Article IV, § 2, subdivision 2, of the Constitution places no
limitation upon the power of the states to arrest in advance of
extradition proceedings; with Rev.Stats., § 5278, it deals merely
with the conditions under which one state may demand rendition from
another and under which the alleged fugitive may resist compliance
by the state upon which the demand is made.
147 App.Div. 557, 210 N.Y. 567, affirmed.
The cases are stated in the opinion.
Page 245 U. S. 316
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These actions, which were tried together in the Supreme Court of
New York and argued together here, arise out of the same facts and
involve the same question of law. The plaintiffs, mother and
daughter, both residents of Pennsylvania, occupied the same berth
in a Pullman car while traveling from their home to New York City.
At Syracuse, New York, police officers of that city entered the
car, arrested the plaintiffs, and, at the next station, removed
them from the train. The officers making the arrest acted without a
warrant, upon telegraphic orders from the police department of
Rochester, New York, in the belief that one of the plaintiffs was
the woman implicated in atrocious murders which had recently been
committed in Indiana. Investigation soon disclosed that this belief
was unfounded, and they were promptly discharged from custody.
These suits were then brought against the defendant to recover
damages for the annoyance and indignities suffered. Plaintiffs
contended that defendant had an affirmative duty to protect them as
passengers from a wrongful arrest, and had failed to perform it.
The trial court refused to permit plaintiffs to go to the jury and
dismissed the complaints. Exceptions to these orders were overruled
by the Appellate Division (147 App.Div. 557); the judgments entered
for defendant were affirmed by the Court of Appeals (210 N.Y.
567-568), and the cases come here on writs of error.
Plaintiffs duly claimed that they had been denied rights secured
by Article IV, § 2, subdivision 2, of the federal Constitution.
[
Footnote 1] The contention is
that, by reason of this
Page 245 U. S. 317
clause of the Constitution, they could not legally be arrested
in New York for a crime committed in another state, except upon
compliance with the provisions of § 5278 of the Revised Statutes
[
Footnote 2] of the United
States; that, such being the law, defendant's representatives were
bound to know it and to protect them, its passengers, from arrest
unless all steps had been taken which would have justified their
rendition upon application of another state. But these provisions
of the Constitution and statutes have no application here. They
deal merely with the conditions under which one state may demand
rendition from another and the alleged fugitive may resist the
latter's complying with the demand. [
Footnote 3] Here, no demand had been made upon the
executive of New York. Proceedings for
Page 245 U. S. 318
rendition had not even been initiated. And there was no attempt
at removal from the state. The arrest, so far as appears, was made
by the New York police department of its own initiative.
These provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes do not
deal with arrest in advance of a requisition. They do not limit the
power of a state to arrest, within its borders, a citizen of
another state for a crime committed elsewhere; nor do they
prescribe the manner in which such arrest may be made. These are
matters left wholly to the individual states. Whether the asylum
state shall make an arrest in advance of requisition, and, if so,
whether it may be made without a warrant are matters which each
state decides for itself. Such has been the uniform practice,
sanctioned by a long line of decisions and regulated by legislation
in many of the states. [
Footnote
4] The alleged federal right which plaintiffs assert is not
immunity from arrest without a warrant; it is immunity from
arrest
Page 245 U. S. 319
until after requisition granted. The Constitution grants no such
immunity. To restrict the right of arrest as claimed would rob
interstate rendition of much of its efficacy. As no federal right
of plaintiffs was denied, the judgments must be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Article IV, Sec. 2, subdivision 2:
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other
crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state,
shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which
he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having
jurisdiction of the crime."
[
Footnote 2]
Rev.Stats. Sec. 5278 (Act of Feb. 12, 1793, Sec. 1, 1 Stat.
302):
"Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory
demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive
authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled,
and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made
before a magistrate of any state or territory, charging the person
demanded with having committed treason, felony, or [any] other
crime, certified as authentic by the Governor or chief magistrate
of the state or territory from whence the person so charged has
fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state
or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be
arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given
to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of
such authority . . . to receive the fugitive, and to cause the
fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear."
[
Footnote 3]
The provisions are so narrow in scope that, if the removal is
actually effected without the interposition of the state's
executives -- though it be by kidnapping and breach of the peace --
the federal law affords no redress, and interposes no obstacle to
the prosecution of the alleged fugitive by the state which has by
wrongful act acquired jurisdiction over him.
Mahon v.
Justice, 127 U. S. 700.
See also Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183;
Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192;
Key v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436.
[
Footnote 4]
The decisions appear to be uniform that at common law arrest in
advance of requisition is legal.
People v. Schenck, 2
Johns. 479 (1807);
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 5 Bin. 617
(1813);
People v. Goodhue, 2 John.Ch. 198 (1816);
Commonwealth v. Deacon, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 1, 17 (1823);
State v. Anderson, 1 Hill 327, 350-8 (1833);
State v.
Loper, 2 Ga.Dec. 33 (1842);
State v. Buzine, 4 Har.
572 (1846);
In the Matter of Fetter, 23 N.J.L. 311 (1852);
Morrell v. Quarles, 35 Ala. 544 (1860);
Ex parte
Romanes, 1 Utah 23 (1876);
Simmons v. Van Dyke, 138
Ind. 380 (1894);
State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 4 (1896). But
some deny that it can be made without a warrant, even in case of a
felony.
Botts v. Williams, 17 B.Mon. 687 (1857). The right
of arrest and detention in advance of requisition is in many states
regulated by statute.
Ex parte Rosenblat, 51 Cal. 285;
Wells v. Johnston, 52 La.Ann. 713;
Ex parte
Lorraine, 16 Nev. 63;
State v. Shelton, 79 N.C. 605,
608;
Ex parte Ammons, 34 Ohio St. 518;
State v.
Whittle, 59 S.C. 297.
See Moore on Extraditions and
Interstate Rendition, Appendix II. And, under the statutes of some
states, arrest cannot be made until after proceedings charging the
person have been had in the state where the crime is alleged to
have been committed.
State v. Hufford, 28 Ia. 391,
395.