As an incident to the establishment of an elective workmen's
compensation system which (by admission in this case) is free from
constitutional objection, it is not violative of due process for a
state to withdraw the common law defenses of assumption of risk,
contributory negligence and negligence of fellow servants from
those employers who voluntarily reject the system so established.
New York Central R. Co. v. White, ante, 243 U. S. 188.
In such case, also, the state may constitutionally provide that,
in an action against an employer who has rejected the Compensation
Act, the injury shall be presumed to have resulted directly from
his negligence and that the burden of rebutting the presumption
shall rest upon him.
The provisions in § 3 of the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law,
Laws of Iowa, 35 G.A. c. 147; Iowa Code Supp., 1913, § 2477m,
requiring employees who reject the act to state by affidavit who,
if anyone, requested or suggested that course, and providing that,
where an employer or his agent has made such request or suggestion,
the employee shall be conclusively presumed to have been unduly
influenced and his rejection of the act shall be void.
Held permissible regulation in aid of the general scheme
of the act.
A workmen's compensation act which, prescribing the measure of
compensation and the circumstances under which it is to be made,
establishes a method of applying the measure to the facts of each
case by due hearings before an administrative tribunal, whose
action upon all fundamental and jurisdictional questions is subject
to judicial review, is not open to objection upon the ground that
it clothes the administrative body with an arbitrary and unbridled
discretion in violation of due process of law.
Trial by jury is not one of the rights secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Page 243 U. S. 211
Iowa was not part of the Northwest Territory, nor subject to the
Ordinance of July 13, 1787, enacted for the government of that
Territory (1 Stat. 51).
The act establishing Iowa Territory (June 12, 1838, c. 6, 5
Stat. 235) was but a regulation of territory belonging to the
United States, and such provision as it adopted from the Ordinance
of 1787 respecting the right of trial by jury, though declared to
be unalterable without common consent, was but a part of that
regulation, was subject to repeal, and was superseded by the state
constitution when Iowa was admitted into the Union "on an equal
footing with the original states in all respects whatsoever."
Iowa is as much at liberty as any other state to abolish or
limit the right of trial by jury, or to provide for a waiver of
that right, as is done by the Workmen's Compensation Act,
supra.
The Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act,
supra, is held not
to deprive the employer of equal protection of the laws in allowing
him the common law defenses of assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and negligence of fellow servants only when he has
accepted the act and the employee has not, while it withdraws them
if employer and employee both, or employer alone, have rejected
it.
220 F. 378 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE Pitney delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity brought by appellant in the United
States district court to restrain the enforcement of an act of the
General Assembly of the State of Iowa, approved April 18, 1913,
relating to employers' liability
Page 243 U. S. 212
and workmen's compensation; it being c. 147 of Laws of Iowa, 35
G.A., embraced in Iowa Code, Supp. of 1913, § 2477m. The bill sets
forth that complainant is an employer of laborers within the
meaning of the act, but has rejected its provisions, alleges that
the statute is in contravention of the federal and state
constitutions, etc., etc. A motion to dismiss was sustained by the
district court (220 F. 378), and the case comes here by direct
appeal, because of the constitutional question, under § 238, Jud.
Code.
Since the decision below, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in an able
and exhaustive opinion, has sustained the act against all
constitutional objections, at the same time construing some of its
provisions.
Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co., 154
N.W. 1037; 157 N.W. 145. Hence, no objection under the state
constitution is here pressed, and we, of course, accept the
construction placed upon the act by the state court of last
resort.
As to private employers, it is an elective workmen's
compensation law, having the same general features found in the
recent legislation of many of the states, sustained by their
courts.
See Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607;
Young
v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346;
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147
Wis. 327;
State ex Rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349;
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.
S. 571;
Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 84
N.J.L. 85, 86 N.J.L. 701;
Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261
Ill. 454;
Crooks v. Tazewell Coal Co., 263 Ill. 343;
Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11;
Matheson v. Minneapolis Street R. Co., 126 Minn. 286;
Shade v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 92 Kan.
146, 93 Kan. 257;
Sayles v. Foley, 38 R.I. 484;
Greene
v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571;
Middleton v. Texas Power &
Light Co., 185 S.W. 556. The main purpose of the act is to
establish, in all employments except those of household servants,
farm laborers, and casual employees,
Page 243 U. S. 213
a system of compensation according to a prescribed schedule for
all employees sustaining injuries arising out of and in the course
of the employment, and producing temporary or permanent disability,
total or partial, and, in case of death resulting from such
injuries, a contribution towards the support of those dependent
upon the earnings of the employee; the compensation in either case
to be paid by the employer in lieu of other liability, and
acceptance of the terms of the act being presumed unless employer
or employee gives notice of an election to reject them. To this
main purpose no constitutional objection is raised, the attack
being confined to particular provisions of the law.
Some of appellant's objections are based upon the ground that
the employer is subjected to a species of duress in order to compel
him to accept the compensation features of the act, since it is
provided that an employer rejecting these features shall not escape
liability for personal injury sustained by an employee, arising out
of and in the usual course of the employment, because the employee
assumed the risks of the employment, or because of the employee's
negligence, unless this was willful and with intent to cause the
injury, or was the result of intoxication, or because the injury
was caused by the negligence of a coemployee. But it is clear, as
we have pointed out in
New York Central R. Co. v. White,
ante, 243 U. S. 188,
that the employer has no vested right to have these so-called
common law defenses perpetuated for his benefit, and that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a state from establishing a
system of workmen's compensation without the consent of the
employer, incidentally abolishing the defenses referred to.
The same may be said as to the provision that, in an action
against an employer who has rejected the act, it shall be presumed
that the injury was the direct result of his negligence, and that
he must assume the burden of
Page 243 U. S. 214
proof to rebut the presumption of negligence. In addition, we
may repeat that the establishment of presumptions, and of rules
respecting the burden of proof, is clearly within the domain of the
state governments, and that a provision of this character, not
unreasonable in itself and not conclusive of the rights of the
party, does not constitute a denial of due process of law.
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. Co. v. Turnipseed,
219 U. S. 35,
219 U. S.
42.
Objection is made to the provision in § 3, that, where an
employee elects to reject the act, he shall state in an affidavit
who, if anybody, requested or suggested that he should do so, and
if it be found that the employer or his agent made such a request
or suggestion, the employee shall be conclusively presumed to have
been unduly influenced, and his rejection of the act shall be void.
Passing the point that appellant is an employer, and will not be
heard to raise constitutional objections that are good only from
the standpoint of employees (
Hatch v. Reardon,
204 U. S. 152,
204 U. S. 160;
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260,
226 U. S. 271;
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
S. 531,
232 U. S. 544;
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.
S. 571,
235 U. S. 576;
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610,
235 U. S.
621), it is sufficient to say that the criticized
provision evidently is intended to safeguard the employee from all
influences that might be exerted by the employer to bring about his
dissent from the compensation features of the act. The lawmaker no
doubt entertained the view that the act was more beneficial to
employees than the common law rules of employer's liability, and
that it was highly improbable an employee would reject the new
arrangement of his own free will. The provision is a permissible
regulation in aid of the general scheme of the act.
It is said that there is a denial of due process in that part of
the act which provides for the adjustment of the compensation where
the employer accepts its provisions. In case of disagreement
between an employer and an
Page 243 U. S. 215
injured employee, either party may notify the Industrial
Commissioner, who thereupon shall call for the formation of an
arbitration committee consisting of three persons, with himself as
chairman. The committee is to make such inquiries and
investigations as it shall deem necessary, and its report is to be
filed with the Industrial Commissioner. If a claim for review is
filed, the Commissioner, and not the committee, is to hear the
parties, may hear evidence in regard to pertinent matters, and may
revise the decision of the committee in whole or in part, or refer
the matter back to the committee for further findings of fact. And
any party in interest may present the order or decision of the
Commissioner, or the decision of an arbitration committee from
which no claim for review has been filed, to the district court of
the county in which the injury occurred, whereupon the court shall
render a decree in accordance therewith, having the same effect as
if it were rendered in a suit heard and determined by the court,
except that there shall be no appeal upon questions of fact or
where the decree is based upon an order or decision of the
Commissioner which has not been presented to the court within ten
days after the notice of the filing thereof by the Commissioner.
With respect to these provisions, the Supreme Court of Iowa held
(154 N.W. 1064):
"Appeal is provided from the decree enforcing the award on which
all save pure questions of fact may be reviewed. . . . We hold
that, though the act does not in terms provide for judicial review
except by said appeal, the statute does not take from the courts
all jurisdiction in the premises. . . . We are in no doubt that the
very structure of the law of the land, and the inherent power of
the courts, would enable them to interfere if what we have defined
to be the jurisdiction conferred upon the arbitration committee
were by it exceeded -- could inquire whether the act was being
enforced against one who had rejected it, whether
Page 243 U. S. 216
the claiming employee was an employee, whether he was injured at
all, whether his injury was one arising out of such employment,
whether it was due to intoxication of the servant, or
self-inflicted, or, acceptance being conceded, into whether an
award different from the statute schedules had been made, into
whether the award were tainted with fraud on part of the prevailing
party, or of the arbitration committee, and into whether that body
attempted judicial functions, in violation of or not granted by the
act."
Thus, it will be seen that the act prescribes the measure of
compensation and the circumstances under which it is to be made,
and establishes administrative machinery for applying the statutory
measure to the facts of each particular case; provides for a
hearing before an administrative tribunal, and for judicial review
upon all fundamental and jurisdictional questions. This disposes of
the contention that the administrative body is clothed with an
arbitrary and unbridled discretion inconsistent with a proper
conception of due process of law.
Plymouth Coal Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531,
232 U. S.
545.
Objection is made that the act dispenses with trial by jury. But
it is settled that this is not embraced in the rights secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S.
90;
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.
S. 309,
237 U. S. 340;
New York Central R. Co. v. White, ante, 243 U. S. 188.
It is elaborately argued that, aside from the Fourteenth
Amendment, the inhabitants of the State of Iowa are entitled to
this right because it was guaranteed by the Ordinance of July 13,
1787, for the government of the Northwest Territory, 1 Stat. 51, in
these terms: "The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be
entitled to the benefits of . . . the trial by jury." The argument
is rested first upon the ground that Iowa was a part of the
Northwest Territory. This is manifestly untenable, since that
territory was bounded on the west by the Mississippi river, and
Iowa was not a part of it, but of
Page 243 U. S. 217
the Louisiana Purchase. But, secondly, it is contended that the
guaranties contained in the ordinance were extended to Iowa by the
act of Congress approved June 12, 1838, establishing a territorial
government (c. 96, § 12, 5 Stat. 235, 239), and by the act for the
admission of the state into the Union. Acts of March 3, 1845,
chaps. 48 and 76, 5 Stat. 742, 789; Act of August 4, 1846, c. 82, 9
Stat. 52; Act of December 28, 1846, c. 1, 9 Stat. 117; 1 Poore,
Chart. & Const. 331, 534, 535, 551. This is easily disposed of.
The Act of 1838 was no more than a regulation of territory
belonging to the United States, subject to repeal like any such
regulation, and the act for admitting the state, so far from
perpetuating any particular institution previously established,
admitted it "on an equal footing with the original states in all
respects whatsoever." The regulation, although embracing provisions
of the ordinance declared to be unalterable unless by common
consent, had no further force in Iowa, after its admission as a
state and the adoption of a state constitution, than other acts of
Congress for the government of the territory. All were superseded
by the state constitution.
Permoli v. New
Orleans, 3 How. 589,
44 U. S. 610;
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559,
221 U. S. 567,
221 U. S.
570,;
Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 223 U. S. 390,
223 U. S. 401.
The State of Iowa therefore is as much at liberty as any other
state to abolish or limit the right of trial by jury; or to provide
for a waiver of that right, as it has done by the act under
consideration.
Section 5 is singled out for criticism as denying to employers
the equal protection of the laws. It reads:
"Where the employer and employee elect to reject the terms,
conditions and provisions of this act, the liability of the
employer shall be the same as though the employee had not rejected
the terms, conditions, and provisions thereof."
As we have shown, if the employer rejects the act, he remains
liable for personal injury sustained by an
Page 243 U. S. 218
employee arising out of and in the usual course of the
employment, and is not to escape by showing that he had exercised
reasonable care in selecting competent employees in the business,
or that the employee had assumed the risk, or that the injury was
caused by the negligence of a coemployee, or even by showing that
the plaintiff was negligent, unless such negligence was willful and
with intent to cause the injury, or was the result of intoxication
on the part of the injured party. This is the result whether the
employee, on his part, accepts or rejects the act. But where the
employee rejects it and the employer accepts it, then, by § 3b,
"the employer shall have the right to plead and rely upon any
and all defenses, including those at common law, and the rules and
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow
servant shall apply and be available to the employer as by statute
authorized unless otherwise provided in this act,"
with a proviso not material to the present point. We cannot say
that there is here an arbitrary classification within the
inhibition of the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. All employers are treated alike, and so are all
employees, and if there be some difference as between employer and
employee respecting the inducements that are held out for accepting
the compensation features of the act, it goes no further than to
say that, if neither party is willing to accept them, the
employer's liability shall not be subject to either of the several
defenses referred to. As already shown, the abolition of such
defenses is within the power of the state, and the legislation
cannot be condemned when that power has been qualifiedly exercised,
without unreasonable discrimination.
Section 42 of the act provides:
"Every employer, subject to the provisions of this act, shall
insure his liability thereunder in some corporation, association,
or organization approved by the state department of insurance.
Page 243 U. S. 219
. . . And if such employer refuses, or neglects to comply with
this section, he shall be liable in case of injury to any workman
in his employ under part one (1) of this act."
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the
Hunter case, said of
§ 42, 154 N.W. 1056: "This clearly shows that no employer is
compelled to insure unless he has accepted, and thus become subject
to, the act," proceeding, however, to discuss the case further upon
the hypothesis that all employers named in the act were compelled
to maintain insurance. In view of the construction adopted, it is
unnecessary for us to pass upon the question of compulsory
insurance in this case, appellant not having accepted the act.
Other contentions are advanced, but they are without merit and
call for no particular mention.
Decree affirmed.