In an action against an interstate carrier for damage to goods
shipped on a through bill of lading, the questions (1) whether,
under the Carmack Amendment, the lawful holder of the bill of
lading may sue without proving ownership of the goods, (2) whether,
in view of stipulations in the bill of lading limiting liability,
there was evidence of negligence upon the part of the carrier
sufficient to go to the jury, and (3) whether a recovery of freight
paid the carrier by the shipper
Page 243 U. S. 575
was allowable are questions which this Court may review in a
case coming from a state court.
Under the Carmack Amendment, the lawful holder of the bill of
lading may sue the carrier for loss or damage to the goods without
proving ownership of the goods; § 8 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
24 Stat. 382, in providing generally for liability of the carrier
to "the person or persons injured," is not in conflict with this
specific meaning of the amendment.
In an action against a carrier for damage to goods caused by
delay in forwarding and delivery, where the carrier proves a strike
and resulting congestion of traffic which, under the bill of
lading, exempts it from liability if due care was observed to meet
the situation, a refusal of the court to charge that the burden is
on plaintiff to prove that such care was not exercised is, at most,
harmless error when followed by instructions properly explaining
that the carrier is not responsible for delay resulting from the
strike, nor liable if not negligent in forwarding and delivering
the goods, that such negligence is not presumed, and that the
burden of proving it is on the plaintiff.
Where a carrier defended upon the ground that delay in
forwarding and delivering goods was due to proven conditions of
traffic beyond its control due to a strike, evidence that the goods
were received for shipment after the strike was over and that the
delay was caused by preferring other goods in delivery
held sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the
jury.
When carrier and shipper agree that the basis for measuring
damages for loss or damage to goods shall be their value at place
and time of shipment, the amount of freight paid upon delivery may
be added to the depreciation of such value caused by the carrier's
default.
Allowing the shipper to recover the freight paid is not
objectionable as a rebate, preference, or discrimination where
there is no attempt to evade the Interstate Commerce Act.
Where goods are brought to destination in a damaged condition
and sold at less than their value at shipment, the carrier is
liable to refund freight paid if the damage resulted from its
negligence.
88 N.J.L. 376 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 243 U. S. 578
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a consolidation of actions, each action expressed in a
number of counts, and each count praying for the recovery
Page 243 U. S. 579
of the sum of $500 for a carload of watermelons received, as it
is alleged, and accepted by the railroad company to be transported
and delivered within a reasonable time to plaintiff at Jersey City,
New Jersey, and alleging that, by reason of the failure so to
transport and deliver, a large number of the melons were wholly
lost and the remainder delivered in a bad and damaged
condition.
The car numbers are given, the places of receipt, all of which
were in North Carolina, and the dates, all between July 26 and
August 2, 1912, both dates inclusive.
The answers of defendant denied the allegations of the complaint
and set up, besides, the following defenses: if the property came
into the hands of defendant for the purpose of transportation, it
did so as to each and every count of the complaint under the terms
and conditions of a certain bill of lading issued to plaintiff by
the initial carrier of the property, pursuant to the provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act, constituting an express agreement
whereby the defendant was to be relieved from any and all liability
for damage to the property resulting from delay in transportation
and delivery if the delay was caused by (a) a strike or strikes
among defendant's employees; (b) an accumulation of freight at any
point; (c) or by any other cause or causes over which defendant had
no control.
It is alleged that a strike did take place among defendant's
employees and continued from July 9, 1912, to the 21st of that
month, which strike was the cause of the alleged delay; also that
an accumulation of freight did occur at Jersey City which continued
from July 9 to August 15 and beyond.
It is further alleged as a defense that no claim for the loss or
damage to the property was made in writing, as required by the
respective bills of lading of defendant at the point of delivery of
the property within ten days after its delivery, or after due time
for its delivery to plaintiff,
Page 243 U. S. 580
though it was agreed between plaintiff and defendant that such
claim should be made at the time, place, and in the manner
mentioned.
Nor was there any claim for such loss or damage made in writing
to defendant at the point of delivery or point of origin within
four months after the delivery of the property, or after a
reasonable time for delivery, though it was expressly agreed that
such claim should be made at the time, place, and in the manner
mentioned, and, if not so made, defendant should not be liable.
It will be observed, therefore, that the basis of the action is
that certain carloads of watermelons were received for shipment by
defendant at certain places in North Carolina for transportation to
and delivery at Jersey City, New Jersey, and that defendant failed
to transport and deliver the same within a reasonable time, in
consequence of which a large number of the melons were lost and the
others delivered in a bad condition.
In point of fact, the melons were not delivered to defendant in
North Carolina, but in such state to a carrier with which defendant
had connections, and were delivered to defendant at Edgemoor,
Delaware, to be transported from there to Jersey City, and were so
transported.
The melons were transported on through bills of lading issued by
the initial carrier, which contained the stipulations upon which
the defenses are based, to-wit: (1) that the delay in
transportation and delivery was caused by a strike, accompanied by
demonstrations of violence over which defendant had no control and
against which it could not contend; (2) that there was a congestion
of freight, due to causes beyond its control, and (3) that claims
for damages were not made within the time required by the bills of
lading -- that is, within ten days in some cases, thirty days in
others, and four months in others.
The ultimate basis of these defenses is the Carmack
Page 243 U. S. 581
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. What this amendment
requires of shipper and carrier becomes the question in the
case.
The case involves, as we have said, a number of actions tried
together and submitted to one jury. Plaintiff was plaintiff in all
of them, and obtained judgment which was affirmed by the Court of
Errors and Appeals on the authority of another case of like
kind.
There was a stipulation which concentrated the issues and
removed from controversy the amounts involved. For instance, as to
the latter it was stipulated that the value of the melons at the
time and place of shipment was $13,465, and that they were sold at
the place of delivery for $8,895, being the best price which could
be obtained for them, owing to their damaged condition. And it was
further stipulated that the freight charges paid by plaintiff
amounted to the sum of $5,484.59.
As to the other elements, it was stipulated that the melons were
received and accepted by defendant at Edgemoor, Delaware, for
transportation to Jersey City, New Jersey, in accordance with the
bills of lading; that the usual and customary time for
transportation was about seven hours, under the most favorable
circumstances; that plaintiff was at the time of bringing the
actions, and is now, the lawful holder of the bills of lading; that
the melons were received at Edgemoor by defendant in apparently
good order, but were in a damaged condition when delivered to
plaintiff at defendant's delivery yard at Jersey City, and that
claims for damages were duly made in writing, as required by the
bills of lading.
The cases are designated as the "64-count case," the "13-count
case," and the "11-count case." All of the bills of lading in the
"64-count case," one in the "13-count case," and four in the
"11-count case," contain a provision exempting the carrier from
liability for loss or damage resulting "from riots or strikes."
Twelve of the
Page 243 U. S. 582
bills of lading in the "13-count case" and seven in the
"11-count case" provide that the carriers should
"not be liable for any injury to or decay of fruits or
vegetables, or other perishable freight due to detention or delay
occasioned by an accumulation of freight at any point . . . or to
any other causes over which the carriers have no control."
And there is difference in times of demands.
A motion is made to dismiss on the ground that no federal
question appears in the record, or alternatively, if one appears,
it is without merit. In support of the contentions, it is said the
questions in the case are (1) whether, it being stipulated that
plaintiff was the holder of the bills of lading, it was the owner
of the melons at the time the shipments were made; (2) whether
there was any evidence of negligence of defendant which should have
been submitted to the jury, and (3) whether plaintiff was entitled
to recover the freight paid by it.
The first question involves the Carmack Amendment, and,
considering it, the Court of Errors and Appeals decided that
"any lawful holder of a bill of lading issued by the initial
carrier pursuant to the Carmack Amendment . . . , upon receiving
property for interstate transportation, may maintain an action for
any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by any
connecting carrier to whom the goods are delivered. Citing
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S.
491."
We are not prepared to say that a contest of this view is
frivolous, and the motion to dismiss is denied. Besides, it is
contended that the shipments having been in interstate commerce,
they are subject to and governed by the Interstate Commerce
Act.
Coming to the merits of the question, however, we concur with
the Court of Errors and Appeals in its construction of the Carmack
Amendment. It provides:
"That any common carrier . . . receiving property for
transportation from a point in one state to a point in
Page 243 U. S. 583
another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor
and shall be liable to the lawful holder [italics ours] thereof for
any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it. . .
."
The crucial words are "lawful holder." Defendant contends that
they mean
"the owner or someone shown to be duly authorized to act for him
in a way that would render any judgment recovered in such an action
against the carrier
res adjudicata in any other
action."
And § 8 of the Interstate Commerce Act is referred to as
fortifying such view. It provides that "such common carrier shall
be liable to the person or persons injured" in consequence of any
violations of the act.
*
To accept this view would make § 8 contradict the Carmack
Amendment (§ 20), it having only a general purpose, whereas the
purpose of the amendment is special and definitely expresses the
lawful holder of the bill of lading to be the person to whom the
carrier shall be liable "for any loss, damage, or injury" to
property caused by it.
Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger,
supra.
The next contention of defendant is that there was error in
applying the burden of proof upon the motion to direct a verdict
for defendant.
The grounds of the contention urged at the trial and now
repeated are that, by certain of the bills of lading, the carrier
is relieved from liability in case of a strike, by certain others
in case of delays occasioned by causes beyond
Page 243 U. S. 584
its control, and by others in case of an accumulation of freight
proved to be a matter beyond the control of the carrier. And, these
causes having been proved, it is contended the carriers were
brought within the protection of the stipulation, and it became
incumbent upon plaintiff to show that defendant, in one way or
another, failed "to handle the situation at that time in a way
which was free from negligence." It was and is contended that the
whole issue was shifted
"from the general allegation of negligence to the allegation
that the injury was caused because the defendant failed to perform
the duty which it was obliged to perform under the law."
Counsel concede that the whole question was whether, when the
proof was that "there was the excepting cause," defendant did what
it "should have done to meet the situation," and the burden was
upon the plaintiff to show that the carrier did not do what it
"ought to have done."
The court rejected the contention. It replied that merely
proving an accumulation of freight or a strike did not shift the
burden of proof, but that, to complete its defense the carrier must
show that the strike or the accumulation of freight caused the
delay in executing its contract to deliver the property.
If we should grant that the ruling was technically erroneous,
its effect in the case can hardly be estimated in view of the
instructions of the court to the jury, entirely considered. They
are too long to quote, but we may say of them that they were very
carefully expressed to give the jury the elements of decision.
The court told the jury that defendant had proved a cause beyond
its control; that is, a strike; and at the request of defendant,
further instructed that, if no negligence on the defendant's part
was shown, defendant was not liable, and that the burden of proving
such negligence was upon the plaintiff. A like instruction was
given as to any cause beyond defendant's control, including an
Page 243 U. S. 585
accumulation of freight, if reasonable care was exercised by
defendant to relieve the situation, that negligence was not to be
presumed, but must be affirmatively proved, and that the burden of
proving it was upon plaintiff. "The question is," the court
said,
"whether or not, in the light of what occurred over there, the
defendant in this case has been shown by the greater weight of the
evidence to have been negligent in the forwarding and the delivery
of this freight. If it has been, why these plaintiffs are entitled
to recover, and to have you assess their damages, unless some of
these other defenses have been made out by the greater weight of
the evidence. If the defendant has not been shown to have been
negligent in the particular indicated, why, then, manifestly, the
defendant is not responsible, and the verdict in all the cases
where these rules apply would have to be for the defendant."
Defendant, however, contended that there was not sufficient
evidence of negligence to justify the submission of the case to the
jury. Counsel, in attempted support of the contention, select
certain elements in the case, ignoring others and their probative
value. That is, counsel ignore the fact, of which there was
evidence, that the melons were received for shipment after the
strike was over, and the fact, of which there was evidence, that
the delay in delivery was caused by the use by defendant of tracks
where melons were usually delivered for the delivery of peaches,
usually delivered elsewhere, to the exclusion of melons, which were
placed in storage tracks at the "meadows."
The fourth contention is that plaintiff should not recover as
part of its damages the freight paid upon delivery at
destination.
The contention is rested upon the prohibition of the Interstate
Commerce Act against deviation from the filed tariffs and schedules
and against rebates and undue preferences and discriminations It is
not asserted in the
Page 243 U. S. 586
present case that there was an evasion of the statute or an
attempt to evade, but that the possibility of such result makes the
recovery of freight illegal. It is urged besides that the melons
were carried to destination and were there sold by plaintiff or on
its account, and that freight thereby accrued and was properly
paid. For which 2 Hutchinson on Carriers, 3d ed. § 802, is cited.
But the cited authority shows that to be the rule when the loss or
damage results from no fault or negligence of the carrier. And,
besides, to the contentions the plaintiff opposes the terms of the
bills of lading, they providing that the amount of loss or damage
for which a carrier is liable
"shall be computed on the basis of the value of the property
(being the
bona fide invoice price, if any, to the
consignee, including the freight charges, if paid) at the place and
time of shipment. . . ."
Some of the bills of lading do not contain this provision, but
it was agreed at the trial that the proper measure of damages was
to be computed upon the basis of the value of the property at the
place and time of shipment, and that such measure should be read
into all of the bills of lading. As plaintiff further says, to
recover the damages sustained by it, based upon this value,
plaintiff must receive from defendant the difference between this
value and the proceeds of the sale, and the freight paid. In this
we concur, and therefore there was no error in including in the
recovery such freight.
Shea v. Minneapolis, St. Paul &
Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 63 Minn. 228;
Davis v. New York,
Ontario & Western Ry. Co., 70 Minn. 37, 44;
Horner v.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 70 Mo.App. 285, 294;
Tibbits v.
Rock Island & Peoria Ry. Co., 49 Ill.App. 567, 572. The
plaintiff was no more than made whole.
Affirmed.
*
"Sec. 8. That in case any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be
done any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared
to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in
this act required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable
to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of
damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the
provisions of this act, together with a reasonable counsel or
attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery,
which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the
costs in the case."
24 Stat. 382.