Plaintiff, employed by the defendant, an interstate carrier, was
injured while laboring in a tunnel which was then being constructed
by the defendant in the Washington for the purpose of shortening
its main line between Chicago and Seattle, and thus improving its
freight and passenger service. The tunnel was incomplete, and had
never been used in interstate commerce.
Held:
(1) That neither party was engaged in interstate commerce,
quoad the injury, and that no cause of action existed
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
(2) That plaintiff's cause of action, viewed as arising under
the state law, was remediable only as provided by the Washington
Workmen's Compensation Act, Laws 1911, c. 74.
Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, post, 243 U. S. 219;
New York Central R. Co. v. White, post, 243 U. S. 188.
233 F. 239 affirmed.
This was an action for personal injuries begun in the District
Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington,
the petition averring that the plaintiff was a citizen of that
state and the defendant a foreign corporation. The facts are stated
in the opinion.
Page 243 U. S. 44
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Raymond, the plaintiff in error, sued the railway company, a
foreign corporation doing business in Washington, to recover
damages resulting from injuries sustained by him while in its
employ. The petition alleged that the defendant operated an
interstate commerce railroad between Chicago and Seattle and that,
for the purpose of shortening its main line and making more
efficient and expeditious its freight and passenger service, was
engaged in cutting a tunnel through the mountain between Horrick's
Spur and Rockdale, in Washington. It was averred that plaintiff was
employed by the defendant in the tunnel as a laborer, and that,
while he was at work, his pick struck a charge of dynamite which,
through the defendant's negligence, had not been removed, and that,
from the explosion which followed, he had sustained serious
injuries.
The defendant's answer contained a general denial and alleged
that, at the time and place of the accident, the railroad and
Raymond were not engaged in interstate commerce, since the tunnel
was only partially bored, and hence not in use as an
instrumentality of interstate commerce. It was further alleged that
the court was without jurisdiction to hear the cause because of the
provisions of the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act (Chapter
74, Laws of 1911), with whose requirements the defendant had fully
complied. The reply of the plaintiff admitted the facts alleged in
the answer, but denied that they constituted defenses to the
action.
The trial court entered a judgment for the defendant on the
pleadings, and this writ of error is prosecuted to a
Page 243 U. S. 45
judgment of the court below affirming such action. 233 F.
239.
Considering the suit as based upon the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, it is certain, under recent decisions of this Court,
whatever doubt may have existed in the minds of some at the time
the judgment below was rendered, that, under the facts as alleged,
Raymond and the railway company were not engaged in interstate
commerce at the time the injuries were suffered, and consequently
no cause of action was alleged under the act.
Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.
S. 439;
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v.
Harrington, 241 U. S. 177;
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Nash, 242 U.S.
619.
It is also certain that, if the petition be treated as alleging
a cause of action under the common law, the court below was without
authority to afford relief, as that result could only be attained
under the local law in accordance with the provisions of the
Washington Workmen's Compensation Act, which has this day been
decided to be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States.
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, post,
243 U. S. 219. And
this result is controlling even although it be conceded that the
railroad company was, in a general sense, engaged in interstate
commerce, since it has been also this day decided that that fact
does not prevent the operation of a state Workmen's Compensation
Act.
New York Central R. Co. v. White, post, 243 U. S. 243
U.S. 188.
Affirmed.
