Where no conflict with the federal Constitution or laws is
involved, a construction of a state statute by the highest court of
the state is accepted by this Court as conclusive. The act of
Tennessee providing that, when nonresidents qualify in the state as
the personal representatives of decedents dying and leaving assets
therein, such nonresidents shall be treated as citizens of the
Page 243 U. S. 300
state for the purpose of suing and being sued, was not intended
to exclude them from resort to the federal courts.
The purpose of the act as construed by the state supreme court
was to permit them to sue
in forma pauperis.
232 F. 708 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, S. C. Moore, a citizen of Arkansas, in his
representative capacity as administrator of the estate of Ivy B.
Douglas, deceased, under appointment by the Probate Court of Shelby
County, Tennessee, sued the petitioner, the Memphis Street Railway
Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Tennessee, in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, for wrongfully causing the death of his decedent. He
recovered judgment, which was affirmed by the circuit court of
appeals, and the case is here on certiorari for review of the
holding of that court that the plaintiff had legal capacity to
maintain the suit in a federal court.
On the face of the declaration, there was the requisite
diversity of citizenship to give the federal court jurisdiction,
but the petitioner claims that the respondent, Moore, although a
citizen of Arkansas, must be treated as a citizen of Tennessee
under the statute of that state entitled
"An Act to Declare That, for the Purpose of Suing and Being
Sued, a Nonresident of Tennessee, Who Qualifies as Executor or
Administrator in Tennessee, Shall Be Considered a Citizen of
Tennessee, and to Provide for the Service of
Page 243 U. S. 301
Process upon Him"
(c. 501, p. 1344, Acts 1903), which provides:
"That whenever a nonresident of the State of Tennessee qualifies
in this state as the executor or administrator of a person dying in
or leaving assets or property in this state, for the purpose of
suing and being sued, he shall be treated as a citizen of this
state."
The remainder of the act prescribes the method of service of
summons upon such a nonresident executor or administrator.
Upon a full review of the legislation of the state in
Southern Railway Co. v. Maxwell, 113 Tenn. 464, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee decided that the sole purpose of this
act is to extend to such nonresident executors and administrators
as are described in it the privilege of suing in the state courts
in forma pauperis, and that the effect of it, when read
with the other statutes of the state on the subject, is to confine
this privilege to the people of the state or to suits devoted to
their interest,
"since the right is not extended to nonresident administrators
generally, but only to those who have qualified in this state as
the personal representatives of persons dying or leaving assets or
property in this state."
No conflict with the federal Constitution or laws being
involved, this construction of the state statute will be accepted
by this Court as conclusive.
Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152,
23 U. S. 159;
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U.
S. 100,
230 U. S.
116.
But, irrespective of this rule, we quite agree with this
authoritative declaration that the only purpose of the act is to
determine privileges in the state courts of nonresidents who may be
appointed administrators or executors of the estates of persons
such as are described in the act. There is nothing whatever in the
statute which indicates any intention on the part of the
legislature to exclude nonresident executors or administrators from
resort to federal
Page 243 U. S. 302
courts under appropriate conditions, and the construction which
is urged upon us to give to it such an effect is too strained and
artificial to be allowed. The judgment of the circuit court of
appeals is affirmed.