A decision of the Secretary of the Interior adjudicating a
contest over certain Choctaw and Chickasaw lands, and awarding a
patent, under the agreement in the Act of June 28, 1898, c. 517, 30
Stat. 505, and the supplemental agreement in the Act of July 1,
1902, c. 1362, 32 Stat. 641,
held free from
misconstruction or misapplication of law.
The provisions of §§ 17 and 18 of the Act of June 28, 1898,
supra, inhibiting enclosures and holdings of lands in
excess of allottable quantities, were left in force as to the
Choctaws and Chickasaws by the agreement in the 29th section which
became effective through tribal ratification on August 24,
1898.
Choctaw and Chickasaw lands held by a widow and her minor
children in excess of allottable quantities, and bearing certain
meager and nonseverable improvements, were surrendered by her in
January, 1899, for an adequate consideration, to one who took
possession, made valuable and lasting improvements and, in
December, 1902, sold, maintaining possession meanwhile.
Held:
(1) That, in virtue of these transactions, and by force of §§ 17
and 18 of the Act of June 28, 1898,
supra, the interests
of the children were so devested that an applicant for allotment
relying for priority on quitclaims of their rights in the land and
improvements, executed in November and December, 1902, could not
prevail over a prior applicant who had succeeded to the rights of
the widow's surrendered under his sale.
(2) That the failure of the children's guardian to join in the
surrender was immaterial.
Sections 19 to 21 of the Act of July 1, 1902,
supra,
allowing until September 25, 1902, within which to reduce excessive
enclosures and holdings, were not intended to permit of the revival
and reassertion of long dormant claims to the prejudice of persons
entitled to allotments who had entered into possession and made
valuable improvements.
43 Okl. 749 affirmed.
Page 242 U. S. 362
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a controversy arising out of conflicting applications
for the allotment of 420 acres of Choctaw and Chickasaw lands. The
lands were subject to allotment, and all the applicants possessed
the requisite qualifications, so it was merely a question as to who
had the better right to select the particular lands. The applicants
were minors, and are designated in the record as the Reynolds
children and the Hill children. The former were the first to apply,
and the latter instituted a contest which ultimately reached the
Secretary of the Interior. That officer sustained the claims of the
Reynolds children, and patents were issued to them. The Hill
children then brought this suit to charge the others as trustees
and to compel a conveyance. In the trial court, the plaintiffs
prevailed, but in the supreme court there was a judgment for the
defendants. 43 Okl. 749.
The chief contention of the plaintiffs is that the Secretary of
the Interior misconstrued the law applicable to the facts conceded
and proved, and that this resulted in the issue of patents to one
set of claimants when the other set was entitled to them. Under a
familiar rule, if this were true, the plaintiffs would be entitled
to the relief sought.
Ross v. Stewart, 227 U.
S. 530,
227 U. S. 535.
But was there any material misconstruction of the law by the
Secretary? We say material misconstruction because, if
Page 242 U. S. 363
his decision was otherwise right, its force was not lessened by
anything he may have said concerning what was not material at the
time.
The lands of the two tribes were being allotted in severalty
among their members under the agreement set forth in § 29 of the
Act of June 28, 1898, c. 517, 30 Stat. 505, and the supplemental
agreement embodied in the Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1362, 32 Stat.
641. These agreements defined what should be a standard allotment,
entitled each member to such an allotment, to be selected by or for
him, and permitted the selection to be so made as to include his
improvements, if any, but without exceeding a standard allotment.
When the conflicting applications therefor were made, the lands in
controversy were not wild or vacant, but improved and occupied, and
the issues in the contest all centered about the ownership of the
improvements. Both sides claimed to own them, and to have in
consequence a preferred right of selection.
The facts found by the Secretary of the Interior -- and his
findings were not without evidence to sustain them -- are as
follows: these lands were part of a much larger body, containing
12,000 or 15,000 acres, which had been enclosed and occupied by one
Campbell in his lifetime. He was a white man who had married into
the Chickasaw tribe. Of the lands so enclosed, he reduced 1,200 or
1,500 acres to cultivation and used the remainder for pasturing
livestock. His dwelling and the improvements connected therewith
were upon part of the enclosed lands, but not upon those in
controversy. He died in 1896, leaving a widow, two married
daughters, and five minor sons. A guardian for the minors was
appointed, but permitted matters to drift without any particular
control by him. The widow and minor sons continued to occupy the
home place, and she, with the guardian's assent, looked after the
cultivation and renting of the tillable fields and made some use of
the pasture land. In
Page 242 U. S. 364
January, 1899, for a consideration not challenged, she
surrendered 640 acres of the enclosed land, with the improvements
thereon, to one Blassingame. This tract embraced the lands in
controversy. At that time, the improvements on the latter consisted
of a surrounding 4-wire fence and two or three fields reduced to
cultivation, the tillable ground being regarded as an improvement.
Blassingame took possession of all the lands now in dispute,
ditched a large part of them, brought practically all under
cultivation, and erected substantial buildings thereon, the
estimated cost of this work being $2,500. He remained in possession
until December, 1902, and then sold to one Brimmage. Two or three
months later, Brimmage sold to one Reynolds, who went into
possession of all but about 80 acres, presently to be noticed, and
afterwards made application for the allotment of the lands to his
minor children, the contestees.
At no time during Blassingame's occupancy was there any serious
effort by any of the Campbells or by the guardian to dispossess
him. By a court decree, he and his family had been adjudged to be
members of the Chickasaw tribe, and were accordingly entitled to
share in the occupancy and use of the tribal lands. By a later
decree, they lost this status, but not until after the sale to
Brimmage. The status of the latter, as also that of Reynolds, was
such that either could hold whatever passed by Blassingame's
sale.
In November and December, 1902, Campbell's widow, three of his
sons who then had attained their majority, and the guardian of two
of his sons who were still minors sold and quitclaimed to one Hill
all of their rights in the lands in controversy and the
improvements thereon. Afterwards, Hill made application to have the
lands allotted to his minor children, the contestants. His status
was such that he could hold whatever he received from the
Campbells.
Page 242 U. S. 365
No improvements were added by Hill, save a short and
unsubstantial fence, and when the contest was begun, he had not
been in possession of any part of the lands save a tract of 80
acres or less. He had been in possession of it less than a year,
and had entered without leave, and in disregard of such rights as
had arisen out of Blassingame's occupancy and improvement for
nearly four years. In this way, Reynolds was prevented from taking
possession of this tract.
The members of the Campbell family all selected and received
other lands for their allotments, so none of those in dispute were
needed for that purpose.
Upon these facts, the Secretary of the Interior concluded that
the contestees, the Reynolds children, had the better claim to the
improvements, and therefore the better right to select the lands
for their allotments. In this we perceive neither any
misconstruction nor any misapplication of the law. We assume, of
course, that, upon Campbell's death in 1896, his family succeeded
to his rights in these lands -- that is, to his possessory claim
and his improvements. But, at best, the improvements were meager,
and continued occupancy was essential to sustain the possessory
claim. This was the situation when the Act of June 28, 1898,
supra, came into operation. It not only made provision for
the allotment in severalty of the tribal lands, but directed the
correction in the meantime of various practices respecting those
lands that were deemed particularly objectionable. One of these was
the practice of enclosing or holding possession of tribal lands
greatly in excess of what would be the approximate or allottable
share of the occupant and his family. By its 17th and 18th
sections, the act provided that, after the expiration of nine
months from its passage, all such enclosures or holdings should be
deemed unlawful, and that proceedings should be taken to terminate
them and to punish the offenders. The agreement set forth in the
29th section became effective
Page 242 U. S. 366
through tribal ratification on August 24, 1898 (
238 U. S. 238
U.S. 308), and superseded many provisions of the act so far as the
Choctaws and Chickasaws were concerned, but it left the 17th and
18th sections in force as to them, and made new and more elaborate
provision for allotting their lands in severalty. The enclosure or
holding of the Campbell family, embracing as it did 12,000 or
15,000 acres, came within the letter and spirit of the 17th and
18th sections, for, as was pointed out by the Secretary of the
Interior, that acreage was several times greater than the
approximate or allottable share of all the members of the family,
including the two married daughters. Thus, it was essential that a
considerable portion of the holding be surrendered, and the time
for doing this was limited. The widow was the head of the family,
and apparently its only active agent. The guardian was inactive,
and besides, under the statute, 30 Stat. 507, the widow was to have
precedence over him in selecting the lands to be allotted to the
minor children. She therefore was in a position to exercise a real
voice in determining which lands should be surrendered and which
retained. It was in these circumstances that she surrendered to
Blassingame the lands in controversy, with the meager improvements
thereon. Presumably the consideration was adequate, for no
objection on that score was made. He went into possession in
evident good faith, and there was no real effort to disturb him. He
made extensive, lasting, and valuable improvements, the ownership
of which plainly was in him. Upon no permissible theory did the
Campbells have any right to them, legal or equitable, for they were
made after the Campbell occupancy ended and at a time when its
continuance would have been unlawful. By comparison, the original
improvements made by Campbell were inconsiderable, if not entirely
negligible, and were such that they could not well be retained
after the lands were surrendered. It follows
Page 242 U. S. 367
that Reynolds succeeded to the rights of Blassingame, and that
Hill took nothing by his purchase from the Campbells, made after
Blassingame had been in possession almost four years, because they
were then without any interest in the lands or the
improvements.
But it is urged that §§ 19 to 21 of the supplemental agreement
set forth in the Act of July 1, 1902,
supra, permitted
excessive enclosures or holdings to be reduced or corrected at any
time within ninety days after its final ratification, which was on
September 25, 1902, when Blassingame had been in undisturbed
possession for considerably more than three years. Upon this point,
the Secretary of the Interior was of opinion that the agreement of
1902
"was certainly not intended to permit Indian citizens to revive
and reassert claims long dormant after others had entered into
possession of and highly improved the lands."
We concur in that view.
What we have said sufficiently covers the rulings of the
Secretary of the Interior upon the questions of law which were
material to the contest in hand. Criticism is made of some
observations in his opinion upon other questions, but they need not
be noticed here.
Judgment affirmed.