Only by the action of this Court may one who has secured
admission to its bar be disbarred from practicing before it.
The character and scope of the investigation to be made on a
prayer for disbarment, before sanction is given to it, must depend
upon the character of the acts of misconduct charged, the place of
their commission, and the nature of the proof relied upon to
establish them.
While membership of the bar of a state court of last resort and
fair private and professional character are both prerequisite to
admission to the bar of this Court, loss of the first, after
admission here, cannot, without more, affect the standing of the
member.
Fair private and professional character, however, are continuing
essentials, and their loss by wrongful personal and professional
conduct, wherever committed, is adequate reason for disbarment.
An order of the highest court of a state disbarring a member of
its bar upon charges of personal and professional misconduct this
Court has no authority to reexamine and reverse in the capacity of
a court of review.
Such an order of the state court, although not binding on this
Court as a thing adjudged, so operates, while unreversed, against
the private and professional character of the member as to
constrain this Court to exclude him from its bar also unless, upon
intrinsic consideration of the state record, this Court shall (1)
find that the state procedure was wanting in due process, (2) come
to a clear conviction that the proof of facts relied on by the
state court to establish want of fair character was so infirm that
acceptance of the state court's conclusion thereon as a finality
would be inconsistent with this Court's duty, or (3) discover some
other grave and sufficient reason why this Court could not disbar
consistently with its duty not to take that action unless
constrained under the principles of right and justice to do so.
Ex Parte
Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 108, distinguished.
Page 243 U. S. 47
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
George W. Radford was admitted to practice in the Supreme Court
of the State of Michigan on the 15th day of June, 1876. About ten
years thereafter, on March 18, 1886, upon the representation that
he had been for the three years preceding, a member of the bar of
the highest court of the State of Michigan, and upon the further
assurance, both conformably with Rule 2 of this Court, that his
private and professional character appeared to be fair, he was
permitted to become a member of the bar of this Court.
Represented by the Solicitor General of the United States, the
petitioners, as a committee of the Association of the bar of the
City of Detroit specially appointed for that purpose, seek to
procure an order striking Radford from the roll of the members of
the bar of this Court on the ground of his personal unworthiness to
continue as a member of such bar. And, in coming to consider their
request, we unselfishly understand their sense of pain at being
called on to discharge the duty which they perform. The original
petition filed for that purpose alleged that, in a suit brought in
a designated court of original jurisdiction in Michigan for the
purpose of disbarring Radford for professional misconduct amounting
to moral wrong, he had, after notice and full hearing, been found
to have committed the wrongful acts complained of, and had been
disbarred, and that such judgment had been approved by
Page 243 U. S. 48
the Supreme Court of Michigan in a proceeding by certiorari
taken to consider the same. Annexed to the petition was a copy of
the opinion and order of disbarment entered by the court of
original jurisdiction, as well as a copy of the opinion and order
of the supreme court of the state in the certiorari proceeding, the
same being reported in 168 Mich. 474.
It was alleged in the petition that, notwithstanding the fact
that Radford had, by the final action of the Supreme Court of the
State of Michigan, been stricken from the rolls of the courts in
that state for the reasons previously stated, he had continued in
the City of Detroit to hold himself out as a practicing lawyer
entitled to respect and confidence as such because of the fact that
he continued to be a member of the bar of this Court, unaffected by
the order of disbarment by the courts of the state. After reciting
the unseemly condition produced by these circumstances and the
disrespect for the state courts which was naturally implied, the
prayer was for a rule to show cause and for the awarding, on the
return to such rule, of the order of disbarment which was
sought.
An answer was made to the rule to show cause and a brief filed
in support of the same, as to which we think it suffices to say for
our present purposes that both the answer and the brief take a much
wider range than is permissible, and rely upon much that is here
irrelevant, not to say, in some respects, improper to be
considered, as the prayer for the enforcement of the judgment of
the court of last resort of Michigan is not to be converted into a
trial of the courts of that state or of the members of the Detroit
Bar Association on behalf of which the petition was filed.
Beyond all question, when admission to the bar of this Court is
secured, that right may not be taken away except by the action of
this Court. While this is true, it is also true that the character
and scope of the investigation to
Page 243 U. S. 49
be made on a prayer for disbarment, before sanction is given to
it, must depend upon the character of the acts of misconduct and
wrong relied upon, of the place of their commission, and the nature
of the proof relied upon to establish their existence.
While, moreover, it is true that the two conditions --
membership of the bar of the court of last resort of a state and
fair private and professional character -- are prerequisites to
admission here, there is a wide difference in the nature and effect
of the two requirements. This follows because the first, although a
prerequisite to admission here, is ephemeral in its operation,
since its effect is exhausted upon admission to this bar which it
has served to secure -- a result which becomes manifest by the
consideration that, although the membership of the bar of the court
of last resort of a state, after admission here, might be lost by
change of domicil from one state to another, if so provided by the
state law or rule of court, or by any other cause not involving
unworthiness, such loss would be wholly negligible upon the right
to continue to be a member of the bar of this Court. The second
exaction, on the contrary, is not ephemeral, and its influence is
not exhausted when the admission based upon it is secured, since
the continued possession of a fair private and professional
character is essential to the right to be a member of this bar. It
follows, therefore, that the personality of the member and these
inherent and prerequisite qualifications for membership of this bar
are indivisible -- that is, inseparable. They must, if they exist,
follow the personality of one who is a member of the bar, and hence
their loss by wrongful personal and professional conduct, wherever
committed, operates everywhere, and must, in the nature of things,
furnish adequate reason in every jurisdiction for taking away the
right to continue to be a member of the bar in good standing.
In the light of these conclusions, the question is, what,
Page 243 U. S. 50
consistently with the duty which rests upon us, is exacted in
dealing with the situation now presented?
In coming to solve that question, three things are patent: (a)
that we have no authority to reexamine or reverse, as a reviewing
court, the action of the Supreme Court of Michigan in disbarring a
member of the bar of the courts of that state for personal and
professional misconduct; (b) that the order of disbarment is not
binding upon us as the thing adjudged in a technical sense, and (c)
that albeit this is the case, yet, as we have previously shown, the
necessary effect of the action of the Supreme Court of Michigan, as
long as it stands unreversed, unless for some reason it is found
that it ought not to be accepted or given effect to, has been to
absolutely destroy the condition of fair private and professional
character, without the possession of which there could be no
possible right to continue to be a member of this bar.
Meeting this situation, we are of opinion that, on the case
presented, our duty is not to review the action of the state court
of last resort -- a power which we do not possess -- but wholly to
abdicate our own functions by treating its judgment as the thing
adjudged, excluding all inquiry on our part, and yet not, in
considering the right of one to continue to be a member of the bar
of this Court, to shut our eyes to the status, as it were, of
unworthiness to be such a member which the judgment must be treated
as having established, unless for some reason we deem that
consequence should not now be accepted. In other words, in passing
upon the question of the right to continue to be a member of the
bar of this Court, we think we should recognize the absence of fair
private and professional character inherently arising as the result
of the action of the Supreme Court of Michigan so far as we are at
liberty to do so consistently with the duty resting upon us to
determine for ourselves the right to continue to be a member of
this bar. That is to say, we are of opinion
Page 243 U. S. 51
that we should recognize the condition created by the judgment
of the state court unless, from an intrinsic consideration of the
state record, one or all of the following conditions should appear:
1, that the state procedure, from want of notice or opportunity to
be heard, was wanting in due process, 2, that there was such an
infirmity of proof as to facts found to have established the want
of fair private and professional character as to give rise to a
clear conviction on our part that we could not, consistently with
our duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject, or 3,
that some other grave reason existed which should convince us that
to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their
effect would conflict with the duty which rests upon us not to
disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of
right and justice, we were constrained so to do.
In concluding that our duty is to give effect to the finding of
the state court establishing the want of fair private and
professional character, subject to the limitations stated, we
confine ourselves to the case before us, and therefore do not in
the slightest degree call in question the ruling in
Ex Parte
Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 108, that a mere punishment for
contempt by an inferior federal court was not a sufficient ground
for preventing admission to the bar of this Court, there being
nothing to indicate that the action of the inferior court was based
upon the doing of acts which inherently and necessarily deprived
the applicant of the fair private and professional character
essential to admission.
Thus defining what is open to our consideration, we think we
ought not to foreclose the subject on the answer made to the rule
to show cause in the proceeding which is now before us, but that an
opportunity should be afforded the respondent, confining himself to
the propositions stated, if he is so advised, to file the record or
records of the state court within thirty days from this date
with
Page 243 U. S. 52
permission by printed brief, considering the record
intrinsically, to point out any ground within the limitations
stated which should prevent us from giving effect to the
conclusions established by the action of the Supreme Court of
Michigan which is now before us, as we have seen, as part of the
petition we are now considering.
It is so ordered.