Judgments or decrees of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia are not made final by Judicial Code, § 250, in cases
involving the interpretation and effect of acts of Congress which
are general in character, or the general duties or powers of
officers under the law of the United States, as distinguished from
merely local authority.
By Judicial Code, 251, the power of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia to certify questions to this Court is confined
to cases where the judgments or decrees of that court are made
final by § 250.
Page 245 U. S. 167
This limitation, being plain in the letter and spirit of the
statute, would not be overridden by the fact (if there were such)
that this Court had overlooked it in former cases where it was not
brought in question.
Certificate dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Without competitive examination or certification under the Civil
Service Law in 1903, William F. Arant, the relator and appellant,
was appointed by the Secretary of the Interior superintendent of a
national park in Oregon. Following his refusal in 1913 to resign,
when requested by the Secretary, he was summarily removed without
specification of charges or hearing, and, upon his refusal to
vacate, was ousted by the United States marshal. Nearly two years
afterwards, this proceeding for mandamus to restore the relator to
office was commenced. The return, referring to the act of Congress
governing the civil service (Act of August 24, 1912, c. 389, 37
Stat. 555), especially challenged the assertion that the relator
was within the provisions of that law inhibiting removal without
charges and hearing and asserted that the right to appoint and
remove from the office in question was excepted out of such
provisions. A demurrer to the return as stating no defense was
overruled, and from the judgment dismissing the proceeding, the
case was taken to the Court of Appeals of the District, which,
desiring to be
Page 245 U. S. 168
instructed as to its duty, after certifying the case as above
stated, propounded two questions for our consideration:
"First, whether the relator was subject to the summarily removed
without charges or hearing thereon; and, second, if not, whether,
in consequence of the long delay, he was barred by laches from the
right to relief."
As the power of the court below to submit the questions for our
solution is challenged, that subject requires first to be
considered. The power must find its sanction in the following
provision of § 251 of the Judicial Code:
"It shall also be competent for said Court of Appeals, in any
case in which its judgment or decree is made final under the
section last preceding at any time to certify to the Supreme Court
of the United States any questions or propositions of law
concerning which it desires the instruction of that court for their
proper decision,"
this being followed by a clause conferring authority on this
Court in such case either to answer the questions or to order up
for review the whole case and dispose of it.
It is not open to controversy that the judgments or decrees of
the court below are not made final by § 250 in cases involving the
interpretation and effect of an act of Congress general in
character or the general duty or power of an officer under the law
of the United States, as contradistinguished from merely local
authority.
American Security & Trust Co. v. District of
Columbia, 224 U. S. 491;
McGowan v. Parish, 228 U. S. 312;
United Surety Co. v. American Fruit Co., 238 U.
S. 140;
Newman v. Frizzell, 238 U.
S. 537. This being true, it is apparent that, as this
case is of the character just stated, it was not one coming within
the authority conferred to certify, which is confined to cases
where the judgments or decrees of the court are made final under §
250. The unambiguous command of the text excludes the necessity for
interpretation. But, if it be conceded for the sake of argument
that there is necessity for interpretation, the
Page 245 U. S. 169
briefest consideration will reveal the coincidence between the
animating spirit of the provision and the obvious result of its
plain text. It is undoubted that the authority to certify conferred
upon the Court of Appeals of the District by § 251 did not
previously exist in that court in any case. The circuit courts of
appeals, however, had undoubtedly under the Act of 1891, a power to
certify. Section 6, 26 Stat. 828, c. 517. But while, by the terms
of that act, such authority apparently extended to "every such
subject within its appellate jurisdiction," it came to be settled
that, by limitations found in the text, such power to certify was
restricted to cases in which the judgments or decrees of the
circuit courts of appeals were final, and therefore not susceptible
of being of right otherwise reviewed in this Court.
Columbus
Watch Co. v. Robbins, 148 U. S. 266,
148 U. S. 268;
Bardes v. Hawarden First National Bank, 175 U.
S. 526,
175 U. S. 527.
Coming to provide concerning this situation, the Judicial Code
enlarged the power of a circuit court of appeals by conferring
authority to certify "any case within its appellate jurisdiction"
(§ 239), but, in giving power to certify for the first time to the
Court of Appeals of the District, expressly limited it to cases "in
which its judgment or decree is made final" (§ 251). The expansion
of authority conferred upon the circuit courts of appeals at the
same time that the restricted authority was conferred upon the
Court of Appeals of the District makes manifest the legislative
intent to give a greater power in the one case than in the
other.
It is true that, in
Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S.
1, and
Equitable Surety Co. v. McMillan,
234 U. S. 448,
controversies were determined on certificates made and questions
based thereon by the Court of Appeals of the District. But, in both
cases, the judgment or decree of the court below if rendered would
have been final within the purview of § 250 of the Judicial Code;
the first, because it arose under the patent laws, and the second,
because it
Page 245 U. S. 170
concerned an act of Congress of local application. Even,
however, upon the assumption that the cases are susceptible of a
different view, as no question was raised in either concerning the
power to certify and the limitation to which it was subjected by
the statute, the mere fact that the cases were entertained affords
no ground for holding them as authoritative on the question before
us, and thereby causing the statute to embrace a power which it
excluded by both its letter and spirit.
United
States v. More, 3 Cranch 159,
7 U. S. 172;
Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U.
S. 225,
191 U. S.
236.
As, therefore, there was no authority in the court below to
certify and propound the questions, the certificate must be, and it
is,
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.