is settled by the
Shreveport Case
(Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States),
234 U. S. 342.
Upon full consideration, it there was held:
1. Under the commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress has
ample power to prevent the common instrumentalities of interstate
and intrastate commerce, such as the railroads, from being used in
their intrastate operations in such manner as to affect injuriously
traffic which is interstate.
2. Where unjust discrimination against interstate commerce
arises out of the relation of intrastate to interstate rates, this
power may be exerted to remove the discrimination, and this whether
the intrastate rates are maintained under a local statute or by the
voluntary act of the carrier.
3. In correcting such discrimination, Congress is not restricted
to an adjustment or reduction of the interstate rates, but may
prescribe a reasonable standard to which they shall conform and
require the carrier to adjust the intrastate rates in such way as
to remove the discrimination; for where the interstate and
intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the
effective regulation of one involves control of the other, it is
Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the
dominant rule.
4. It is admissible for Congress to provide for the execution of
this power through a subordinate body such as the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and this it has done by the Act to Regulate
Commerce.
5. Where, in the exercise of its delegated authority, the
Commission not only finds that a disparity in the two classes of
rates is resulting in unjust discrimination
Page 245 U. S. 507
against interstate commerce, but also determines what are
reasonable rates for the interstate traffic, and then directs the
removal of the discrimination, the carrier not only is entitled to
put in force the interstate rates found reasonable, but is free to
remove the forbidden discrimination by bringing the intrastate
rates to the same level.
Upon further consideration, that decision was approved and
followed in
American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.
S. 617.
The parties differ widely about the scope of the order. The
carriers assert that it covers every intrastate passenger rate in
Illinois, is addressed to the removal of discrimination found to be
statewide, and gives ample authority for increasing all rates
between points in Illinois from 2 cents to 2.4 cents per mile. On
the other hand, the state authorities assert that it is not
statewide, and that the extent to which it is intended to affect
the state-made rates is so indefinitely and vaguely stated as to
make it inoperative and of no effect as to them. Of course, the
Commission could adjust the remedy to the evil, and make the order
as broad as the wrongful discrimination, and not improbably it
would intend to go that far and no farther. But the extent of the
discrimination found and of the remedy applied must be gathered
from the reports and order of the Commission, for they constitute
the only authoritative evidence of its action. The reports show
that the only discrimination found relates to the passenger traffic
between Illinois and two cities outside that state -- St. Louis and
Keokuk. There is no finding that this traffic extends in
appreciable volume to all sections of Illinois. As to some
sections, its volume may be very large, and as to others, almost or
quite negligible. At best, the reports leave the matter uncertain.
Obviously this traffic is only a small part of the interstate
passenger traffic moving over
Page 245 U. S. 508
the railroads in Illinois, and yet the finding is merely that
there was discrimination against this part. Had the Commission
regarded the discrimination as statewide, it is but reasonable to
believe that it would have said so in its findings. And had it
intended to require or authorize a statewide readjustment of the
intrastate rates, it doubtless would have given direct expression
to that purpose, which easily could have been done in a few lines.
But neither in any part nor as a whole does the order plainly
manifest such a purpose. In harmony with the reports, it deals with
the intrastate rates insofar only as they result in discrimination
against interstate traffic to and from St. Louis and Keokuk. Its
most comprehensive paragraph -- the next to the last -- declares
that the carriers must
"abstain from the undue preferences and the undue and
unreasonable prejudices and disadvantages found in said report to
result from the contemporaneous maintenance between Illinois points
of passenger fares, which fares, in combination with other fares
required or permitted by this order, would produce the
discrimination against interstate commerce and the undue preference
in favor of intrastate commerce condemned in the report of the
Commission."
But, even here, the general terms are so far restrained by the
reference to the reports as to show that nothing more is intended
than to command the removal of the discrimination to which the
traffic to and from St. Louis and Keokuk is subjected. Besides,
this paragraph evidently proceeds upon the theory that some of the
intrastate rates are not affected by the other paragraphs, and
ought not to be disturbed save where their use in connection with
rates sanctioned by the order will be productive of the
discrimination which it is intended to correct.
But, while the order shows that it is not intended to require or
authorize a readjustment of all the intrastate
Page 245 U. S. 509
rates, the description of those to which it applies is at best,
indefinite. There may be less uncertainty in some parts of the
order than in others, but, when each is read in the light of the
rest, and all in the light of the reports, it is apparent that none
has a certain or definite field of operation. The uncertainty
arises out of a failure to designate with appropriate precision the
territory or points to and from which the intrastate rates must or
may be readjusted, and this omission accords with the absence from
the reports of any finding showing definitely the territory or
points where those rates operate prejudicially against the
interstate traffic which the order is intended to protect.
To be effective in respect of intrastate rates established and
maintained under state authority, an order of the Commission of the
kind now under consideration must have a definite field of
operation, and not leave the territory or points to which it
applies uncertain. Upon this point, we said in
American Express
Co. v. Caldwell, supra, p.
244 U. S.
625:
"Where a proceeding to remove unjust discrimination presents
solely the question whether the carrier has improperly exercised
its authority to initiate rates, the Commission may legally order,
in general terms, the removal of the discrimination shown, leaving
upon the carrier the burden of determining also the points to and
from which rates must be changed, in order to effect a removal of
the discrimination. But where, as here, there is a conflict between
the federal and the state authorities, the Commission's order
cannot serve as a justification for disregarding a regulation or
order issued under state authority, unless and except so far as it
is definite as to the territory or points to which it applies. For
the power of the Commission is dominant only to the extent that the
exercise is found by it to be necessary to remove the existing
discrimination against interstate traffic. "
Page 245 U. S. 510
In construing federal statutes enacted under the power conferred
by the commerce clause of the Constitution, the rule is that it
should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or suspend
the exercise of the reserved powers of a state, even where that may
be done, unless and except so far as its purpose to do so is
clearly manifested.
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.
S. 137,
187 U. S. 148;
Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410,
188 U. S. 430;
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harris,
234 U. S. 412,
234 U. S. 419.
This being true of an act of Congress, it is obvious that an order
of a subordinate agency, such as the Commission, should not be
given precedence over a state rate statute otherwise valid, unless
and except so far as it conforms to a high standard of
certainty.
We conclude that the uncertainty in this order is such as to
render it inoperative and of no effect as to the intrastate rates,
established and maintained under a law of the state, and therefore
that the suits by the carriers were rightly dismissed on the
merits.
Decrees affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The report similarly speaks of other towns across the river from
St. Louis, East St. Louis being here mentioned as representative of
all.
[
Footnote 2]
The report refers to a plurality of points opposite Keokuk, but
it suffices here to mention Hamilton.
[
Footnote 3]
The order is dated October 17, 1916, and, omitting the caption,
reads as follows:
"
It appearing that, on July 12, 1916, the Commission
entered its report and order in this proceeding, and on the date
hereof a supplemental report, which reports are hereby referred to
and made a part hereof:"
"
It is ordered that the said order of July 12, 1916,
be, and it is hereby, vacated, and that the following be
substituted therefor."
"
It is further ordered that the above-named defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to cease and desist, on or before
January 15, 1917, and thereafter to abstain, from publishing,
demanding, or collecting passenger fares between St. Louis, Mo.,
and points in Illinois upon a basis higher than 2.4 cents per mile,
bridge tolls excepted, which basis was found reasonable in said
report, or higher than the fares contemporaneously exacted for the
transportation of passengers between East St. Louis, Ill., and the
same Illinois points, by more than a reasonable bridge toll; or
fares constructed upon a higher basis per mile, bridge tolls
excepted, than fares contemporaneously maintained between Illinois
points intermediate between St. Louis, Mo. and points in Illinois,
as such fares have been found in said report to be unlawfully
discriminatory."
"
It is further ordered that the above defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to cease and desist, on or before
January 15, 1917, and thereafter to abstain, from publishing,
demanding, or collecting fares for the transportation of passengers
between St. Louis, Mo., and points in Illinois, the basis of which
per mile, bridge tolls excepted, is higher than the basis per mile
for fares contemporaneously maintained between Chicago and the same
Illinois points, as such fares have been found in said report to be
unlawfully discriminatory."
"
It is further ordered that the above-named defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to cease and desist, on or before
January 15, 1917, and thereafter to abstain, from publishing,
demanding, or collecting passenger fares between Keokuk, Iowa, and
points in Illinois upon a basis higher than 2.4 cents per mile,
bridge tolls excepted, which basis was found reasonable in said
report, or higher per mile than the fares contemporaneously exacted
for the transportation of passengers between Illinois points
directly opposite Keokuk and the same Illinois points by more than
a reasonable bridge toll; or fares constructed upon a higher basis
per mile, bridge tolls excepted, than fares contemporaneously
maintained between Illinois points intermediate between Keokuk,
Iowa, and points in Illinois, as such fares have been found in said
report to be unlawfully discriminatory."
"
It is further ordered that the above-named defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to cease and desist, on or before
January 15, 1917, and thereafter to abstain, from publishing,
demanding, or collecting fares for the transportation of passengers
between Keokuk, Iowa, and points in Illinois, the basis of which
per mile, bridge tolls excepted, is higher than the basis per mile
for fares contemporaneously maintained between Chicago and the same
Illinois points, as such fares have been found in said report to be
unlawfully discriminatory."
"
It is further ordered that the above-named defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force on
or before January 15, 1917, upon notice to this Commission and to
the general public by not less than 30 days' filing and posting in
the manner prescribed in § 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce and
thereafter to maintain and apply to the transportation of
passengers between St. Louis and points in Illinois fares upon a
basis not in excess of the fares between East St. Louis, Ill., and
the same points by more than a reasonable bridge toll; nor upon a
higher basis per mile, bridge tolls excepted, than fares
contemporaneously maintained between Illinois points intermediate
between St. Louis and points in Illinois, as such fares have been
found in said report to be unlawfully discriminatory."
"
It is further ordered that the above-named defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force on
or before January 15, 1917, upon notice to this Commission and to
the general public by not less than 30 days' filing and posting in
the manner prescribed in § 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and
thereafter to maintain and apply to the transportation of
passengers between St. Louis, Mo. and points in Illinois fares, the
basis of which per mile, bridge tolls excepted, is not higher than
the basis per mile for fares contemporaneously maintained between
Chicago and those same Illinois points."
"
It is further ordered that the above-named defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force on
or before January 15, 1917, upon notice to this Commission and to
the general public by not less than 30 days' filing and posting in
the manner prescribed in § 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and
thereafter to maintain and apply to the transportation of
passengers between Keokuk, Iowa, and points in Illinois fares upon
a basis not in excess of 2.4 cents per mile, bridge tolls excepted,
which basis has been found reasonable in the said report, nor in
excess per mile of the fares between points in Illinois directly
opposite to Keokuk and the same points by more than a reasonable
bridge toll; nor upon a higher basis per mile, bridge tolls
excepted, than fares contemporaneously effective between Illinois
points intermediate between Keokuk, Iowa, and points in
Illinois."
"
It is further ordered that the above-named defendants,
according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force on
or before January 15, 1917, upon notice to this Commission and to
the general public by not less than 30 days' filing and posting in
the manner prescribed in § 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and
thereafter to maintain and apply to the transportation of
passengers between Keokuk, Iowa, and points in Illinois fares, the
basis of which per mile, bridge tolls excepted, is not higher than
the basis per mile for fares contemporaneously maintained between
Chicago and those same Illinois points."
"
It is further ordered that said defendants, according
as they participate in the transportation, be, and they are hereby,
notified and required to cease and desist, on or before January 15,
1917, and thereafter to abstain, from the undue preferences and the
undue and unreasonable prejudices and disadvantages found in said
report to result from the contemporaneous maintenance between
Illinois points of passenger fares, which fares, in combination
with other fares required or permitted by this order, would produce
the discrimination against interstate commerce and the undue
preferences in favor of intrastate commerce condemned in the report
of the Commission."
"
And it is further ordered that this order shall
continue in force for a period of not less than two years from the
date when it shall take effect."
