A suit to restrain a state official and his successors in office
from estimating, levying, and assessing a tax under a state law
claimed to be unconstitutional is a suit against him as an
individual and, in the absence of a statute otherwise providing,
abates when his term of office expires and cannot be revived
against his successor.
New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank,
167 U. S. 371,
167 U. S. 388,
distinguished. Writ of error to review 70 Fla. 9 dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 243 U. S. 448
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida,
by the Pullman Company against Knott, comptroller of the State of
Florida, to enjoin him and his successors in office from
estimating, levying, and assessing a tax on the gross receipts of
the Pullman Company on the ground that the state law authorizing
the tax was void under the Constitution of the United States. The
circuit court held that the law was constitutional, and dismissed
the bill; that decree was affirmed by the supreme court of the
state. 70 Fla. 9. The case was then brought here upon writ of
error.
It is now before us upon a motion of the defendant in error, by
the attorney general of the state, to dismiss the proceeding in
this Court upon the ground that there is no proper person defendant
to stand in judgment in the action. It is averred, and is not
disputed, that Knott, the defendant in error, is no longer
Comptroller of the State of Florida, his term of office having
expired on January 2, 1917, and that thereupon he retired from the
office of comptroller and has been succeeded by another, who is the
duly commissioned and acting comptroller of the state.
The original suit was against Knott; the bill stated that he was
the duly elected, qualified, and acting Comptroller of the State of
Florida. The bill sets forth the duties required of him in that
connection in levying the tax against the enforcement of which the
injunction was sought by the Pullman Company.
While it is true that the duty required concerns the state, the
suit is against Knott as an individual, and he
Page 243 U. S. 449
alone can be punished for the failure to obey an injunction,
should one issue as prayed for in the bill. Whether the court below
was right in refusing the injunction and dismissing the bill
against Knott is the question presented. In such cases, a long line
of decisions in this Court has settled that the action abates upon
the expiration of the defendant's term of office, and cannot be
revived against his successor in office in the absence of a statute
so providing.
We had occasion to review and consider these cases in the case
of
Pullman Company v. Croom, Comptroller of the State of
Florida, 231 U. S. 571, in
which this Court held, vacating the former order of substitution
granted without discussion, that the action for an injunction
against the enforcement of the tax abated upon the death of Croom,
comptroller, and there being no statute covering such cases, no
order of substitution could be made, and thereupon dismissed the
appeal for want of a proper party to stand in judgment.
The case upon which the subsequent decisions are rested is
United States v.
Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604. In that case, the rule and
the reasons for it were stated by the Court. That was a suit for
mandamus against the Secretary of the Treasury, and involved the
right to substitute the successor of the Secretary, his term of
office having expired since the suit was commenced. The Court held
that the right to a writ of mandamus ceased to exist upon the
defendant retiring from the office of Secretary, and that, in the
absence of a statute, the writ must necessarily abate. The Court
further held that the duty sought to be enforced was a personal
one, and existed only so long as the office was held; that the
Court could not compel the defendant to perform such duty after his
power so to do had ceased; that, if the successor in office could
be substituted, he might be mulcted in costs for the fault of his
predecessor without any delinquency of his own, and that, were a
demand
Page 243 U. S. 450
made upon him, he might discharge the duty, rendering the
interposition of a court unnecessary, and, in any event, the
successor was not in privity with his predecessor, nor was he his
personal representative. (
84
U. S. 17 Wall. 604,
84 U. S.
607-608.)
In
Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U. S.
28, the previous cases were reviewed by Mr. Justice
Gray, speaking for the Court, and the principle was applied to a
suit for an injunction.
In
United States ex Rel. Bernardin v. Butterworth,
169 U. S. 600, it
was held that the substitution could not be made, even with the
consent of the successor in office. In that case, it was stated
that it seemed desirable that Congress should provide for the
difficulty by enacting a statute that would permit the successors
of heads of departments who had died or resigned to be brought into
the case by a proper method. Congress thereupon passed the Act of
February 8, 1899, 30 Stat. 822, under the terms of which successors
of officers of the United States may be substituted in suits
brought against them in their official capacity. This statute has
no application to other than federal officers.
In
Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.
S. 487, an action was brought against McChesney, as
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. This Court took judicial
notice that his term of office had expired pending the suit, and
that a successor had been inducted into office, and held that the
former rule applied, and that the only exception to it was where
the obligation sought to be enforced devolved upon a corporation or
a continuing body.
Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.
S. 250. This seems to be the rule in the Florida courts.
Columbia County v. Bryson, 13 Fla. 281. In the
McChesney case, this Court held that as the official
authority of the secretary had terminated, the case, so far as it
sought to accomplish its object, was at an end, and there being no
statute providing for the substitution of the successor, the writ
of error was dismissed,
Page 243 U. S. 451
citing
United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall.,
supra,
United States ex Rel. Bernardin v. Butterworth, 169 U.S.,
supra; Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, 196 U.
S. 432,
196 U. S.
441.
It is argued for the plaintiff in error that this Court has held
that former judgments adjudicating rights against the state are
binding in subsequent actions; that the mere fact that there has
been a change of person holding the office does not destroy the
effect of the thing adjudged.
New Orleans v. Citizens'
Bank, 167 U. S. 371,
167 U. S.
388-389. But that argument does not touch the question
here. It was held in the
Citizens' Bank case that a
holding that a contract for exemption from taxation existed bound
subsequent officers of the state. The difficulty here is that this
proceeding in error, since the expiration of Knott's term of
office, leaves no party defendant in error to stand in
judgment.
It is said that this ruling involves great hardship, and that
official terms will expire, so that cases of this sort cannot be
reviewed at all in this Court. In this case, the judgment of the
state court was rendered on June 26, 1915; the order allowing the
writ of error to this Court was filed September 24, 1915, and the
record was filed in this Court on October 8, 1915. It does not
appear that any attempt was made to advance the case, in view of
the expiration of Knott's terms of office as comptroller in
January, 1917. As the law now stands, we have no alternative except
to dismiss the writ of error for want of a proper defendant to
stand in judgment.
And it is so ordered.