Following the court below, it is
held that a law of
West Virginia,
viz., Acts 1881, c. 17, §§ 69, 71; Code
1913, c. 54, §§ 2983, 2995, in declaring that "railroads" shall be
public highways "free to all persons for the transportation of
their persons and property," embraces a branch line constructed and
operated under it, and imposes on the carrier with respect to such
line a continuing franchise obligation to
Page 242 U. S. 604
transport passenger as well as freight, and that such obligation
may be enforced by state action although the carrier has long
operated the branch in freight traffic only, and never in any
other.
The duty to provide adequate transportation facilities for the
public, which arises with the acceptance and accompanies the
enjoyment of the privileges which a railroad company receives from
a state, cannot be avoided merely upon the ground that performance
will be attended by some pecuniary loss.
In passing upon the reasonableness of a state order requiring
transportation service, the fact that a pecuniary loss will result
to the carrier is not the only circumstance to be considered; the
nature and extent of the carrier's intrastate business, its
productiveness, the character of service required, the public need
for it, and its effect upon the service already being rendered are
to be considered also.
75 W.V. 100 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a proceeding under the laws of West Virginia (Acts
1913, chap. 9, § 16) to suspend and vacate an order of the Public
Service Commission of that state, requiring the Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Company to install and maintain upon a branch line in
that state a passenger service consisting of two passenger trains
daily each way. The order was assailed on several grounds, one of
these being that it was violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. The Supreme Court of Appeals of the state
held that none of the objections was tenable, 75
Page 242 U. S. 605
W.Va. 100, and the railway company brought the case here.
Insofar as the decision turned upon questions of state law, it
is controlling, our power of review being restricted to the federal
question.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U. S. 61,
220 U. S.
75.
The order was made after a full hearing wherein the railway
company was permitted to present all the evidence which it regarded
as helpful. There was but little conflict in the evidence, and the
facts, which must here be regarded as proved, are these: the
railway company is a Virginia corporation, and owns and operates
several lines of railroad in West Virginia, including a main line
along the Kanawha River. This line consists of two tracks, one on
the north side of the river for west-bound trains and one on the
south side for trains that are east-bound. Among the stations on
the north side is one called Hawks Nest, and across the river is
another called MacDougal, the two being connected by a railroad
bridge. The main line and these stations are used for both freight
and passenger traffic. The company also owns and operates a
standard gauge branch line extending from MacDougal and Hawks Nest
to the town of Ansted, a little more than two miles, and thence
another mile to some extensively operated coal mines. This is the
branch line to which the order in question relates. Ansted has a
population of twelve hundred or more, and is the trading center for
a population of six thousand. The branch line was constructed in
1890, and has been used for freight traffic only -- that is to say,
for hauling empty cars to the coal mines and loaded cars from the
mines to the main line, and for carrying other freight between the
main line and Ansted. The railway company has a freight station at
Ansted in charge of an agent and helper, and also maintains a
telegraph service there. There is no other railroad at that place,
and the nearest passenger stations are Hawks Nest and MacDougal.
In
Page 242 U. S. 606
the year preceding the order, the number of passengers taking
the main-line passenger trains at these stations was 12,714, and of
this number 90 percent came from Ansted. In the same year, the
shipments of coal and other freight over the branch line aggregated
242,280 tons.
From an operating standpoint, there is no serious obstacle to
installing upon the branch line the service which the order
requires, but the curves and grades are such that particular
attention must be given to making the roadbed secure and to
providing suitable devices for controlling the trains. Isolatedly
considered, such a passenger service would not presently be
remunerative, but would entail a pecuniary loss, and how long this
would continue to be true can only be conjectured. But, beyond
this, the effect from a revenue standpoint of installing such a
service is not shown. It does not appear either that the company's
intrastate passenger business in that state would not yield a
reasonable return or that the traffic, freight and passenger,
passing over the branch line to and from points on the main line,
would not do so.
In support of its position that the order is essentially
unreasonable and arbitrary, and therefore repugnant to the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the railway company contends that the order requires a passenger
service to be installed and maintained upon the branch line when
that line never has been devoted to anything other than the
transportation of freight, and when the service ordered, if
separately considered, cannot be rendered without pecuniary
loss.
It well may be that the power of regulation which a state
possesses over private property devoted to public use gives no
warrant for requiring that an existing line of railroad, lawfully
devoted to a particular public use, such as carrying freight, shall
be devoted to a further public use, such as carrying passengers,
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v North Dakota, 236 U.
S. 585,
236 U. S. 595,
but, even if this
Page 242 U. S. 607
be so, it has no bearing on the validity of the order in
question.
As the opinion of the state court shows, the act whereby the
railway company was granted the right to construct and operate the
branch line did not leave the company free to devote it to freight
service only or to passenger service only, but declared that it
should be a public highway, and "free to all persons for the
transportation of their persons and property," subject to the
payment of the lawful charges for such transportation. Acts 1881,
c. 17, §§ 69, 71; Code 1913, chap. 54, §§ 2983, 2995. True, the §
containing this declaration speaks of "railroads," without
particularly mentioning branch lines, but that it embraces the
latter is shown by the state court's opinion, which says that this
branch line, when constructed,
"became an integral part of the extensive Chesapeake & Ohio
system, and must be treated and controlled as such, and not merely
as a segregated part of it."
Thus, in legal contemplation, the branch line was devoted to the
transportation of passengers as well as of freight, even though
actually used only for the latter. An obligation to use it for both
was imposed by law, and so could not be thrown off or extinguished
by any act or omission of the railway company. It follows that the
order, instead of enlarging the public purpose to which the line
was devoted, does no more than to prevent a part of that purpose
from being neglected.
One of the duties of a railroad company doing business as a
common carrier is that of providing reasonably adequate facilities
for serving the public. This duty arises out of the acceptance and
enjoyment of the powers and privileges granted by the state, and
endures so long as they are retained. It represents a part of what
the company undertakes to do in return for them, and its
performance cannot be avoided merely because it will be attended by
some pecuniary loss.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. North
Carolina Corporation Commission, 206 U. S.
1,
206 U. S. 26;
Page 242 U. S. 608
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.
S. 262,
216 U. S. 279;
Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild,
224 U. S. 510,
224 U. S. 529;
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 237 U. S. 220,
237 U. S. 229.
That there will be such a loss is, of course, a circumstance to be
considered in passing upon the reasonableness of the order, but it
is not the only one. The nature and extent of the carrier's
business, its productiveness, the character of service required,
the public need for it, and its effect upon the service already
being rendered are also to be considered. Cases
supra.
Applying these criteria to the order in question, we think it is
not shown to be unreasonable.
Judgment affirmed.