A street improvement tax having been laid upon abutting property
under a city ordinance, partly according to frontage and partly
according to area, and the state court having sustained it
in
toto, this Court reversed its judgment upon the sole ground
that the assessment based on area had produced results in conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment, and sent the case back for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. Upon a second
review,
held that the questions whether the part of the
tax based on frontage was severable, though the other part was
void, and whether, and by what agency, a new and just area
assessment should be made, were questions of state law, untouched
by this Court's decision and mandate, and left for determination by
the state court.
Gast Realty Co. v.Schneider Granite Co.,
240 U. S. 55,
explained.
269 Mo. 561 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are cross writs of error, bringing under review a judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court of Missouri
Page 245 U. S. 289
after the reversal by this Court of a previous judgment in the
same action.
The action was brought to collect a tax bill for paving one of
the streets of St. Louis, levied upon land fronting upon the
street, under an ordinance that imposed one-fourth of the cost of
the improvement upon all the abutting property according to its
frontage, and three-fourths according to area upon all the property
in an improvement district whose boundaries were to be fixed in a
manner specified in the ordinance, the effect of which, as applied
to the property in question, was to extend the area assessment upon
defendants' land to a depth of between 400 and 500 feet, while
other lands similarly benefited by the improvement were subjected
to the area assessment to a much less depth. A judgment of the
supreme court, which had affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court
of the City of St. Louis sustaining the tax (259 Mo. 153), was
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.
240 U. S. 240 U.S.
55.
Upon the going down of the mandate, the case was transferred to
the supreme court in banc, whereupon the plaintiff prayed that the
cause be remanded to the circuit court (the trial court) with
directions, first, to render judgment for the amount of the
frontage assessment in the original tax bill, with interest, and
second, to charge against the land a proper area assessment, in
some mode to be prescribed by the supreme court in its mandate, it
being plaintiff's contention that the decision of this Court did
not condemn the entire area assessment, but only so much of it as
was in excess of benefits received. On the other hand, the
landowners moved for a reversal of the judgment of the circuit
court
in toto, with directions for the entry of a general
judgment in their favor. The supreme court, interpreting our
decision as limited to holding the ordinance invalid only so far as
concerned
Page 245 U. S. 290
the area assessment, reversed the judgment of the trial court
and remanded the cause with directions to enter judgment for the
amount of the frontage assessment, with interest.
Both parties sued out writs of error from this Court, plaintiff
on the ground that the state court refused its application for an
area assessment, the landowners upon the ground that there was
error in directing judgment for any part of the tax bill sued
on.
These contentions must be tested by the true intent and meaning
of the mandate of this Court, and, so tested, both must be
overruled. The mandate, while reversing the judgment that was under
review on the former writ of error, permitted further proceedings
of any kind to be had in the state courts, provided they were not
inconsistent with the opinion of this Court. It left the tribunals
of the state at liberty to exercise their proper jurisdiction in
the cause between the parties, so long as they avoided a conflict
with the rights of the landowners under the Fourteenth Amendment as
established by our decision. As our former opinion shows, the
conflict with federal rights was due solely to the mode in which
that portion of the tax which was levied according to area was
distributed. The subsequent judgment of the state court sustaining
the tax to the extent of the frontage assessment was not
inconsistent with it.
The landowners insist that the two elements were inseparable,
and that the tax, being void in part, was entirely void. But the
supreme court of the state held in this case, following
Collier
Estate v. Western Paving & Supply Co., 180 Mo. 362, 375,
that the tax was severable. This, like the kindred question of the
severability of a statute of the state, is a question of state law.
See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.
S. 347,
238 U. S. 366;
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368,
238 U. S. 380.
In those cases, we passed upon the question of severability, in the
absence of controlling state
Page 245 U. S. 291
rulings, but we were there reviewing the proceedings of federal
courts, and were called upon to consider questions of state as well
as of federal law, while, in reviewing the judgments of state
courts, we are confined to the federal questions.
Plaintiff's contention that our mandate required a new
assessment in lieu of the former area assessment is likewise
unfounded. It is true that there would be nothing inconsistent with
our former judgment and mandate in imposing a new area assessment,
so long as it did not infringe the landowners' rights under the
Constitution of the United States. But whether such new assessment
should be made, and, if made, whether it should be done by a court
or by an assessing board or other appropriate instrumentality, and
whether further legislation was needed for the purpose, were and
are matters of state law, it being well settled that, where a
special assessment to pay for a particular improvement has been
held to be illegal, the Constitution of the United States does not
prevent the making of a new and just assessment to pay for the
completed work.
Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.
S. 345;
Bellingham Bay, etc. R. Co. v. New
Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314;
Lombard v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 181 U. S.
33,
181 U. S. 42.
Our former decision left the Supreme Court of Missouri, and the
other agencies of the state, entirely unhampered in this
regard.
No. 461, affirmed.
No. 473, affirmed.