When the decision of the state court in the application of state
laws to real property is controlled by a construction of federal
statutes concerning the title, which were relied on by the party
complaining, this Court has jurisdiction to review the
judgment.
When a forest reservation is made to include a school section
previously surveyed, the state may waive its right to the section
and select other lands in lieu, under §§ 2275, 2276, Rev.Stats., as
amended by the Act of March 3, 1891, c. 384, 26 Stat. 796.
This Court will not readily disturb a construction of a land law
by the Land Department which, though differing from an earlier one,
has been adopted on full consideration and long consistently
adhered to by the Department, and upon the faith of which large
acreages have been acquired and large expenditures have been
made.
167 Cal. 147 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 243 U. S. 416
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Deseret Water, Oil, & Irrigation Company brought a
proceeding in condemnation in the Superior Court of Mono County,
California, against the State of California, to appropriate by
right of eminent domain certain lands in that state for the purpose
of preserving and maintaining water rights, equipping and operating
canals, etc., to be used in supplying water and power to mines,
farming neighborhoods, cities, and towns and villages, and to
corporations and individuals, draining, reclaiming, and irrigating
lands, equipping, operating, and maintaining ditches, reservoirs,
etc., and for the operation and maintenance of pumps and pumping
plants, electrical lighting and power plants, and electric and
power lines.
The right to make such appropriation was sustained in the
superior court, but, upon appeal, this judgment was reversed by the
District Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District.
Thereupon, upon motion to the Supreme Court of California, the
cause was transferred to that court for hearing and decision, and,
upon consideration, the judgment of the superior court was
affirmed. 167 Cal. 147. The supreme court held that the lands
belonged to the state, and that by certain statutes of the state it
had been provided that, notwithstanding the ownership of the state,
the lands might be appropriated to a public use such as the Water
Company was lawfully proposing to make of them, and that, as to
such matters, the state had consented to be sued in the same manner
as any private proprietor might be. A writ of error brings the case
to this Court.
The land in question is a sixteenth section passing to the state
by virtue of the federal grant for school purposes. Act of 1853, 10
Stat. 244, chap. 143; Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 218. Afterward, a
national reservation, known as the Mono Forest Reserve, was
established by proclamation of the President.
Page 243 U. S. 417
This reservation included this section 16 within its
boundaries.
It was shown at the trial that the lands in question were
withdrawn from sale by the state by an act of the legislature, and
it was contended they could only be used as bases for lieu
selections. The surveyor-general of the state offered the lands as
bases for such selections, except forty acres, for which the state
had sold an indemnity certificate entitling the purchaser to
surrender that land and apply for unappropriated public land in
lieu thereof. All the remainder had been offered for lieu
selections, which are pending in the General Land Office.
The Supreme Court of California held that the title to the lands
was completely vested in the state, and subject to condemnation at
the instance of the Water Company.
A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction has been submitted.
As we shall have occasion to see in the further discussion of the
case, its disposition depended upon the construction of statutes of
the United States, and the opinion of the state court shows that
these statutes were considered, and federal rights asserted under
them denied. Nor can we agree that there was a local ground of
decision broad enough to sustain the judgment of the state court
independently of the construction and effect given to the federal
statute. The controlling effect of the federal statutes is conceded
in the opinion of the state court, and must necessarily follow in
view of the nature of the rights dealt with. In this situation,
this Court has jurisdiction.
Miedreich v. Lauenstein,
232 U. S. 236,
232 U. S. 242;
North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.
S. 248,
232 U. S. 257;
Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U.
S. 184,
240 U. S.
188.
The federal statutes involved are §§ 2275 and 2276 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended in 1891, 26 Stat.
796, 797. They are found in the margin.
*
Page 243 U. S. 418
As we have already stated, the state has elected to surrender
this section 16 to the United States, asking compensation in other
lands for the same under the provisions contained in the sections
of the federal statutes just referred to. It is the contention of
the state that, because of such
Page 243 U. S. 419
action, the lands in question in equity belong to the United
States, and that consequently they could not be condemned for the
uses of the Water Company.
The controversy reduces itself to the precise question whether,
when a forest reservation, subsequently proclaimed, includes within
its limits a school section surveyed before the establishment of
the reservation, the state may, under § 2275, Revised Statutes of
the United States, as amended in 1891, waive its right to such
section and select other lands in lieu thereof.
The first part of the section, giving the right to select lands
in lieu of such as were settled upon with a view to preemption or
homestead, is clearly limited to settlements made before survey of
lands in the field, and under the following provision, giving the
right of selection to the state where the lands are mineral or are
included in an Indian, military, or other reservation, or are
otherwise disposed of by the United States, it well may be that, in
the absence of the proviso, the right of selection would be
confined to instances where the lands were unsurveyed
Page 243 U. S. 420
when found to be mineral or included in a reservation, and this
because if the lands were unreserved and not known to be mineral
when surveyed, the title would then vest in the state (
Sherman
v. Buick, 93 U. S. 209;
Heydenfedt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co.,
93 U. S. 634;
United States v. Morrison, 240 U.
S. 192,
240 U. S.
204-207), and because lieu selections are usually,
although not always, permitted where the right to the place lands
is cut off before the time for the title to become vested. But the
proviso, which was not originally in the statute, is an important
part of it, and, according to a familiar rule, must be given some
effect. It reads:
"Where any state is entitled to said sections sixteen and
thirty-six, or where said sections are reserved to any territory,
notwithstanding the same may be mineral land or embraced within a
military, Indian, or other reservation, the selection of such lands
in lieu thereof by said state or territory shall be a waiver of its
right to said sections."
This language, while not as clear as it might be, operates, as
we interpret it, to give to the state a right to waive its right to
such lands where, as in this case, the same are included in a
forest reservation after survey -- that is, after the title vests
in the state. Unless this proviso refers to lands the title to
which has passed to the state, it adds nothing to the statute and
performs no office whatever. This construction preserves the
integrity of forest reservations, and permits the state to acquire
other lands not surrounded by large tracts in such reservations
which are withdrawn from settlement.
It is true that the interpretation of the statute has not been
uniform in the Department of the Interior, and it has been
otherwise construed in at least one of the federal courts.
Hibberd v. Slack,, 84 F. 571. But the interpretation for
which the state insists has been long given to it by the Interior
Department. It was more than suggested in Gregg v.
Page 243 U. S. 421
Colorado, 15 L.D. 151, 154, and Rice v. California, 24 L.D. 14,
15, was adopted upon full consideration in State of California, 28
L.D. 57, and has been uniformly followed ever since. Territory of
New Mexico, 29 L.D. 364; School Land Opinion, 30 L.D. 438; Dunn v.
California, 30 L.D. 608; Territory of New Mexico, 34 L.D. 599;
State of California, 34 L.D. 613.
In the brief presented by leave of court on behalf of the United
States, it is set forth that the rule laid down in State of
California, 28 L.D.
supra, is still adhered to by the Land
Department; that selections aggregating many thousands of acres
have been made in reliance upon it, and that no doubt large
expenditures of money have been made in good faith upon the
selected lands. It is therefore urged that such construction has
become a rule of property. In this situation, we should be slow to
disturb a ruling of the department of the government to which is
committed the administration of public lands.
McMichael v.
Murphy, 197 U. S. 304.
Furthermore, the reasoning upon which the departmental
interpretation is founded commends itself to our judgment as best
calculated to carry out the purposes intended to be accomplished by
the statute in question.
It follows that the Supreme Court of California erred in its
decision of the federal question involved. With the state questions
we have no concern, their ultimate solution being a matter for that
court. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to that
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.
*
"Sec. 2275. Where settlements with a view to preemption or
homestead have been or shall hereafter be made before the survey of
the lands in the field, which are found to have been made on
sections sixteen or thirty-six, those sections shall be subject to
the claims of such settlers, and if such sections, or either of
them, have been or shall be granted, reserved, or pledged for the
use of schools or colleges in the state or territory in which they
lie, other lands of equal acreage are hereby appropriated and
granted, and may be selected by said state or territory in lieu of
such as may be thus taken by preemption or homestead settlers. And
other lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated and
granted, and may be selected by said state or territory where
sections sixteen or thirty-six are mineral land, or are included
within any Indian, military, or other reservation, or are otherwise
disposed of by the United States:
Provided, where any
state is entitled to said sections sixteen and thirty-six, or where
said sections are reserved to any territory, notwithstanding the
same may be mineral land or embraced within a military, Indian, or
other reservation, the selection of such lands in lieu thereof by
said state or territory shall be a waiver of its right to said
sections. And other lands of equal acreage are also hereby
appropriated and granted, and may be selected by said state or
territory to compensate deficiencies for school purposes, where
sections sixteen or thirty-six are fractional in quantity, or where
one or both are wanting by reason of the township being fractional,
or from any natural cause whatever. And it shall be the duty of the
Secretary of the Interior, without awaiting the extension of the
public surveys, to ascertain and determine, by protraction or
otherwise, the number of townships that will be included within
such Indian, military, or other reservations, and thereupon the
state or territory shall be entitled to select indemnity lands to
the extent of two sections for each of said townships, in lieu of
sections sixteen and thirty-six therein; but such selections may
not be made within the boundaries of said reservations:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent any state or territory from awaiting the extinguishment of
any such military, Indian, or other reservation and the restoration
of the lands therein embraced to the public domain, and then taking
the sections sixteen and thirty-six in place therein; but nothing
in this proviso shall be construed as conferring any right not now
existing."
"Sec. 2276. That the lands appropriated by the preceding section
shall be selected from any unappropriated, surveyed public lands,
not mineral in character, within the state or territory where such
losses or deficiencies of school sections occur, and where the
selections are to compensate for deficiencies of school lands in
fractional townships, such selections shall be made in accordance
with the following principles of adjustment, to-wit: for each
township or fractional township containing a greater quantity of
land than three quarters of an entire township, one section; for a
fractional township, containing a greater quantity of land than one
half, and not more than three quarters of a township, three
quarters of a section; for a fractional township, containing a
greater quantity of land than one quarter, and not more than one
half of a township, one-half section, and for a fractional township
containing a greater quantity of land than one entire section, and
not more than one quarter of a township one quarter section of
land:
Provided, That the states or territories which are,
or shall be entitled to both the sixteenth and thirty-sixth
sections in place, shall have the right to select double the
amounts named, to compensate for deficiencies of school land in
fractional townships."