An action governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act is
not removable from the state to the federal court upon the ground
of diverse citizenship.
Where there is substantial evidence of negligence to support the
verdict in an action for personal injuries, this Court will not
disturb the finding of a state court.
Under the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531, c.196, as amended
by the Act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, the duty to
provide grab-irons or hand-holds on the ends, as well as on the
sides, of locomotive tenders is an absolute duty which must be
literally complied with, and claimed equivalents cannot satisfy the
law.
268 Mo. 31 affirmed. .
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 243 U. S. 312
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Moore, the defendant in error, was in the employ of the
plaintiff in error as a brakeman, and was desperately injured on
June 9, 1910. His claim is that, at the moment of the accident, he
was engaged in adjusting a defective automatic coupler on the rear
end of the tender of an engine, which was started unexpectedly,
causing him to be thrown from his feet by the steam hose equipment,
which hung down to within a few inches of the surface of the track,
and that, in part because the tender was not equipped with grab
irons or handholds, as required by the federal law, he fell
helpless under the wheels and lost both of his hands.
He recovered a judgment in the trial court, which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and the case is here on writ of
error.
The applicability of the Employers' Liability Act to the case
was admitted from the beginning, but nevertheless a petition was
promptly filed for the removal of the case to the United States
circuit court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. This
petition was denied, and the claim that this denial constitutes
reversible error is now argued here, albeit somewhat faintly. The
claim is wholly without merit, as is apparent from the plain
reading of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and as is
determined in
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie,
238 U. S. 599, and
in
Southern Railway Co. v. Lloyd, 239 U.
S. 496.
It is claimed, with much apparent confidence, that no
substantial evidence appears in the record to support the judgment
of the state courts, and that, under the authority of
Southern
Pacific Co. v. Pool, 160 U. S. 438, the
judgment
Page 243 U. S. 313
should be reversed. An inspection of the record satisfies us
that substantial testimony was introduced in support of the claimed
negligence of the railroad company, and that, applying the usual
rule, the result cannot be disturbed on this claim.
But chief emphasis, perhaps, is laid on the argument upon the
claim that the trial court erred in refusing to say to the jury as
a matter of law that
"any iron rod or iron device securely fastened upon the end of
defendant's tender to which employees could conveniently catch hold
while in the performance of their duties in coupling or uncoupling
cars was a handhold or grab iron within the meaning of the
law,"
and that therefore if the vertical iron handhold and iron rod --
pin lifting or uncoupling lever -- extending across the tender just
above the coupler were so designed and constructed as to permit
employees engaged in coupling or uncoupling cars to readily grasp
them for their better security while in the performance of such
work, the defendant was not guilty of negligence in failing to
provide necessary and proper handholds or grab irons, and the
plaintiff cannot recover for any injury sustained from lack of them
on the engine tender.
The trial court gave this request as the law of the case, but
provided only the jury should find
"that said attachments or devices furnished reasonable security
to the employees of defendant in coupling and uncoupling said
tender and cars."
The railroad company excepted to this modification of its
request to charge, and argues now that to so modify it was
error.
We quite agree with the Supreme Court of Missouri in its
conclusion that the giving of the company's request, even as
modified by the trial court, was error in its favor, being much
more than it deserved under the law.
Section 4 of the Safety Appliance Statute provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to use any car in
interstate commerce that is not provided with
Page 243 U. S. 314
secure grab irons or handholds in the ends and sides of each car
for greater security to the men in coupling and uncoupling
cars."
27 Stat. 531. This statute was, in terms, made applicable to
tenders of engines by the amendment of 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c.
976.
The request preferred is an obvious attempt to secure the
application of the doctrine of equivalents to the Safety Appliance
Act, and to persuade the court to say that it is not necessary for
carriers to comply with the law if only they will furnish some
other appliance which one jury may say is "just as good," but which
another jury may say is not.
It is much too late for such a claim to be seriously
entertained. In the case of
St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281,
often approved by this Court, it was settled once for all that
Congress, not satisfied with the common law duty and its resulting
liability, in the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat.
531, prescribed and defined certain definite standards to which
interstate carriers must conform, and of the required automatic
couplers, this Court said: Congress has enacted that "no cars,
either loaded or unloaded, shall be used in interstate commerce
which do not comply with the standard." There is no escape from the
meaning of these words. Explanation cannot clarify them, and ought
not to be employed to confuse them or to lessen their
significance.
The exercise of care, even the greatest, in supplying and
repairing these appliances will not excuse defects in them -- the
duty and liability are absolute.
St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, supra; Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Otos, 239 U. S. 349,
239 U. S. 351.
If equivalents were allowed, the statute would be lost in
exceptions, and its humane purpose defeated in the uncertainty of
litigation.
The request to charge on which the plaintiff in error
Page 243 U. S. 315
relies in its terms implies the absence of the required
handholds or grab irons, and an inspection of the photograph of the
tender confirms the inference. The vertical handhold referred to in
the request was at the corner of the tender, and could be useful
only to a man walking or running alongside the track to operate the
uncoupling lever, or, as it is sometimes called, the pin-lifting
lever. It could not be of value when the automatic coupler was not
in working condition, or to a man in the position in which Moore
was when injured.
This grab iron requirement first appears in the Act of 1893, and
the amendment ten years later (March 2nd 1903), 32 Stat. 943,
making the requirement in terms applicable to tenders, did not
change it. Whatever may be said of 1893, there can be no doubt
that, in 1903, automatic couplers, and therefore uncoupling or
pin-lifting levers, were in common if not general use on the
tenders of engines, and if Congress had intended them to be
accepted as a substitute for handholds or grab irons, we must
assume that the amendment of 1903 would have so provided. The
statute requires both. If practical confirmation of this conclusion
were desired, it is to be found in the fact that, in the order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission standardizing safety appliances,
under the Act of Congress of April 14, 1910, 36 Stat. 298, two rear
end hand-holds are required on locomotives, "one near each side on
rear end of tender
on the face of the end sill."
It is not admissible to allow such an important statutory
requirement to be satisfied by equivalents or by anything less than
literal compliance with what it prescribes. The charge as given
being more favorable to the company that it deserved, the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Missouri is
Affirmed.